Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1993

Rewriting the Masculine: The National Subject in Modern
American Drama.
Francis Granger Babcock
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Babcock, Francis Granger, "Rewriting the Masculine: The National Subject in Modern American Drama."
(1993). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 5557.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5557

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly
to order.

U n iversity M icrofilm s International
A B ell & H ow ell Inform ation C o m p a n y
3 0 0 N orth Z e e b R o a d . A n n Arbor. Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1 3 4 6 U S A
3 1 3 /7 6 1 -4 7 0 0

8 0 0 /5 2 1 -0 6 0 0

Order Number 9405383

R ew ritin g th e m asculine: T he n ation al subject in m odern
A m erican dram a
Babcock, Francis Granger, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1993

C opyright © 1993 by B ab cock , Francis G ranger. A ll rights reserved.

300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Rewriting the Masculine:
The National Subject in Modern American Drama

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of English

by
Granger Babcock
B . A . , Hamilton College, 1981
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1985
August 1993

Dedication
Because they believed in and supported my education,
this dissertation is dedicated to my mother Gloria
Sternicki

(1932-1982) and my father Harry Babcock.

Acknowledgments
This dissertation would never have been completed
without the support and encouragement of many people.

I

would like to thank Patrick McGee for his inspiration
and labor— without him this was impossible.

I would like

to thank William Demastes for his patience and
considerable skills as an editor and as an advisor.

I

would also like to thank Anthony Barthelemy for his
support and encouragement and his talents as a reader
and Dana Nelson for reading and commenting on early
drafts. Thanks also to Mary Jane Smith for her advice oh
readings in American history. Thanks to my friends
Leslie Stratyner, Doris Macdonald, and Connie Porter,
who were always supportive. Thanks also to Kevin
Milliman, Phil Atteberry, Joanna Newman, and Patrick
McGee for financial aid in times of need.

I also owe a

special debt of gratitude to Joan Espy McGee for her
support and kindness and great food. Lastly, more recent
thanks are due to Eve Perry and Norma Jenckes.

Table of Contents

Dedication and Acknowledgments ................... ii
Table of Contents

..................................iii

Abstract .............. .............................iv
Chapter One: The Autonomy of the National
Subject: An O v e r v i e w .............................. 1
Chapter Two: Formations and Reformations of the
National Subject .......... ........................ 26
Chapter Three: Eugene O'Neill and the Liminality
of the National Subject ........................... 76
Chapter Four: Tennessee Williams and the
Instrumentality of R e a s o n ........................ 135
Chapter Five: "What's the Secret?": Willy Loman
as Desiring Machine ............................... 195
Works Cited ........................................ 243
Vita ................................................ 256

iii

Abstract
This dissertation traces the development of an American
masculinity, using the concept of the national subject
(borrowed from Frantz Fanon), through three different
stages of the American capitalism: mercantile,
market, monopoly,

or

and corporate, or late-capitalism.

It

constructs a genealogy of American maleness and then
examines how this genealogy was altered and
reconstituted during times of economic crisis and
technological innovation.

It argues that successive

technological revolutions in the symbolic apparatus of
American culture allowed elite political and economic
interests to gain consensus by deploying the national
subject using various media.

In the early national

period Franklin and Crevecoeur used the national
subject to encourage immigration and expansion;

in the

Jacksonian era, Jackson and his supporters used the
national subject to sanction Manifest Destiny; and in
the late 1880s, Andrew Carnegie and Horatio Alger, Jr.
used the national subject to valorize the practices of
industrial capitalism.

In the forties, the national

subject was resurrected to sanction the emergent
structure of corporate capitalism, or what Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno called late-capitalism.
The final three chapters of this dissertation examine
the relationship between the writings of Eugene

The final three chapters of this dissertation examine
the relationship between the writings of Eugene
O'Neill, Tennessee Williams, and Arthur Miller and the
advent of late-capitalism. Specifically,

I examine how

O'Neill, Williams, and Miller challenge the dominant
version of the national subject by offering a counter
discourse to the consumerism and nationalism advocated
by popular conceptions of American masculinity. Using
the writings of Jacques Lacan and the Frankfurt School,
I attempt to situate the drama of O'Neill, Williams,
and Miller in a broader historical context, a context
which has thus far been either ignored or repressed.

v

Chapter One
The Autonomy of the National Subject: An Overview
At 4:00 p.m. on January 13, 1982, Air Florida Flight
#90 took off from Washington's National Airport in a
snowstorm. Approximently twenty seconds later the Boeing
737 skidded across the 14th Street Bridge and crashed
into the Potomac River. Seventy-seven people died
instantly. Investigators later discovered that the plane
had not been properly de-iced. In the hours that
followed the crash, Washington and a national television
audience watched as volunteers, park rangers, and police
and firemen struggled to rescue six survivors floating
in the icy water. Five would live. The dramatic images
of Martin "Lenny" Skutnik diving into the water to save
Patricia Tirado made him an instant celebrity. The
footage of helicopter pilot Donald Usher and paramedic
Gene Windsor hovering over the water and dragging the
survivors to safety also made them instant heroes. In
the days that followed the tragedy, the Washington media
reported that the five survivors— Kelly Duncan, a flight
attendant, Joe Stiley, a business executive, Patricia
Felch, Stiley's secretary, Bert Hamilton, also a
businessman, and Patricia Tirado, who lost her husband
and child in the crash— were just "ordinary" Americans
who had miraculously survived.

1

Two

years later, on April 1, 1984, NBC aired a

"docudrama" called Flight #90; Disaster on the Potomac.
The movie starred Richard Masur and Dinah Manoff and was
advertised as a "realistic dramatization" and a "factbased account" of the Air Florida crash. According to
the producers of the show, John McGreevey's teleplay was
based on a 137-page federal report on the accident. In a
review in The Washington Post on the same day, media
critic Tom Shales called the movie "a loathsome,
ghoulish production" filled with "third-rate Hollywood
actors"

(L:7). In the same review, Shales argued that

"absolutely nothing in this pathetic recreation.. .can
equal the impact or challenge the memory of the
unforgetable news tape of the real rescue attempts and
the aftermath of the crash"

(L:7). Watching Disaster on

the Potomac that night, one couldn't help but agree with
Shales. Nothing in the movie represented my
recollections of that day in Washington; nothing in the
movie conveyed the sense of shock and loss I felt as I
watched the crash coverage on local television. A
blizzard had made travel in the city nearly impossible,
but when the Air Florida jet crashed at the beginning of
the afternoon rush hour— and a subway train crashed a
half an hour later— the city was almost paralyzed. It
took weeks for Washington to return to normal, yet
nothing in McGreevey's teleplay reflected what I

remembered about that day. Instead, what McGreevey
"challenged" my memory with was, as Shales wrote, a
script that rigorously followed the formula of "Irwin
Allen disaster films"

(L:7).

The most notable thing about this film, however, was
not its shallow exploitation of a tragic event, but
rather the way the people who made Disaster on the
Potomac turned a violent, disturbing accident into a
didactic tale using the dominant cultural
representations of masculinity. The most egregious
example of the teleplay's didacticism concerns the
character of Joe Stiley. In real life Joe Stiley was a
business executive who, by his own admission, was lucky
have survived. His actions in the water after the crash
were largely responsible for the survival of Patricia
Felch, Patricia Tirado, and Kelly Duncan; because his
injuries were the least severe of the five who survived,
he was able to move around and help others in the water
before they were rescued. In the movie version of the
crash, Stiley, played by Stephen Macht, is an exemplar
of American masculinity. The first time we see Stiley,
he is hard at work for a company that he feels takes him
for granted. At the same time, he expresses his desire
to have his own business. These scenes are used to
demonstrate that he will be "successful" because he is
industrious and competent; he is technically proficient

and does not waste time. We are shown that Stiley
possesses all the masculine qualities that will enable
him to "get ahead."
Later, as passengers begin to board Flight #90,
shots of Stiley hard at work are continually juxtaposed
with shots of "lesser" men wasting time, flirting with
flight attendants, or sleeping. As it becomes clear that
the flight will be delayed because of bad weather,
Stiley confidently and expertly explains to his
secretary the complex process of de-icing the airplane.
Specifically contrasted with Stiley's competence is the
incompetence of Patricia Tirado's husband, Jose, who is
played by Richard Beauchamp. Before take off, Jose,
consistently expresses his anxiety— in a heavy Spanish
accent— about his failure to be a man in his relations
with Patricia's family. He also expresses his doubts
about providing for his family and about the ability of
a plane to fly in a snowstorm.

("A plane can fly in this

weather?" he asks his wife.) These brief scenes make it
clear that Jose Tirado lacks the knowledge and autonomy
(he is too dependent on his wife) that make Joe Stiley
successful; and because Jose and the other men on board
Flight #90 do not conform to the essentialized type of
masculinity sanctioned by the movie,

it is much easier

for viewers to accept their deaths. That is, Disaster on
the Potomac gives the impression that Joe Stiley

survived because he is industrious and ambitious and,
therefore, deserves to survive, while Jose Tirado and
the other men on the plane deserved to die because they
did not behave like Stiley. This lesson is further
underscored in the epilogue where we learn that Stiley,
after recovering from his injuries, opens his own
business: he lives because he has what it takes to "get
ahead" in business, and because he has these qualities,
he is given a second chance.
There is nothing particularly outstanding about the
didacticism of Disaster on the Potomac. In fact, the
depiction of masculinity in the movie is a typical
example of a discourse that permeates the symbolic
practices of our culture and, as Shales vaguely
suggests, works to marginalize lived experience by
replacing it with formulas made familiar by repetition.
The construction of masculinity in Disaster on the
Potomac is only a single telling of a story that is
told, or witnessed, thousands of times daily in
conversations, magazines, books, movies, newspapers, and
on television. The formula of the narrative is so
omnipresent that, for most of us, it is completely
natural. We have seen it and heard it before, and we
will see it and hear it again. "Work hard," it says;
"You'll 'get ahead.'" The natural trajectory of the
American citizen is "moving forward" or "working up the

corporate ladder." The formula tells us that "hard work
pays off," that we have nothing to fear but our own
laziness— because that's the only thing that will "hold
us back." Its voice is other to us, and it speaks to us
and sometimes through us. It tells us, through Ronald
Reagan,

"that government should not do for men what they

can do for themselves." It tells us, through Dan Rather,
that "Ava Gardner died today. The daughter of a North
Carolina sharecropper, she rose to the height of
Hollywood fame and fortune." It tells us about Nolan
Richardson, an African-American basketball coach whose
Arkansas team is about to compete in the National
Semifinals, that "he was born into a poor family with
eleven brothers and sisters." It speaks as a frustrated
olasnost entrepreneur:

"In America they teach you to be

rich, in Russia they teach you to be poor." It says in
Reader's Digest that the "ultimate key to success is
persistence."
This "it" is the voice of the other, a fragment of a
dream first assembled during the early national period
of American history. At present,

it remains as a

simulacrum, disconnected from its historical origins,
"writ large" by the publicity apparatus of late
capitalism.1 As a body of knowledge, as ideology, it

1 For an explanation of simulacra see Jean
Baudrillard 253-81.

represents a unit of what Homi Bhabha calls "the
national pedagogy"

(i.e. the American Dream).2 As such,

it produces a universal American citizenship through the
(re)production of a national identity, or subject. It
deploys a transcendent model freed from history and the
determining structures of our culture: economic, racial,
sexual, familial. That is, an "American" is normally
thought as white, middle-class, male and heterosexual,
or as someone who possesses the values of such a person.
At the same time, the national identity, or subject,
functions, as David Lloyd writes,

"to occlude

troublesome and inassimilable manifestations of
difference by positing a transcendent realm of essential
identity"

(x).

The national identity was first consciously and
deliberately constructed by America's eighteenth-century
revolutionary elites as a strategy to gain economic
independence for the colonies. As such, the national
identity is a formation of the mercantile, or market,
stage of capitalism (in America roughly 1700-1830). The
rhetoric of the emergent nation— "America"— defined
itself against the static, class-bound monarchy of
eighteenth-century England and Europe. As the writings
of J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Thomas Jefferson
2 For details see Bhabha 291-322. Lauren Berlant
calls this discourse the "National Symbolic." See
Berlant 19-56. See also Sacvan Bercovitch 5-42.

and Benjamin Franklin demonstrate, the hero of the new
nation was the subject set free from the determining
structures of Europe.

(Their texts are discussed in

greater detail in chapter two.) This nationalist
rhetoric was an attempt to construct what Benedict
Anderson calls the Hnation-ness of the nation"

(12); it

worked not only to invent America as a nation, but also,
more importantly,

it functioned as a sort of ideological

glue to bind people together in an "imagined community"
at a time when feudal organizing structures— monarchy
and the Church— were becoming obsolete.3 From our
perspective of the late twentieth-century,

it is perhaps

too easy to dismiss the national identity as an
ideological formation or trick. Still,

in the context of

eighteenth-century America, the emergent national
identity represented desires and aspirations that were
often possible (for white males) given the structures of
an agrarian or mercantile economy. A man's labor did, in
fact, many times permit him to improve his conditions
and those of his family significantly. The desire for
self-improvement is reflected in the writings of
Crevecoeur and Jefferson who both present, as David
Robinson remarks about Crevecoeur,

"a vision of a

society of social and economic equals, made independent
through their economic dependence on the land alone yet
3 For details see Benedict Anderson 11-16

bound together in a supportive and compassionate
community"

(17). The paradigmatic national subject of

Franklin's autobiography, on the other hand, is
determined by the structures and practices of an early
urban market economy. Nevertheless, what these writers
emphasize— above all— is the autonomy of the national
subject, the ability of an "American" to use, or misuse
his labor to determine the course of his life.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the
emergence of industrial capitalism transformed the
localized agrarian and mercantile economies of the
National period. The conditions under which men lived
and worked were radically altered as a national economy
developed and as its structures became more and more
centralized and regulated.4 New technologies in
communication, navigation, transportation, and
production made it possible for large industries

(steel

for example) to increase profits and efficiency by
controlling every stage of the production process.
Because factories could now produce goods cheaper and
faster than craftsmen in small towns and villages, or
the local entreprenuer in urban areas, and because they
could distribute their products nationwide at low cost,

4 For a discussion of the effects of industrial
capitalism on American culture, see T. J. Jackson Lears
(No Place of Grace) 4-58.. See also Christopher Wilson
39-64 and Richard Ohmann 135-70.

local goods were replaced by the brand-name products of
an emergent national market. In addition, the
consumption that industrial capitalism encouraged
opposed the traditional methods of buying and selling,
or methods of barter, that people in an agrarian or pre
industrial economy understood. "Conspicuous
consumption," as Thorstein Veblen named it, disrupted
the practices of thrift, sacrifice, and saving that were
necessary for small communities or households to survive
in isolated areas as self-sufficient units. The relative
independence of these economic systems favored the
autonomous modes of production and labor used by the
small farmer and the small entreprenuer in the National
period.
The restructuring of the economy caused a crisis in
the national pedagogy because it threatened to make the
autonomy of the national subject obsolete. As the
"Taylorized" labor of the factory replaced the self
regulated labor of the farm or the small shop, and as
wage labor became a permanent fixture for millions of
lives, the autonomy of the mercantile economy
disappeared. Massive immigration and urbanization during
this period, as well as a series of depressions at the
end of the century, exacerbated competition for jobs and
further restricted male autonomy. Westward expansion, it
was argued, offered men a "safety valve" in which they

could reclaim their lost autonomy; this idea, in fact,
was the driving force behind what has come to be known
as "Jacksonian Democracy." As Emerson wrote at mid
century, "The land is wide enough, the soil has bread
for all"

(541). Significantly, Andrew Jackson emerged

during the election of 1828 as the embodiment of the
national subject. That is, like Napoleon, Jackson became
a representative man. The press often constructed
Jackson as a common man, as "one of us," as a
frontiersman who rose to the presidency. Like Napoleon,
who was perhaps the most popularized figure of the
nineteenth century,

"Old Hickory" represented the

autonomy that the common man desired, the autonomy that
was ironically beginning to vanish. Not coincidentally,
for Eugene O'Neill in A Touch of the Poet and More
Stately Mansions, the popularity of Jackson and Napoleon
becomes a cultural symptom that represents the betrayal
of the utopian values of the Revolution, a crucial point
in American history where "the ethics commerce" supplant
"the old values."
The emergence of monopoly capital in the final
decades of the century, however, produced a more serious
"legitimation crisis" for the national pedagogy.5 As
production and labor became more rationalized and
5 The term legitimation crisis is borrowed from
Jurgen Habermas. For a detailed discussion of the term
see Habermas 33-94.

segmented,

labor lost control of the workplace.

Hierarchical, or managerial, structures replaced
autonomous practices, and fewer and fewer men made the
decisions that controlled the lives of millions of
others. Machines "deskilled" labor and eliminated
thousands of jobs. For a time, labor openly rebelled
against capital, but business and the state acted to
repress strikes and "bust" unions. At the same time,
intellectuals provoked anxiety by announcing the
"closing of the frontier." America then looked outside
its borders to expand it markets. In the midst of this
crisis, as Jackson Lears, Richard Terdiman, Richard
Ohmann, and others make clear, the "consciousness
industry" was born. The spectacle of advertising gave
men a way to (re)enact the desired autonomy by
purchasing goods.

In other words, the emergence of mass

culture in the 1880s can be linked, in part, to the need
of industrialists to sell their products; in order to do
this, they used magazine and newspaper advertising to
convince people to abandon older cultural practices and
modes of consciousness. More specifically, at precisely
this moment of crisis, rags-to-riches narratives and
examples of masculine power and individualism began to
proliferate in mass circulation magazines, books, and
the penny press. However, whereas, earlier
representations of the national subject were in some

ways representative— the images of manhood that
Crevecoeur, Franklin, and Jefferson wrote about did
correspond to the opportunities available to large
numbers of white adult males in a pre-industrial
economy— representations of the national subject found
in emergent mass cultural texts were disconnected from
the historical conditions and processes that gave rise
to the national identity and the version of masculinity
vrhich it sanctioned. Capital took advantage of the
available technology ("the magazine revolution" of the
1890s) to rechannel desire for autonomy into desire for
consumption.
The core assumptions about the national subject
survived in the new mass cultural texts in a slightly
altered formula that reflected the social Darwinism of
the period. In sum, these representations constructed
social relations between men in very unproblematic,
ahistorical ways. They represented America as a unique
place where everyone had the opportunity to rise (i.e.
to become wealthy and powerful) through hard work and
industry, and that there were no constraints on selfdetermination except personal behavior and will. If a
man wanted to be successful, he would be successful, and
if he failed,

it was his own fault. Summarizing Theodore

Greene's research on magazine biographies and profiles
between the years of 1894-1903, Richard Ohmann concludes

that "The typical subject of a biography at this time is
a man (almost always) characterized above all by his
power, of thought and of will. His achievement flows
from extraordinary personal qualities and especially
from his strength and determination. He has risen from
his humble origins. The main criterion of his success is
fame"

(Ohmann 164).6 This characterization also

describes the typical trajectory of Horatio Alger's
best-selling protagonists as well as the rising self
found in popular autobiographies written by famous men
like Andrew Carnegie and Teddy Roosevelt— and of the
heroes that appeared in hundreds of cheap magazines like
Work and W i n . Pluck and Luc k , and Fame and Fortune
Weekly. (Alger and Carnegie are discussed in greater
detail in chapter two.) As John D. Rockefeller said in
1906, "No boy, howsoever lowly— the barefoot country
boy, the humble newsboy, the child of the tenant— ’need
despair....They have but to master the knack of economy,
thrift, honesty, and perseverence, and success is
theirs"

(qtd. in Rodgers 35).

This rationalization of the national subject
decontextualized it and initiated a process whereby the
national subject eventually became a simulacrum, or what
Baudrillard describes as "the generation by models of a
real without origin or reality"

(253). The advent of new

6 See Theodore Greene, especially 110-65.

media technologies in the 1920s, 30s, and 4 0s, along
with successive technical revolutions in mass
production, prepared the way for what Max Horkheimer and
Theodore Adorno first called late capitalism in the
early forties. Their research theorized a mutation in
subjectivity brought about by the structures of
industrial modernization, which produced what they
called an "administered society."
In their view, the autonomous individual had ceased
to exist; he had been "reduced to the nodal points of
conventional responses and modes of operation expected
of him"

(Horkheimer and Adorno 28). Knowledge was now

heteronomous; reason had become instrumental. What
Horkheimer and Adorno called the Culture Industry
constituted citizens as consumers and consumers as
citizens. That is, the Culture Industry, or what I call
the publicity apparatus, programmed subjectivity so that
it became an effect of the economy. As Bob Harper
insists in Tennessee Williams' The Last of Mv Solid Gold
Watches (1945), business reduced individuality to "vital
statistics." "Individual" desire was massified (Sartre's
term), so that the essence of one was the essence of
every other. In expressing his uniqueness— in the
prescribed manner, of course— a man expressed the desire
of every other. Men were thus isolated from each other
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in their (same) desire, which was organized by the
images and the othodoxies of the Culture Industry.
As Horkheimer, Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse were
aware, their discovery of late-capitalism destablized
the central myth of American culture— the autonomy of
the American male. Their discovery also revealed a
contradiction. As Marcuse suggested in 1941, masculine
desire for freedom had been turned into a repressive
instrument of control. He theorized that radical selfinterest, which had been a progressive force during
mercantile capitalism, was in the process of being
transformed into a repressive ideology by "the totality
of instruments, devices and contrivances which
characterize the machine age"

("Social Implications"

138) :
Individuality, however, has not disappeared. The
free economic subject rather has developed into the
object of large-scale organization and coordination,
and individual achievement has been transformed into
standardized efficiency. The latter is characterized
by the fact that the individual's performance is
motivated, guided and measured by standards external
to him, standards pertaining to predetermined tasks
and functions. The efficient [i.e. successful]
individual is the one whose performance is an action
only insofar as it is the proper reaction to the
objective requirements of the apparatus, and his
liberty is confined to the selection of the most
adequate means for reaching a goal which he did not
set. Whereas individual achievement is independent
of recognition and consummated in the work itself,
efficiency is a rewarded performance and consummated
only in its value for the apparatus. ("Social
Implications" 142)

Thus, according to Marcuse, "Under the impact of this
apparatus,

individualistic rationality has been

transformed into technological rationality" and "Reason
has found its resting place in the system of
standardized control, production and consumption"
("Social Implications" 141, 146).
Significantly, at approximently the same time the
Frankfurt School was rewriting Freud's theory of
introjection to reflect the new subjectivity (or what
they called instrumental reason or technological
rationality), Jacques Lacan was rewriting Freud's theory
of primary narcissism to account for the same cultural
transformation. By introducing the concept of the mirror
stage at the fourteenth International Psychoanalytical
Congress at Marienbad in 1936, Lacan disclosed a
structure of self-alienation similar to the structure of
self-alienation inherent in the Frankfurt School's
conceptualization of instrumental reason. According to
Lacan (I am quoting from his 1949 essay on the mirror
stage, which is a revision of the earlier paper),
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation— and
which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the
lure of spatial identification, the succession of
phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image
to a form of its totality that I shall call
orthopaedic— and, lastly, to the assumption of the
armour of an alienating identity, which will mark
with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental
development. (Ecrits 4)

Lacan adds that this development in the life of the
subject is "experienced as a temporal dialectic that
decisively projects the formation of the individual into
history"

fEcrits 4). In other words, and I will have

more to say about this in chapter three, the infant's
identification with the "specular image" of his (m)other
is a misrecognition, or what Lacan calls meconnaissance.
which grants to the child a unity or coherence that the
child does not yet possess. The structure of this
primary relationship presents the child with the
"illusion of autonomy," given from the outside, that is
the "source of all secondary identifications"

(Ecrits 6,

2). The self-alientating structure of the mirror stage
propels the subject into history, or human knowledge. As
Jane Gallop comments,

"The mirror stage is a turning

point. After it, the subject's relation to himself is
always mediated through a totalizing image that has come
from outside"

(79).

The Frankfurt School's theorization of instrumental
reason and Lacan's development of the mirror stage are
partially determined by the crises of the thirties and
forties— American technocracy and consumerism, on the
one hand, and Nazism on the other. Both apparatuses
deployed technologies that mediated subjectivity from
the outside in order to produce consensus and conformity
through misidentification. Significantly, the same

recognition of the subject as a social construction
takes place in the plays of Eugene O'Neill, Tennessee
Williams, and Arthur Miller. Up to now, however, it has
gone unnoticed because (first) a narrow formalism has
dominated American dramatic criticism and (second) the
field has been neglected and therefore has not undergone
the same critical revisions that have taken place in the
study of other genres. All this, hopefully, is changing.
In his important book Communists. Cowboys, and
Queers; The Politics of Masculinity in the Work of
Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams (1992), David
Savran writes,
In questioning the popular images of these two
playwrights, this book is designed, in part, as an
answer to the double-dealings, recriminations,
obfuscations, and amnesia that seem to have
afflicted so many writers and critics at the height
of the Cold War and that, deplorably, remain
widespread in highly visible portions of the
theatrical and intellectual communities. This book
represents my critique both of the formalism of the
1950s and of its continued domination of much of the
scholarship of Miller and Williams. (6)
Like Savran, I consider my work a response to the
formalism that has dominated the field, especially as it
has affected the reception of the plays by Arthur
Miller, Tennessee Williams, and Eugene O'Neill discussed
in this dissertation. As a critique of these practices,
my project argues that to decontextualize Death of a
Salesman. The Glass Menagerie. A Touch of the Poe t , or
More Stately Mansions with a universalizing gesture is

to miss something fundamental about their construction
as drama and as text; and it is also to miss something
fundamental about the historical moment of their
creation.
All three playwrights, as Savran remarks about
Miller and Williams, focus our attention on the
hegemonic construction of masculinity during the
emergence of late-capitalism in order to expose the
contradictions inherent in that construction. As George
Lipsitz's research has shown, the economic policy of the
United States government during World War II helped an
emerging corporate structure consolidate its power by
subventing "the greatest capital expansion in American
history"

(Class

4). Lipsitz concludes that this

transformation "permanently altered economic and
political power relations within American society, and
produced a totalitarian oligarchy of the. major interest
groups"

(Class 2).7 As in the 1890s, the national

pedagogy was again deployed to sanction the emergent
social relations. Specifically,

if economic expansion

were to continue, the conversion to a peace-time economy
involved keeping consumption at its high war-time
levels. This was partially accomplished by the expansion
into foreign markets that the rebuilding of Japan and

7 See Lipsitz, especially chapter one of Class
Culture in Cold War America.

and

the Marshall Plan made possible. Consumption at home,
however, also had to be refocused as individual
consumption, which had been disrupted by the
dislocations of the Depression and 'World War II. The
technologies of cinema and television were therefore
deployed to rechannel male desire; and as in the 1890s,
the anxiety produced by the (further) decline of
masculine autonomy was displaced onto consumption by
using residual images of masculinity to erase the
historical transformations then taking place. The
subject was thus restored to fullness by engaging in
programmed consumption.
The plays of O'Neill, Williams, and Miller written
during this period contest new subject-formation in
American culture by exposing the national subject as an
ideological illusion or as an effect of the economy.
Their critique of the standardized modes of masculinity
advocated by the publicity apparatus amounts to a
cultural inversion; they turn the standardized model
inside out and reveal an automaton at the heart of
autonomy.
Specifically,

in A Touch of the Poet (1943) and More

Stately Mansions (1939), Eugene O'Neill discloses the
national subject as predetermined, as subject to and
subjugated by the twin evils of consumerism (what
O'Neill calls materialism) and nationalism. Neither
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consumerism nor nationalism is able to provide the
masculine subject with meaning; both are bestowed upon
the subject by a mediating other which Homi Bhabha calls
the national pedagogy. As a result, the subject
mistakenly masters himself— gains what O'Neill calls
self-sufficiency— by dispossessing himself, by embracing
an ideological mirage. Like Lacan, O'Neill had read
Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), and like
Lacan, O'Neill rewrote Freud's work to reflect his
understanding of human subjectivity. O'Neill's
reconstruction of Freud, as we shall see in chapter
three, is remarkably similar to Lacan's in that both
rewritings point to the historical mutation of the
subject I have been describing.
Williams' and Miller's rewritings of the subject are
more closely related to the Frankfurt School's ideas
concerning instrumental reason. Both authors attempt to
document the dislocations of late-capitalism through the
examples of paradigmatic male characters. In The Last of
Mv Solid Gold Watches (1945) and The Glass Menagerie
(1945), Tennessee Williams represents the normative
desires of American masculinity as predetermined and
destructive. Jim O'Connor's desire to express his
"uniqueness" is what makes him "ordinary"; in other
words, O'Connor's uniqueness is expressed as the
heteronomous knowledge of the apparatus, which makes him

no different than any other (American) man who
identifies with the metanarrative of national identity.
His reason— "Knowledge— Zzzzp! Money— Zzzzzzp!— Power!
That's the cycle democracy is built on!"

(100)— can thus

be viewed as the utter banality of programmed
conformity. Williams opposes the normative model of
subjectivity by, as David Savran points out,
"celebrating various subjugated masculinities"

(81). In

The Glass Menagerie, for instance, Williams uses the
artistic values, or what Marcuse called autonomy of
reason, of Tom Wingfield to resist the instrumental
reason represented by O'Connor. But this resistance is
incomplete since, in the end, Wingfield (and Williams)
cannot restructure what is.
The debate surrounding the tragic stature of Death
of a Salesman (1949) has diminished the radicalness of
Arthur Miller's play. As I suggest in chapter five, most
criticism of the play focuses too narrowly on the
individuated character traits of Willy Loman and the
attendant issue of tragic stature. As Kenneth Tynan
wrote in 1967, "Death of a Salesman... is not
tragedy....What ultimately destroys Willy is economic
injustice, which is curable, as the ills that plague
Oedipus are not"

(67). Tynan's assessment is

representative and from his perspective it is certainly
accurate; that is, economic injustice is (or should be)

curable, but the fate that structures Oedipus' life is
not. Tynan's judgement, however, when viewed from a
different perspective,

ignores the fact that Miller has

rewritten the classical, or Aristotelian, structure of
fate to reflect the economic reality of postwar America.
For Willy, the economy, or apparatus, is his fate; it
structures his life from without, and he is completely
unaware of its processes, much like Oedipus is
completely unaware of the forces that influence his
life. Or, to put this another way, as Horkheimer and
Adorno suggest in 1944, "The actual working conditions
in society compel conformism--not the conscious
influences which also made the suppressed men dumb and
separated them from truth. The impotence of the worker
is not merely a stratagem of the rulers, but the logical
consequence of the industrial society into which the
ancient Fate— in the very course of the effort to escape
it— has finally changed"

(37) .

My purpose here is not to redeem Death of a Salesman
as tragedy— -that would be (is) irrelevant— but rather to
call attention to Miller's historically specific
rewriting of the subject, which has, to this point, been
either ignored or repressed. Willy Loman, as I argue in
chapter five, represents the death of the subject; he
is, like his precursor Jim O'Connor, a product of the
initial stages of late-capitalism and, as such, he too

is other to himself having been transformed by the
ghostly Other of the Culture Industry.

Chapter Two
Formations and Reformations of the National Subject
I.
Stage One:
From Political Economy to Market Capitalism
Narratives praising the industry and autonomy of the
American farmer and small entrepreneur became widespread
as America's Revolutionary leaders rhetorically
distanced the colonies from England in preparation for
war. Franklin and Jefferson, the architects of The
Declaration of Independence, believed that the
independence of the colonies depended upon population
growth and territorial expansion, so, in an effort to
promote American independence, they constructed a
trajectory of American citizenship that encouraged
immigration.1 Not surprisingly, representations of the
small farmer managing his farm and the small
entrepreneur operating his shop began to appear
frequently in publications on both sides of the
Atlantic. Before the Revolution, these types of
representations of American life began to dominate the
print culture of the colonies and then became part of an

1 See Benjamin Franklin's essay "Observation
Concerning the Increase of Mankind" (Writings) 367-374.
For a detailed discussion of the migration of Scottish
and English citizens to America in the years immediately
preceding the Revolution, see Bernard Bailyn, especially
126-203.
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emergent "Republican ideology" as the colonies became a
new nation. According to these representations, America
was a unique place: a country with a new social order
and unlimited opportunities for the white male who was
willing to work hard and save his money. Within a few
years after setting foot in America, the emigrant,
having labored hard for other men and saved his money,
would be able to buy land and start his own farm; and,
in time, if he was frugal and prudent, he would be able
to buy more land and have other men work for him. If he
was truly industrious, he could even rent his land to
other men. In America, the story went, a man could start
with nothing and end up with everything: wealth,
property, and political power.
The political documents that created the United
States also helped to promote this version of America.
In The Declaration, individual self-determination was
linked to the independence of the colonies; and in "The
Bill of Rights," the "pursuit of happiness" set forth in
The Declaration was legalized when the authors
guaranteed (on paper at least) individual rights and
personal liberty. In America, citizens would no longer
be subject to the arbitrary rule of a foreign power, nor
would they be subjected to the rigid class structures of
eighteenth-century Europe, which made it almost
impossible for a man to rise above the station into

which he was born. America, these texts suggested,
provided the social and political conditions that
guaranteed social mobility and individual success.
During this stage of American capital, the trajectory of
the national subject has its most typical articulation
in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, J. Hector St. John
de Crevecoeur, and Benjamin Franklin.
If the "American experiment" was to succeed,
Jefferson, Crevecoeur, and Franklin insisted that a
specific type of masculine citizenship was necessary.
Specifically, they argued that America offered unlimited
opportunities because it was essentially an open,
agrarian society; they also believed that because
America had a vast frontier into which its population
could expand, the new nation would not suffer from the
overcrowding and the economic crises that plagued
European countries.2 Jefferson,

for instance, in his

first inaugural address, spoke of a "rising nation,
spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the
seas with the rich production of their industry, engaged
in commerce with nations who feel power and forget
right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach
of mortal eye" (492) . The optimism of Jefferson's speech
was supported by his belief that individual and national

2 For a detailed discussion of these matters see
Drew R. McCoy, especially 13-104.

progress could be maintained indefinitely if the economy
of the United States remained predominantly agrarian. He
was convinced that individual males engaged in the
practice of farming were autonomous and independent, and
that their autonomous labor would keep the nation free
from the class turmoil he associated with Europe. As he
suggests in Notes on the State of Virginia. "Corruption
of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phaenomenon of
which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is
the mark set on those, who not looking up to heaven, to
their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for
their subsistence, depend on the casualties and caprice
of customers. Dependence begets subservience and
venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares
fit tools for the designs of ambition"

(290-91).

Jefferson's belief in the virtues of husbandry is
typical of the political economy of the eighteenth
century. Its American manifestation, as Drew McCoy
notes, was typical of "classical republicanism," which,
McCoy argues, Jefferson was trying to "reconcile...with
more modern social realities"

(10). According to McCoy,

"In its purest form, classical republicanism stipulated
that republics had to be rather rude, simple, precommerical societies free from any taint of luxury or
corruption. The essence of corruption was the
encroachment of power on liberty, an insidious process

most likety to occur in advanced, stratified societies
where great wealth and inequality promoted avaricious
behavior and dangerous dependencies among men"

(67). The

way to retard this eventuality, in Jefferson's mind, was
to make all American men property owners, so that they
would, as Voltaire put it in Candide, mind their own
gardens and remain independent of commerce and the
vagaries of a full-blown market economy. In other words,
their labor managing their farms would make men
productive and self-sufficient and therefore autonomous.
Manufacturing jobs, on the other hand, would make them
dependent on the ups and downs of the market or the
practices of unscrupulous men.
Crevecoeur's Letters from an American Farmer (1782)
provides a more concrete description of the husbandry of
the period. The centerpiece of this book— "Letter III"—
asks in its title,

"What is an American?" and Crevecoeur

answers the question by essentializing male identity.
The letter begins with the stereotypical claim that
America was an asylum for men "who, when convulsed by
factions, afflicted by a variety of miseries and wants,
restless and impatient, took refuge here"

(66). What

made America so attractive to the dispossessed of Europe
was that the new country did not yet possess a
stratified social structure:

"It is not composed, as in

Europe, of great lords who possess everything and of a

herd of people who have nothing. Here are no
aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no
bishops, no ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power
giving to a few a very visible one” (67). What America
possessed,

instead, writes Crevecoeur, was ”a pleasing

uniformity of decent competence” (67) and opportunity:
"new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system"
(69). In America, the dispossed "become men" because
"they receive ample rewards for their labours; these
accumulated rewards procure them lands; those lands
confer on them the title of freemen, and to that title
every benefit is affixed which men can possibly require"
(69). According to Crevecoeur, the opportunity that
America provided— autonomy through industry— was within
the grasp of every man if he was "sober and
industrious." If he "embraced" these "new principles"
and threw off the poverty and idleness of Europe, then
he would succeed and in doing so become an American; but
if he failed to achieve even an "easy, decent
maintenance by his industry"

(81), he had no one to

blame but himself since, unlike Europe, "[t]here is room
for everybody in America"

(81).3 To illustrate the

3 The complete passage from Crevecoeur's text reads
"He [the immigrant] does not find, as in Europe, a
crowded society where everyplace is overstocked; he does
not feel the perpetual collision of parties, that
difficulty of beginning, that contention which oversets
so many. There is room for everybody in America; has he
any particular talent or industry? He exerts it in order

efficacy of these new principles in a more concrete
form, Crevecoeur provides us with the "the short history
of a simple Scotchman," Andrew the Hebridean. Andrew's
story, as Crevecoeur tells it, does not contain "a
single remarkable event to amaze the reader" but is
included in the book to "delineate the progressive steps
of a poor man, advancing from indigence to ease, from
oppression to freedom, from obscurity and contumely to
some degree of consequence— not by virtue of any freaks
or fortune, but by the gradual operation of sobriety,
honesty, and emigration"

(90). Andrew's story precisely

follows the elements of the universal American narrative
that Crevecoeur constructs in the previous pages of the
letter: he lands on the new continent a penniless exile,
but through his hard work, honesty, and moderation,
Andrew becomes an American:

"a freeholder, possessed of

a vote, of a place of residence, a citizen of the
province of Pennsylvania"

(102). Andrew's history—

because Crevecoeur suggests that it is not remarkable
but representative— becomes the history of a new race of

to procure a livelihood, and it succeeds. Is he a
merchant? The avenues of trade are infinite. Is he
eminent in any respect? He will be employed and
respected. Does he love a country life? Pleasant farms
present themselves; he may purchase what he wants and
thereby become an American farmer. Is he a labourer,
sober and industrious? He need not go many miles nor
receive many informations before he will be hired, well
fed at the table of his employer, and paid four or five
times more than he can get in Europe" (81).
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men called Americans. The narrative functions to
universalize Andrew's experience as the experience or
personal history of all Americans, and because the
letter has the force of a moral exemplar, it sanctions a
specific kind of behavior or competence.4 Crevecouer's
letter also functions to exclude or marginalize what he
calls "freaks or fortune"— social or economic barriers
that prevent(ed)

immigrants from achieving the

sanctioned life he describes.5
Franklin's Autobiography (1791), as Leo Lemay points
out, "is the only enduring best-seller written in
America before the nineteenth century"

(xiii). Lemay and

Zall note that "[n]o other classic of English or
American literature has served as a model for the lives

4 For a discusion of de Crevecoeur's utopian vision
see David M. Robinson 17-31.
5 This was the beginning of the process whereby
participation in the national pedagogy was at once
symbolically extended to all people but granted only to
those Americans who fit the essentialized version of
national identity: white, male, non-Irish immigrants
from Northern Europe. A contemporary reader of
Crevecoeur's letter would have had a very different
response from a present-day reader. In Crevcoeur's time,
it was assumed that the subordinated classes— women, the
Irish, and slaves— were non-persons and therefore not
citizens. An uncritical, present-day reader, however,
will have a slightly different response. S/he will
assume that all Americans have the same opportunity to
succeed and that failure to do so is an individual
problem, thereby ignoring the lived experiences of race,
class, sexuality, and gender.

of so many people"

(xiii).6 More important, however,

Lemay and Zall argue that the Autobiography offers "the
definitive formulation of the American
Dream.... expressed by the standard cliche, the rise from
rags to riches"

(350). During the height of its

popularity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the Autobiography was read in Europe as a
"true" account of American life. Because Franklin
anticipated this reading, the story that he tells shows
a representative American and the social and political
conditions that produced him; it tells the story of a
new man in a new land, a land where the Individual has
the right to determine his own history. As a exemplar of
the national subject, the persona that Franklin creates
stresses many of the same values as Crevecoeur; he too
suggests that America has a revolutionary social order
that guarantees individual autonomy and wealth; he too
traces the progress of an immigrant (in this case, an
immigrant's son) from "rags to riches," and he also
asserts that the paradigmatic American possesses
specific qualities that make him "successful."
Franklin intended his Autobiography as a model for
young males to help them acquire "some degree of wealth,
power, and reputation"

(1). On the first page, for

6 See Lemay and Zall's introduction to Beniamin
Franklin's Autobiography.

example, he writes,

"Having emerg'd from the Poverty and

Obscurity in which I was born and bred, to a State of
Affluence and some Degree of Reputation in the World and
having gone so far throf Life with a considerable Share
of Felicity, the conducting Means I made use of, which,
with the Blessing of God, so well succeeded, my
Posterity may like to know, as they may find some of
them suitable to their own Situations, and therefore fit
to be imitated"

(1) . The "conducting Means" turn out to

be a repetition of the qualities that Crevecoeur's
American possessed, except that they are articulated in
a more formal, extended manner in the Autobiography. The
famous thirteen "Virtues," which appear in part two of
the book, are intented to give the reader a guide to
follow in order to "acquire the Habitude of all these
Virtues"

(68). The reader should not, warns Franklin,

attempt to acquire all the virtues at once, but he
should rather attempt to acquire them one at a time
since "one being acquired, would keep [him] firm in
[his] Endeavors to obtain all the subsequent virtues"
(68). The accomplishment of "Frugality and Industry." he
insisted,

"by freeing me from my remaining Debt, and

producing Affluence and Independence, would make more
easy the Practice of Sincerity and Justice, etc. etc"
(68). Daily examination, of course, was necessary, and
in order to make this task more easy, Franklin created a

schedule to chart his (our) progress. The motivation
behind the habitude was to provide readers with a way to
create affluence and independence by practicing the
11■
v irtues” associated with the labor of a entrepreneur,
which, as we know, Franklin was.
The advice that Franklin offers to his readers is
not done for purely altruistic reasons, however. Like
Jefferson, Franklin believed that for the United States
to become politically independent the country had to
become economically independent. To gain acceptance for
his viewpoint, Franklin constructed a narrative that
encouraged the labor and economic practices that would
make independence easier to accomplish.
Like Jefferson, Franklin linked the autonomy of the
individual to the independence of the nation. The
philosophy of individualism espoused in the
Autobiography— represented by the social practices of
industry, sacrifice, and diligence— was inextricably
linked to the progress of the United States of America.
By symbolically making the autonomy of the national
subject the essential ingredient of American
citizenship, and the economic progress that
automatically accompanied that citizenship if certain
modes of conduct were followed, Franklin helped to
publicize the conceptual framework whereby the national
identity worked, as David Lloyd remarks in a different
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context,

"to occlude troublesome and inassimilable

manifestations of difference [e.g. slavery] by positing
a transcendent realm of essential identity"

(x). In

addition, Franklin's vision of social relations in the
new Republic suggested that competition between men was
not only normal but also necessary, and that those
wishing to succeed as entrepreneurs should be prepared
to seize any opportunity to get ahead.

(As we shall see

in chapter five, this is part of Franklin's legacy that
Arthur Miller is acutely aware of.) Evidence of this
belief is illustrated by Franklin's willingness to bribe
delivery riders in order to get his paper distributed.
Further, the "competitive spirit" and desire for
self-improvement that Franklin exemplifies in the
Autobiography represents "the manners and situation of a
rising people." and as Benjamin Vaughan points out in a
letter to Franklin included at the beginning of part
two, "It will moreover present a table of the internal
circumstances of your country, which will very much tend
to invite it to settlers of virtuous and manly
minds....I do not know of a more efficacious
advertisement than your Biography would give"

(59;

italics original).7

7 For a early discussion of Franklin's
Autobiography as it relates to the historical processes
at work in modern European civilization, see Max Weber
47-78.

What needs to be emphasized here is that the
political philosophy of Jefferson, Crevecoeur, and
Franklin represents the political economy of the period.
Their representations of social relations in early
America are also part of an emergent nationalism, which
American historians identify as "republicanism .118 Like
Drew McCoy, Joyce Appleby uses republicanism to
conceptualize the dominant cultural and political
practices of pre-Civil War America. In the historical
period under discussion— the national period (roughly
1780-1840)— the political ideology of republicanism
constructed American society as essentially classless
and asserted that the best way to keep America free from
the corruption of stratified wealth was through the
independent labor of free men. It was argued that selfinterest based on property ownership created a community
with shared values, in which equivalence of status (i.e
property ownership)

insured social harmony. As Appleby

points out, to the theorists of political economy,
property did not possess exchange value but rather
social value. Ownership, that is, was an expression of
community and not of individual desires or needs.
According to Appleby, "Commerce which prompted private
8 For a historical discussion of American
republicanism, see Joyce Appleby 461-73 and (The
Republican Vision of the 1790s) 1-78. See also Linda
Kerber 474-95 and Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf 496-531.
In addition, see Robert Shalhope 49-80 and 334-56.

interests...threatened civil order," and therefore "Men
deeply involved in their own business, in getting ahead,
and seizing opportunities for [private] gain were not
proper candidates for public office"

[Vision 9). Nor

were they proper citizens. In addition, Appleby notes,
that the ideas which we tend to associate with
industrial capitalism— "free enterprise and greater
productivity"— "did not inspire confidence, but rather
provoked anxiety"

(9).

By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a
market economy had emerged in America. According to
Lawrence Kohl,
In the half-century since the Revolution the
population of the country had nearly quadrupled. The
nation's boundaries had been pushed southward to the
Gulf of Mexico and westward to the foothills of the
Rockies. Industrialism took root in the Northeast,
while America's burgeoning population poured over
the Appalachains in search of fertile land. These
pioneers, however, did not remain isolated in the
west for long. A transportation revolution linked
them by way of roads, canals, and, later, railroads
to the east and ultimately to markets abroad.
Economic enterprise throughout the nation was
stimulated by legal changes which enhanced the
opportunities of the risk-taker in the economy.
State banks proliferated, offering easy credit to
those willing to expand their operations.
Storekeepers became merchants, craftsman became
capitalists. Even simple farmers were caught in the
restless pursuit of wealth. Enticed by new
opportunities, they increasingly turned from a
household economy of self-sufficiency and barter to
production for the market and the cash nexus. High
geographic mobility became inextricably linked with
the desire for social mobility. The idea of the
self-made man emerged as individuals scrambled to
improve their situation in life. (4)

The "civic values" associated with the husbandry of the
political economy were replaced by the values of
commerce and "the common man." Significantly, the
national subject was stripped of its more communal
responsibilites as the concept of self-interest came to
signify the private interests of the individual.
Outsider texts— Tocqueville's Democracy in America
(1835) and Harriet Martineau's Society in America
(1840), for example— record this shift by organizing
themselves around the concept of democracy.
As Robert Remini points out, "By 1837 the word
democracy had largely supplanted the term republicanism
in the national discourse"

(8; italics removed).

According to Remini, this "substitution occurred because
[Andrew] Jackson and company...deliberately worked to
bring about that substitution"

(8) .

Jackson was president from 1829 to 1837. During that
time, he embodied the national subject. Like Franklin
before him and Lincoln after, Jackson literally
represented the rags to riches trajectory of the
national subject. Born into "humble circumstances," he
eventually gained wealth and status. Popular
representations of Jackson, however, differ in one very
significant way from Franklin's self-representation in
the Autobiography. Jackson was figured primarily as a
frontiersman and Indian fighter— and not as an

entrepreneur— because he became a national figure at a
time when the expansionist policies of the United States
dominated national politics. At this historical
juncture, then, the practices associated with the small
entrepreneur and the small farmer were merged with the
figure of the frontiersman, who came to stand for the
(reconstituted) national subject.
The ideology of Jacksonian democracy is a radical
reformulation and reinterpretation of the republicanism
of the revolutionary fathers. That is, it pushed the
earlier ideology to its limits by extending the role of
the "people," by inviting them to participate in (all)
the institutions of the state. Jackson declared the
people "sovereign" and attempted to eliminate all
vestiges of aristocracy in order to promote the
interests of commerce and the common man. Jackson's
supporters in the political intellegensia and the
national press began to associate democracy with
individual autonomy and the expansion of the nation. As
this happened, Jackson's status as a frontiersman and as
an Indian fighter were fused with older conceptions of
enterprenurial and agrarian capital.9 (This is the
formative moment of a syndesis that I will discuss in
9 For an excellent discussion of America's
nationalist discourse during this period see Wai-chee
Dimock 9-21. See also Joyce Warren 1-19. For a related
discussion of the link between nationalism and racism
see Richard Drinnon 219-349.

greater detail in chapter five.) At the same moment, the
republican notions of disinterested virtue and civic
responsiblity as the "hallmarks" of citizenship were
sheared from the new politics of self-improvement and
radical self-interest. This was accomplished, at least
partially, through the governing practices of Jackson
and his supports, who, for the first time in the
nation's history, appealed to the masses by promoting
the doctrine of the right of instruction (a strict
adherence to majority rule) and rotation ("the spoils
system"), as well as appealing directly to the common
man for support in legislative and political battles.
The Jacksonians' political agenda reflected their
profound suspicion of aristocratic forms, or what they
viewed as republican elitism— basically, anything that
inhibited social mobility or the individual white male's
ability to produce wealth and status. As Remini notes,
this is a strong misreading on the Jacksonians part
because Jefferson and the other founding republicans,
especially Madison and Adams, never intended for the
majority to rule since "majority rule...could jeopardize
the personal and property rights of the minority"

(24)

Furthermore, "the Founding Fathers were not attempting
to eliminate aristocratic government. They believed in a

mixed government with elements of aristocratic,
republican, and democratic forms embedded in the whole"
(25) .
Jackson's administration, as Kohl notes, managed to
"anticipate" the spirit of the age (6), The excessive
autonomy that it promoted, and its vehement distrust of
political and cultural forms that hindered the progress
of white males, were the result of the nascent
industrialization of rural and urban communities during
the period, which initially contributed to the
geographic and economic mobility of thousands of
Americans. Until the 1880s in America, as James O'Connor
points out, "individualism in the sense of both economic
and social integration found greater material expression
than in any other country" because "free land, cheap
resources, favorable climates, and independent property
inhibited the hegemony of large-scale capital"

(17).

Nevertheless, the Jacksonians' obsessive concern with
autonomy can also be read as a reaction to the initial
centralizing movement of modernization, especially their
opposition to a central bank and to large-scale finance
capital. Democrats were suspicious of the new lending
practices of large banks because they felt that these
practices would enslave the commom man by making him
dependent on the whims of opportunistic bank owners, who
were anxious to make easy money (i.e. wealth without

labor or industry) by lending to poor men. Resistance to
the early centralization of the economy produced
representations of victimization of the small man. In
the process, Jackson the Frontiersman came to embody the
desires of the common man; and the economic practices
and values that he sanctioned— -private accumulation
driven by personal industry and labor and their ability
to produce individual wealth and economic growth— were
organically linked to a market economy. Therefore, the
frontiersman and the values that he represented marked a
slight reformulation (a minor adjustment compliments of
a market economy) of the national subject, which had
previously been embodied by Crevecoeur's farmer and
Franklin's entrepreuneur.
What should be emphasized about all three models of
the national subject (the farmer, the entrepreneur, and
the frontiersman), however,

is their similarity. First,

all three represent the autonomy through industry
trajectory of American citizenship. Second, all three
are essentially mimetic. That is, their sanctioned
behavior is generated by economic structures specific to
the historical period in which they arose. In other
words, the autonomy represented by the farmer, the
entreprenuer, and the frontiersman closely corresponded
to the actual structures of economic life in eighteenthand early nineteeth-century America; and, as I argue

below, these representations were far more "accurate"
than the rationalized discourse of self-determination
that emerged with the advent of monopoly capital. This
is not to suggest, however, that every white male in
early nineteenth-century America had the opportunity for
economic self-determination. That claim would be untrue.

II.
Stage Two:
Monopoly Capital and the Transformation of Memory
In his study of the American working class between
the years of 18 65 and 1920, Melvyn Dubofsky speculates
as to why "workers continued to come to the United
States from Europe and why they continued to move from
the country to the city" given "the prevalence of
poverty, the recurrence of economic depression, the
drabness of working-class neighborhoods,

[and] the

severe shock by preindustrial peoples adjusting to
industrial society"

(28) Dubofsky also wonders, given

these social conditions,
an event"

"why rebellion appeared so rare

(28). As he asserts in Industrialism and the

American Worker (1975), the years between the Civil War
and the end of World War I were unprecedented in terms
of their economic instability and social conflict.
During this period, the United States evolved from a
largely agrarian nation of small communities and towns
into a modernized urban and industrial society. This

transformation, as Ernest Mandel argues, was the result
of three successive "technological revolutions" in the
mode of production, transformations that delineate the
second stage of capitalism, what Mandel and others call
"monopoly" or "industrial" capitalism:

" [one]

craftsworker-operated (and craftsworker-produced)
machines driven by steam engine;

[two] machinist-

operated (and industrially produced) machines driven by
steam motors;

[three] assembly line combined machines

tended by semiskilled machine operators and driven by
electric motors"

(43). These successive changes in the

mode of production, Mandel notes,
"presuppose...different types of labor organization. The
transition from one to another has historically involved
serious working-class resistence...because it implies
serious deteriorations in working conditions, not
necessarily linked to a lowering of real wages or to an
increase in the physical work load, but felt and
understood by a signifcant part of production workers as
a deterioration in overall labor conditions"

(43). The

deterioration of overall labor conditions associated
with these technological advances was (is) most often
experienced by workers as a loss of autonomy— an
alienation of their labor and a loss of control over the

conditions of their labor; it was also experienced as a
loss of control over the general conditions of their
lives.
The emergence of industrial capitalism radically
altered social relations in America. The autonomy of
"island communities," as Robert H. Wiebe calls the
isolated, self-sufficient cities and small towns of
preindustrial America, disappeared as the economy was
industrialized and consolidated.10 As this happened,
there was an attendant loss of individual autonomy; the
workplace was reorganized and this reorganization
displaced traditional skills and forms of workercontrolled labor. Traditional labor practices were
further displaced as capital "rationalized" the
production process. Horizontal and verticle integration
of business were introduced and new administrative,
scientific, and technological practices were deployed to
ensure that owners had complete control of machinery,
labor, production, and distribution so as to "maximize"
profits by ensuring a smooth flow of goods for
consumption. By the 1890s, as Alan Trachtenberg notes,
"the corporate office virtually dominated the work
place, imposing demands for speed, regularity, and

10 In addition to Robert Wiebe, see Nell Painter,
Alan Trachtenberg, Jackson Lears (No Place of Grace) 458, and Warren Susman 237-85. See also Glenn Porter,
David Noble, Leo Marx, and John Higham 73-102.

quotas of output. As a result, human effort fell more
and more into mechanical categories, as if the laborer
might also be conceived as an interchangeable part"
(56). As this took place, a hierarchy emerged in the
workplace that increasingly subjected workers to the
dictates and "expertise" of a growing managerial class,
which became responsible for work-related decisions and
the daily operations of larger factories and
corporations. This new class of managers and their
practices, collectively known as "scientific
management," radically segmented the labor process and
deskilled large numbers of workers so that a new class
of capitalists, such as Andrew Carnegie and John D.
Rockefeller, could control "the new system."
The new modes of work were at odds with the dominant
labor practices of antebellum America. In the early
nineteenth century, as David Montgomery shows, it was
common for workers to practice a "mutualistic ethic."
Workers often asserted collective control over the
workplace by determining "their own conduct" and working
hours, and, as Montgomery points out, "these rules were
not negiotiated with the employers, but were
unilaterally adopted by the workers"

(The House of Labor

17).11 As machines and management came to dominate the
11 For a more detailed discussion of the
transformation of working conditions in industrializing
America and how these changes affected social relations,

workplace, however, the older forms of labor were
displaced. Workers were now continually supervised and
their labor subject to the pace, regulations, and
authority of others. The rationalization of labor also
had a more profound effect-— the loss of "wqrker
knowledge." "With machines performing more of the work
previously performed by people," comments Trachtenberg,
"workers themselves were required to know less in order
to perform their tasks— to know less because their
machines know more"

(68; italics original). This

"transference of technical knowledge from workers to
machines" resulted in a "process mediated by a new corps
of engineers" whereby the "rise of specialized skills
and arcane knowledge corresponded precisely to the
obliteration of traditional knowledge among skilled
[craftsmen and] manual laborers"

(68-9).

Workers did not, however, passively submit to the
"proletarianization" of work. They rebelled, as has been
well-documented; and many times their resistance brought
results, especially in the 1870s and 80s before
capitalists established control of the economy and
before they learned to use the repressive apparatus of
see Daniel Rodgers 1-93, Melvyn Dubofsky, Herbert Gutman
(Work. Culture, and Society in Industrializing America)
71-92 and 213-54 and (Power and Culture] 3-78 and 21160. See also Francis Couvares 9-30 and 80-95, David
Gordon 1-15 and 48-165, and David Montgomery (The House
of Labor) 1-57 and 214-256. In addition, see
Montgomery's Worker's Control in America.

the state to defeat mass strikes. Nevertheless, to
return to the point Dubofsky raises, if working-class
living and working conditions during this period were so
horrible, and open rebellion at times appeared imminent,
why was it so "rare an event"? A partial answer has
already been given: business, with the cooperation of
the state, violently supressed the more radical parts of
the labor movement. Capitalists understood, however,
that government-endorsed violence was not a long-term
solution to worker resistance. For the new system to
function properly, periods of instability, such as those
brought about by mass strikes or depressions, had to be
avoided. Everything— materials, markets, machines,
managers, workers— had to submit to the structures of
the system. Anything that disrupted the process, as did
worker resistence, had to be transmuted. Consequently,
what also had to be transmuted were older economic
practices and modes of thinking. To put this another
way, order (or consensus) could also be maintained by
symbolic violence.

If the new social relations were to

be accepted, then those relations had to be naturalized
or stabilized. If workers were to become submissive
laborers and consumers, then a new cultural paradigm had
to be created.
As it turned out, however, the new paradigm was not
all that new; it was based on pre-existent, or residual,

versions of the national subject, which were
(re)deployed— using the emergent technology— to
authorize the new social relations and the practices
necessary for the functioning of a consumer economy. In
the 1890s, "American manhood," notes Amy Kaplan, became
a "spectacle" rather than something organically linked
to history or lived experience ("Romancing the Empire"
661). A secondary- or after-effect of this
rationalization of the national subject, but equally
important, was the transformation of cultural memory.
Individual, local, and communal memory were increasingly
colonized by representations disseminated in mass
cultural texts. As Sherwood Anderson commented in 1919,
"Books, badly imagined and written though they may
be...are in every household, magazines circulate by the
millions of copies, newspapers are everywhere"

(71).

Mass cultural texts were so pervasive that Anderson
argued they had replaced the "beautiful childlike
innocence" of the small village so that the "farmer by
the stove is brother to the men of the cities, and if
you listen you will find him talking as glibly and as
senselessly as the best city man of us all"

(71). As

mass-produced representations became part of the
discourse of industrial capitalism, memory became the
site where masculinity materialized itself and thus
helped to reproduce existing social relations. The

national subject,

(re)present in memory, became part of

what Richard Terdiman describes as a "complex of
systems" developed in the late nineteenth century "to
insure that the practices and knowledges which make
social production and reproduction possible would be so
thoroughly internalized as to function in effect outside
memory"

(20). Just as important, this initial

colonization of memory marks (or makes possible) the
advent of what is now— from the perspective of late
capitalism— theorized as "the precession of simulacra"
(Baudrillard) or "instrumentalized knowledge"

(the

Frankfurt School) or "the death of the subject"

(Lacan)-

What is important to note here, however— because of its
consequences for the social subject— is that memory
became the site of the other, the heterogeneous
knowledge that, as Terdiman suggests, functions as if
outside (but within) memory to reproduce dominant social
relations. It is also important to note here that, as
Fredric Jameson argues, the passage from market to
monopoly capitalism produced a crisis in "figuration":
the publicity apparatus produced "a growing
contradiction between lived experience and structure, or
between a phenomenological description of the life of an
individual and a more properly structural model of the
conditions of existence of that experience"
(Postmodernism

410). Stephen Crane's "The Blue Hotel"

(1899) offers a nascent allegory of the effect of this
contradiction on the reading subject since the "Swede"
in Crane's story is killed because he confuses the codes
of dime westerns with real social relations.
The "cult of strenuousity" that developed during
this period along with the mass production of success
narratives and masculine adventure stories were
symptomatic of the contemporary crisis in figuration and
produced what Jameson theorizes as "tabulation"; these
narratives offered compensation for "social and
historical impotence, of the blocking of possibilities
that leaves little option but the imaginary"
(Postmodernism

3 69). According to Jameson, fabulation

becomes a substitute for "real history":

"here the

making up of unreal history is a substitute for the
making of the real kind. It mimetically expresses the
attempt to recover that power and praxis by way of the
past and what must be called fancy rather than
imagination"

(Postmodernism 369). Historically, the

"fabulation" of the national subject was used by the
emerging cultural elite for three reasons. First, it
sanctioned current social relations by repressing
problems associated with industrial capitalism.12 In
12 According to Jackson Lears, "What most [critics]
have missed is that sentimental literature, by
contributing to the evasive banality of the official
culture, actually helped to legitimize modern industrial
capitalism...Evasiveness underlay a central tenet of the

other words, by reemphasizing the rewards of industry
and hard work, these narratives helped to create
imagined social relations that marginalized conflict and
rebellion. Second, as Amy Kaplan argues, the national
subject was reasserted to sanction American imperialism.
She specifically notes that the adventure novels that
emerged in the 1890s "offer a cognitive and libidinal
map of US geopolitics during the shift from continental
conquest to overseas empire. By looking back with
nostalgia at a lost wholeness, they created fanciful

modern world view: faith in individual autonomy. The
official creed held not only that progress was
inevitable but that the key to it was the disciplined,
autonomous self" (No Place of Grace 17). Lears also
argues that certain strains of "realist" fiction,
functioned to ameliorate the conflicts created by
expansion: "As the United States was becoming the most
aggressively expansionist society in the world, American
literature increasingly celebrated a sentimental vision
of mutually dependent social relations. In the name of
'realism,' fiction concerned itself largely with
decorous conversations and parlor intrigues; the
domestic problem novel became the self-proclaimed
'modern' mode. The most distinguished realist, William
Dean Howells, urged that American writers focus on 'the
more smiling aspects of life, which are the more
American'" (No Place of Grace 17). Lears, of course, is
not alone in this belief. For an excellent discussion of
William Dean Howells' fiction as a response to the
emergent mass cultural forms, particularly "popular
novels and mass-circulation newspapers," and the class
conflict brought about by industrialization, see Amy
Kaplan (American Realism) 15-64. For a discussion of
Howells' fiction as a "pedagogy" for the emergent middle
class, see Alan Trachtenberg 182-207. For a related
discussion of how the novels of Booth Tarkington
"salvage[d] the idea of individualism," see Richard
Ohmann 164-68.

realms on which to project contemporary desires for
unlimited expansion"

("Romancing the Empire" 661).

Third, and most important, mass-produced success
narratives introduced workers to the new doctrines of
work and consumption. The fiction of upward mobility
helped to create a disciplined, subordinate workforce.
The fiction of upward mobility also naturalized the
emerging class hierarchy and the growing poverty and
social inequality. In essence, it taught that autonomy
was still an effect of American citizenship, provided
that a man worked hard. In addition, men also had to be
indoctrinated into the economy of consumption; they had
to be persuaded to abandon the practices of local
production, thrift, sacrifice, and saving used to
survive in the small, isolated towns, villages, and
neighborhoods of the older culture. These practices had
to be transmuted because they were barriers to the
structures of a consumer economy. To accomplish this, to
establish what Jackson Lears calls the "ideology of
consumption," businessmen introduced national
advertising campaigns in the 1880s. The practice was an
effort to "rationalize" another part of the system by
controlling sales. This became possible during the last
two decades of the nineteenth century for a number of
reasons, the most important of which, as Richard Ohmann
and Theodore Greene stress, was the rapid growth of the

magazine industry, which provided advertisers with a
mass audience.13 To sell more magazines (and
newspapers), owners "hit on a elegantly simple formula:
identify a large audience that is not affluent or
particularly classy, but that is getting on well enough,
and that has cultural aspirations; give it what it wants
to read; build a huge circulation; sell a lot of
advertising space at rates based on that
circulation.... sell the magazine at a price below the
cost of production, and make your profit on ads"

(Ohmann

140) .
The emergence of advertising at this time cannot be
isolated from the emergence of mass culture as a field,
nor can it be isolated form other social practices used
to legitimate the new economic and political order;
advertising also used received cultural knowledge
concerning masculine autonomy and mobility in order to
sanction an "ideology of consumption." As advertising in
magazines and newspapers became part of the
"consciousness of everyday life," it revised the older
13 For an excellent discussion of the rise of mass
culture and "the new discourse of advertising" and how
they functioned to structure consciousness, see Richard
Ohmann 135-68. For a discussion of the emergent
"ideology of consumption," see T. J. Jackson Lears
("From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and
the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 18801930") 3-39 and Christopher Wilson 41-64. See also
Theodore P. Greene 59-109. For a related discussion see
Richard Terdiman (Discourse/Counter-Discourse) 25-81 and
117-46.

version of masculinity by continously associating
personal consumption with feats of masculine adventure
and power. Mobilty and autonomy were now asserted or
expressed in the marketplace, by consuming goods.
Progress was now judged by a man's dependence on the
market; his independence was asserted by what Thorstein
Veblen called "conspicuous consumption." As autonomy
outside the home was increasingly closed off, men were
directed to make the home an expression of their
masculinity by buying goods and services for themselves
or for their families. Like their predecessors in the
national period, Horatio Alger and Andrew Carnegie
construct masculinity in very unproblematic and
ahistorical ways. Their books,

like Franklin's

Autobiography and Crevecoeur's Letters, are intended to
be didactic, to show young men how to act as proper
Americans. As such, they reassert the national subject.
In their texts, autonomy, or "success," is again
constructed as intrinsic to the individual and
contingent only upon personal will or character. Men who
conform to the behaviorial codes found in the pages of
Ragged Dick (1868) and Struggling Upward (1890) and The
Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie (1920) are guaranteed
success and can expect to experience opportunity,
independence, and mobility. Alger's novels and
Carnegie's writings demonstrate that the good, worthy,

or competent man or boy will possess honesty, industry,
perseverence, and he will be an optimist; and because he
possesses these "good qualities," he will have "good
fortune." Those who do not possess these qualities, like
the "lazy" Johnny Nolan, the "violent" Micky Maguire, or
the "young aristocrat" Roswell Crawford in Alger's
Ragged Di c k , or the union organizers in Carnegie's
autobiography, will not get ahead because they do not
possess "good qualities" and therefore do not deserve
good fortune. Moreover, these villians do not respect
"democratic values" since they become obstacles for the
expression of autonomy through industry and the
automatic progress that this habitus brings.
Before analyzing Alger's and Carnegie's texts in
more detail, however,

it is necessary to point out how

pervasive and typical the discourse they embody was
between the years of 1865 and 192 0. Although there is no
way to know for sure how dominant the male success
narrative was in terms of constructing subjectivity and
social relations, there is considerable evidence that
suggests that it pervaded the culture. Richard Ohmann,
Theodore P. Greene, Daniel T. Rodgers, and John G.
Cawelti have all commented on the "ubiquity" of the
success narrative during this period. Rodgers notes, for
instance, that "Editors and interviewers never tired of
the stories of the Andrew Carnegies and Henry Fords who

worked their way out of the factories and farms to the
pinnacles of economic power” (36). The masculinity
discovered in the typical success narrative of this
period is consistent with the masculinity found in texts
from the national period, with just a slight adjustment
to fit the new culture. In the national consciousness,
the inventor, business magnet, and politician of
magazine and newspaper profiles and biographies began to
replace the entrepreneur, farmer, and frontiersman so
popular in the national period. Nevertheless, as Richard
Ohmann points out, the formula and the core assumptions
about the national subject remained the same: "The
typical subject of a biography at this time is a man
(almost always) characterized above all by his power, of
thought and of will. His achievement flows from
extraordinary personal qualities and especially from his
strength and determination. He has risen from humble
origins"

(164). The discourse and its formula were

pervasive; it could be seen in everything from cheap
magazines like Success, Work and W i n . Pluck and Luc k .
Fame and Fortune Weekly; Stories of Bovs Who Make Money
to more "middle-class" magazines like McClure's.
Munsev's. and Cosmopolitian to the more expensive
magazines like Harper's . the Century, and Atlantic
Monthly. It was also found in the millions of success
guides and manuals published during this period, as well

as in autobiographies like Teddy Roosevelt's, Andrew
Carnegie's, and Booker T. Washington's, and in popular
novels like Owen Wister's The Virginian (1902) and
Charles Major's When Knighthood Was in Flower (1898).
Horatio Alger's novels were, by the author's
admission, designed to teach young boys "the gospel of
success." The version of masculinity they sanction
posits a simply formula that reduces complex social
relations to a simple cause-effect logic; and although
his texts often contradict this logic, especially if
they are read in light of the deus ex machina appearance
of rich benefactors, books like Ragged Dick and
Struggling Upward— through the good example of their
central character— attempt to assert personal agency as
the only factor that influences individual mobility. If
a weak or low-born boy wishes to escape his "humble"
conditions, then he must simply display sufficient
amounts of honesty,

industry, initiative, perseverence,

and desire, and he will be on his way up the corporate
ladder; he will be on his way from being Ragged Dick the
boot black to being Richard Hunter, Esquire. Alger
continually reminds his readers that what his
protagonists represent is universal, that "character" is
egalitarian and something that all boys and men may
possess:

"To succeed in his profession, humble as it is,

a boot-black must depend upon the same qualities which

gain success in higher walks of life" (125). In Alger's
novels, application of these "good qualities" always has
the intended effect: upward mobility. Boys like Ragged
Dick, Henry Posdick, and Luke Larkin, for instance, are
always quick to rise because they have the right stuff:
they are "enterprising," "studious and ambitious to
excel," "alert," "ordinarily cool and self-possessed,"
"reliable," "independent," "plucky," and "determined";
they are also eternal optimists; when obstacles are
placed in their way, they resolve not to be disappointed
and work even harder, and this is what makes them
worthy, in Alger's eyes, of good fortune.
Bad boys or men, on the other hand, deserve what
they get, which is usually nothing. Characters like
Micky Maguire, Johnny Nolan, Roswell Crawford, and Jim
Travis in Ragged Dick and Prince Duncan, Randolph
Duncan, Tony Denton, and J. Madison Coleman in
Struggling Upward are unworthy because, unlike the
heroes of these novels, they are not proper citizens;
they are snobs, thieves, drunkards, or just plain
"lazy." In other words, they obtain either their money
or their position by corrupt means; they do not labor
for their just rewards and therefore, according to
Alger, represent a type of citizenship that is anti
democratic.

As the most visible spokesman of "triumphant
democracy" during these years, Andrew Carnegie used his
wealth to advertise, like Alger, the "gospel of wealth"
and masculine and national progress. On the first page
of Triumphant Democracy (1886), his two-volume "paean to
the United States," Carnegie notes with pride that "The
old nations of the earth creep on at a snail's pace; the
Republic thunders past with the rush of the express. The
United States, the growth of a single century, has
already reached the foremost rank among nations, and is
destined soon to out-distance all others in the race. In
population, in wealth, in annual savings, and in public
credit; in freedom from debt, in agriculture, and in
manufactures, America already leads the civilized world"
(Democracy 1).
In Carnegie's estimation, the reason for this
success was simple: equality and opportunity. America
made men; it did not "emasculate" them, as did Europe,
by making them "feel that their own country decrees
their inferiority, and holds them unworthy of privileges
accorded to others"

(Democracy 19). In America, he

argues, repeating Crevecoeur's claim, there are "No
ranks, no titles, no heredity dignities, and therefore
no classes"

(Democracy 19). Men "reach the shores of the

Republic subjects (insulting word), and she [America]
makes them citizens; serfs, and she makes them men"
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(Democracy 18; italics original). Carnegie,

like his

sometime protege Booker T. Washington, promoted this
vision of American citizenship as a way to "overcome"
the increasing class conflict brought about by rapid
industrialization and urbanization, emancipation, and
mass immigration— conflicts and dislocations that
Carnegie had experienced in Pittsburg.
Carnegie's greatest fear was that ex-slaves and
immigrants would not become properly assimilated into
the new economy and would therefore pose a threat to the
nation's stability. In Triumphant Democracy, he
specifically singles out these two groups as
troublesome, but then asserts that they represent no
danger because the Republic has granted "every slave"
and the "millions of foreigners who came from all lands"
citizenship, an "equal voice in the State"

(Democracy

17-18). Carnegie uses the concept of universal equality
to obscure complex and sometimes violent social
relations and problems in order to sanction the emergent
industrial economy, and this is why Carnegie,

like

Alger, stresses the duties of an American citizen.
man's right is every man's right"

"One

(Democracy 19), he

insisted. And if this was true, if, indeed, everyone was
equal, then the problems associated with industrialism—
labor unrest, class stratification, poverty, and
violence— must somehow be personal. Carnegie insisted,

as did Roosevelt and most of the political elite of the
time, that America was united, that the consent of the
governed was obtained "by the foundation on which the
political structure rests, the equality of the citizen"
(Democracy 19), and that those who resisted the new
social order were simply "malcontents" who had not been
properly "Americanized." And who better to Americanize
the inexperienced immigrant or the recalcitrant worker
or ex-slave than the Scottish immigrant who worked his
way up from "honest poverty" to become one of the
richest men in the world and a symbol of America's
industrial power.
Carnegie's Autobiography (1920), like Franklin's, is
a narrative of self-making; it is also the summation of
his political ideology, having been completed shortly
before his death. The plot is typical of the genre.
Suffice it to say that because he was a "clever boy" and
made himself useful, that because he was industrious and
hardworking, that because he showed initiative and took
risks, and that because he overcame many obstacles and
disappointments, Carnegie was deemed worthy, and
therefore rewarded with great wealth and power. Social
relations are once again reduced to a simple causeeffect logic (i.e. if Carnegie resolved to do something,
the task was accomplished), and Carnegie's humble
origins,

like those of Franklin's and Alger's heroes,

turn out to have been a great boon because they have
been instrumental in his development of character:
"Among the manifold blessings I have had to be thankful
for is that neither nurse nor governess was my companion
in infancy. No wonder the children of the poor are
distinguished for the warmest affection and the closest
adherence to family ties and are characterized by a
filial regard far stronger than those who are mistakenly
called more fortunate in life"

(Autobiography 85).

Character, and the "good qualities" of which it is
composed, also turn out to be the keys to masculine
autonomy, which liberate the good citizen from the
constraints of history.
The discourse of success that Carnegie preaches, so
he wishes us to believe,

is egalitarian simply because

it is capable of being taught to anyone. For him, it
becomes a unique cultural possession, something that is
accessible to all "Americans" simply because they were
born in or have settled in the United States. Those who
would become like Carnegie, therefore, have only to
follow his example, which achieves its authority because
Carnegie is the immigrant par excellance; his life, like
Franklin's, is paradigmatic.
The "good qualities" that make Carnegie's wealth and
power inevitable, that "could not help" but make him a
"respectable character," were given to him by his

parents, in particular his mother. In an episode where a
relative suggests that young Andrew might earn a
"considerable sum" selling "knickknacks... around the
wharves," for example, Carnegie tells readers that this
suggestion provoked an "outburst" so strong in his
mother that it was one of the "most tragic scenes I have
ever witnessed": "My mother was sitting sewing at the
moment, but she sprang to her feet with outstretched
hands and shook them in his face.

'What! My son a

peddler and go among rough men upon the wharves! I would
rather throw him into Allegheny River'"

(Autobiograhov

31-2). His mother's "outburst" was brought about on this
ocassion, Carnegie explains,

"not because the occupation

suggested was peaceful labor, for we were taught that
idleness was disgraceful; but because the suggested
occupation was somewhat vagrant in character and not
entirely respectable in their eyes"

(Autobiography 32).

Carnegie, of course, had been taught that "[a]nything
low, mean, deceitful, shifty, coarse, underhand, of
gossipy were foreign to [the] heroic soul"
(Autobiography 32). In fact, he assures us that a "keen
sence of honor, independence, self-respect, pervaded
[his] household" as a child (Autobiography 32). These
gifts bestowed upon young Carnegie in his parents'
household, and which are bestowed upon all citizens of
his "beloved Republic," are the very same gifts that

Carnegie offers to bestow upon readers of his
Autobiography. Like the nation, he is a prodigious
giver, as the numerous examples of masculine success
that cram the pages of his book are meant to
demonstrate.
With the exception of two, his mother and his wife,
all his exemplars are masculine, and they all
demonstrate the same lesson: industry, determination,
honesty, initiative, self-reliance,

independence (i.e.

what were known collectively at the time as "pluck") are
rewarded. Two relatively brief examples should be
sufficient to illustate the already familiar formula:
I have already spoken of the intimacy between our
family and that of the Phippses. In the early days
my chief companion was the elder brother, John.
Henry was several years my junior, but had not
failed to attract my attention as a bright, clever
lad. One day he asked his brother John to lend him a
quarter of a dollar. John saw that he had important
use for it and handed him the shining quarter
without inquiry. Next morning an advertisement
appeared in the "Pittsburg Dispatch": "A willing boy
wishes work." This was the use the energetic and
willing Harry had made of his quarter, probably the
first quarter he had ever spent at one time in his
life. A response came from the well-known firm of
Dilworth and Bidwell. They asked the "willing boy"
to call. Harry went and obtained a position as
errand boy, and as was then the custom, his first
duty every morning was to sweep the office. He went
to his parents and obtained their consent, and in
this way the young lad launched himself upon the sea
of business. There was no holding back a boy like
that. It was the old story. He soon became
indispensible to his employers, obtained a small
interest a collateral branch of their business; and
then, ever on alert, it was not many years before he
attracted the attention of Mr. Miller, who made a
small investment for him with Andrew Kloman. That
finally resulted in the building of the iron mill in

Twenty-Ninth Street....The errand boy is now one of
the richest men in the United States...
(Autobiography 126-27)
A few pages later Carnegie offers a similar account of
the "old story":
Our strict system of accounting enabled us to detect
the great waste possible in heating large masses of
iron. This improvement revealed to us a valuable man
in a clerk, William Borntraeger, a distant relative
of Mr. Kloman, who came from Germany. He surprised
us one day by presenting a detailed statement
showing results for a period, which seemed
incredible. All the needed labor in preparing this
statement he had preformed at night unasked and
unknown to us. The form adapted was uniquely
original. Needless to say, William soon became
superintendent of the works and later a partner, and
the poor German lad died a millionaire. He well
deserved his fortune. (Autobiography 131)
Both examples reduce complex social relations to a
recognizable version of masculinity that is sanctioned
and rewarded. The man who acts like Henry Phipps or
William Borntraeger is rewared because his worth is
revealed by his industry and his success is therefore
"well deserved." Once again, masculine success is the
result of "inner worth," and other factors that might
constrain individual mobility, such as race or class,
are marginalized. Nevertheless, both passages also
reveal the contradictions in Carnegie's simple-minded
formula; Henry Phipps and William Borntraeger are not
self-made men. Like Benjamin Franklin, Ragged Dick,
Booker T. Washington, and Andrew Carnegie, Phipps and
Borntraeger are at least partially dependent on other
men for their wealth and power. That is, neither Phipps

nor Borntraeger would have become wealthy unless their
"worth” was discerned by other men, and their contact
with these sages was not determined by industry or
personal initiative, but rather by the the social
structures that determined their lives. In other words,
Henry Phipps attracted attention because he was white
and of Anglo origin; his ethnicity and social network
gave him access to opportunity, not his "inner
qualities." Likewise, because he was white and German,
William Borntrager was able to get a job in the iron
mills where his relative worked, so as to later impress
Carnegie and become a superintendent and a partner. Race
and family connections are the real heroes of these two
passages since they provided the opportunities for these
men to rise. For all his insistence on the rewards of
industry in Up From Slavery (1901), Booker T. Washington
would never have had the opportunities for wealth and
position that Phipps and Borntraeger had, simply because
he was not white.
The hidden, or perhaps not-so-hidden, agenda of
Carnegie's autobiography is his desire for a passive
workforce, a workforce that still believed in the
national subject. The new social relations were
therefore legitimized by re-presenting industrial
capitalism and capitalists as benevolent, and this is
why both Alger and Carnegie claim that the patriarchs of

the new economic order deserve to be where they are and
that they have the nation's best interests at heart. In
Alger's novels, capitalists never misuse their power for
personal gain— -only petty bougoise figures like Prince
Duncan in Struggling Upward are capable of such evil;
and they always recognize and promote honest, clever
boys who work hard and save their money.
Likewise, Carnegie's philanthropy, and the
philanthropy of his friends, is meant to demonstrate the
benevolence of the new system. Not only did the monopoly
capitalists reward individual men for their
determination and industry, but also they rewarded men
collectively by donating parks, museums, college
dormitories, concert halls, libraries, and other
cultural institutions. As Carnegie put it, "there was no
use to which money could be applied so productive of
good to boys and girls who have good within them and
ability and ambition to develop it, as the founding of a
public library"

IAutobiography

45). "The fundamental

value of a library [or other cultural institution],
Carnegie argues, "is that it gives nothing for nothing.
Youths must acquire knowledge themselves. There is no
escape from this"

(Autobiography 46). There is also no

escaping the fact that Carnegie's surplus value was,
indeed, capable of producing something where there was
nothing, and that collectively the men who ran the new

economy were capable of producing institutions that
would enable good boys and girls to get ahead by
reproducing the cultural knowledge that supposedly made
this possible. In Carnegie's mind, philanthropy was
possible because of the great wealth the industrial
economy produced, and the implied threat in Carnegie's
gospel of wealth was that any interference in the system
would not only affect Carnegie but the thousands
(perhaps millions)

of people that Carnegie and his

wealthy friends had helped to lead "onward and upward."
In addition, Carnegie assured anxious readers that the
"standard of commercial morality is now very high"
(Autobiography 166), but that this standard could only
be maintained if the economy continued to expand: "It
may be accepted as an axiom that a manufacturing concern
in a growing country like ours begins to decay when it
stops expanding"

(Autobiography 217). Again, as we have

seen in previous writers, free labor is responsible for
the wealth and the progress of individuals and the
nation, and anything that blocks its expression or
expansion, either at home or abroad, contributes to the
decay of the nation: "America is soon to change from
being the dearest steel manufacturing country to the
cheapest. Already the shipyards of Belfast are out
customers. This is but the beginning. Under present
conditions America can produce steel as cheaply as any

other land, notwithstanding its higher-priced labor.
There is no labor so cheap as the dearest in the
mechanical field, provided it is free [i.e. non-union],
contented, zealous, and reaping reward as it renders
service. And here America leads"

(Autobiography 218).

Another "great advantage which America will have in
competing in the markets of the world," Carnegie
continues,

"is that her manufacturers will have the best

home market"

(Autobiography 218). The home market aided

business because it could be used "for a return upon
capital, and the surplus product can be exported with
advantage, even when the prices received for it do not
more than cover actual cost"
Interestingly,

(Autobiography 218).

in his Autobiography Carnegie strongly

disapproves of the "annexation" of foreign territory.
Like many Americans, he realized that our colonial
experience, along with the national identity that was
constructed during that struggle, made it extemely
problematic for America to hold foreign possessions and
deny foreign citizens the right to self-determination.
He calls the annexation of the Philippines, for
instance, America's "first grievous international
mistake— a mistake which dragged in into the vortex of
international militarism and a great navy"
(Autobiography 353). Nevertheless,

in spite of his

opposition to imperialism in the Philippines, Carnegie

favored intervention in Central America to build the
Panama Canal and in Cuba to free the island from Spain.
This apparent contradiction, given that the official
rationale for all three military actions was to free an
enslaved population,

is what William Appleman Williams

calls "imperial anticolonialism.1,14 As a London Times
editorial of 1900 explained, "Even anti-imperialists
[like Carnegie] welcome an Imperial policy which
contemplates no conquests but those of commerce"

(qtd.

in William Appleman Williams 23). In other words,
Carnegie did not favor the acquistion and administration
of foreign possessions; he did, however, favor
intervention, as did (do) most American businessman and
politicians, when it provided stable markets for the
selling of American goods. He did favor the construction
of an "informal empire" because it was in the "best
interest" of American business.
Carnegie's support of American expansion during
these years is inextricably linked to the pedagogy of
masculinity expressed in his writings, and it is, as Amy
Kaplan points out in a slightly different context, a
manifestation of the "rescue mission for American
manhood" under way at the time (659). By refiguring and
extending the frontier/entreprenurial identity of
Jacksonian masculinity to provide symbolic resolutions
14 See William Appleman Williams 24-44.
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to the problems associated with the emergence of
industrial capitalism,

"empire offered the arena for

American men to become what they already were, to enact
their essential manhood before the eyes of a global
audience"

("Romancing the Empire" 659). The

essentialized manhood projected by the texts discussed
here claims that the general welfare and economic
progress of the nation were dependent on the autonomous
male producing goods and services for domestic and
international markets. The national subject, and the
"good qualities" associated with it, became identified
with personal consumption at home and the selling of
surplus goods abroad. The duty of the good citizen,
then, was to contribute to the wealth of the nation by
helping to produce surplus value and by engaging in
personal consumption.
The representation of the national subject found in
the writings of Horatio Alger and Andrew Carnegie are
typical of a reformulated nationalist discourse that
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. Not
coincidentally the ideology of masculinity they deployed
was an appropriation of an earlier republicanism, which
was used to marginalize class conflict and legitimize
the emergence of an industrial economy. Cultural elites
used the technologies of the emergent mass culture
industries to legitimize the new social relations, and

thus sanctioned a version of masculinity that helped to
perpetuate the new order. These representations helped
to create what Frederic Jameson calls a "political
unconscious."15 As mass-produced representations of
masculine success and autonomy proliferated and began to
permeate everyday life and the memory of individual men,
men increasingly interpreted their experience in terms
of a previously elaborated mastercode, which taught them
to see social relations in very reductive ways. The
narrative taught them that because there was virtually
no limit on masculine aspiration in America, state
intervention to correct the problems associated with
industrialization, such as extreme social inequality and
poverty, was unnecessary. These problems, the narrative
suggested, would be corrected by the "free market,"
whose benevolent capitalists miraculously intervened in
the lives of "worthy" young men. Economic failure or
stagnation, then, expressed the failure of the
individual, not the system. Masculine "character" was
thus reduced to an essence that replaced political
rights, so that one's "American-ness" was now determined
by one's ability to re-present the practices and norms
of mass-produced fictional models--formulas that were
normally contradicted by lived experience.

15 See Jameson (The Political Unconscious) 17-102.

Chapter Three
Eugene O'Neill and the Liminality of the
National Subject
In the decade of the 1930s, Eugene O'Neill turned
his attention to American history. At this time, O'Neill
started work on A Tale of Possessors. Self-Dispossessed,
a proposed cycle of seven plays that attempted to trace
the history of America from the French and Indian War to
the Depression, through the generations of a single
family.1 In a letter to Lawrence Langner in July of
1936, O'Neill described the project as "primarily...the
history of a family," but "not an 'American life' in any
usual sense of the word": "I don't want anyone to get
the idea that this Cycle is much concerned with what is
usually understood by American history, for it isn't. As
for economic history...I am not much interested in
economic determinism, but only in the self-determinism
of which the economic is one phase"

(Bogard and Bryer

452)
O'Neill never completed the Cycle and in 1952
destroyed all but two of the proposed seven plays, A
Touch of the Poet (1943), which he now considered a
separate project, and More Stately Mansions (1939),
which was unfinished. During the same period (roughly
1 For a history of the composition of the cycle
plays see Bogard 366-453. See especially Floyd 215-22,
as well as Gelb 790-805.
76

1935-1944), as part of what are known as the "great late
works," O'Neill wrote The Iceman Cometh (1939), Long
Day's Journey Into Night (1941), and A Moon for the
Misbegotten (1944). All five plays mark an
intensification of O'Neill's obsession with what he
called in 1928 "the big subject": "the death of the old
God and the failure of Science and Materialism to give
any satisfying new One for the surviving religious
instinct to find a meaning for life in, and to comfort
the fears of death with"

(Bogard and Bryer 311). Sixteen

years later, in an interview with James Agee shortly
after the Second World War, O'Neill remarked that
America had failed to provide that meaning:
...[I]nwardly...the war [World War II] helped me
realize that I was putting my faith in the old
values, and they're gone....It's very sad, but there
are no values to live by today....Anything is
permissable if you know the angles. I feel in that
sense, that America is the greatest failure in
history. It was given everything, more than any
other country in history, but we've squandered our
soul by trying to possess something outside it, and
we'll end up as that game usually does, by losing
our soul and the thing outside it too. (Estrin 188)
The failure of America— in O'Neill's mind the inability
of the nation to provide the "satisfying new One"—
manifested itself as what he called the "drama of
American possessiveness and materialism"

(Bogard and

Bryer 452), a process that had "squandered" the utopian
promise of the nation's founding.

The "nation-ness" of the modern nation, as Benedict
Anderson argues in Imagined Communities, was invented in
the late eighteenth century, a time when previous models
of political and social organization were breaking down.
Nationalism (or what Anderson calls "nation-ness”) came
about at precisely the moment when what O'Neill termed
"old values" were being destroyed by "Enlightenment and
Revolution"

(Anderson 16).2 Anderson theorizes that each

nation invented itself, or created its own narrative,
which sought to unify it subjects by universalizing them
in the concept of "the people." In this respect, the
modern nation can be viewed as a compensatory act or
gesture; it was invented to replace monarchy and
religion as the organizer-of-society, as the giver-ofmeaning; it was to be the "satisfying new One" by
providing continuity.
The American-ness of America has its most powerful
objectification in the autonomous subject. In fact, as I

2 Anderson comments further: "in Western Europe the
eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age of
nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought.
The century of the Enlightenment, of rationalist
secularism, brought with it its own modern darkness.
With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which
belief in part composed did not disappear.
Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes fatality more
arbitrary. Absurdity of salvation; nothing makes another
style of continuity more necessary. What then was
required was a secular transformation of fatility into
continuity, contingency into meaning.... few things were
(are) better suited to this end than the idea of the
nation" (19).

suggest in chapter two, the project of America's
colonial leaders was the construction and dissemination
of a national subject liberated from the values and
structures of the Old World. As Gordon Woods writes in a
recent book, the triumph— or what he calls the
"radicalness"— of the American Revolution was that it
"brought respectability and even dominance to ordinary
people long held in contempt and gave dignity to their
menial labor in a manner unprecedented in history and to
a degree not equaled elsewhere in the world"

(8). Not

only did the Revolution reconsitute "what Americans
meant by public or state power," but also "it made the
interests and prosperity of ordinary people— their
pursuits of happiness— the goal of society and
government"

(8).

One of the first examples of the national subject
(Wood's "ordinary person")

in pursuit of his happiness

is found in Letter III of Crevecoeur's Letters From an
American Farmer, where he describes the transformation
of a European emigrant into an American:
Let me select one as an epitome of the rest: he is
hired, he goes to work, and works moderately;
instead of being employed by a haughty person, he
finds himself with his equal...his wages are high,
his bed is not like that bed of sorrow on which he
used to lie...
hitherto he had not lived, but
simply vegetated....He begins to forget his former
servitude and dependence....He looks around and
sees many a prosperous person who but a few years
before was as poor as himself. This encourages him
much; he begins to form some little scheme, the
first, alas, he ever formed in his life....He is

encouraged, he has gained friends; he is advised and
directed; he feels bold, he purchases some
land....He is become a freeholder, from perhaps a
German boor. He is now an American, a
Pennsylvanian....He is naturalized; his name is
enrolled with those of the other citizens of the
province. Instead of being a vagrant, he has a place
of residence.... From nothing to start into being;
from a servant to the rank of master; from being the
slave of some despotic prince....What a change
indeed! It is in consequence of that change that he
becomes an American.... it extinguishes all his
European prejudices, he forgets that mechanism of
subordination, that servility of disposition which
poverty had brought him (Crevecoeur 82-3)
Crevecoeur's "good subject" represents what O'Neill
calls "an American life" in the "usual" sense. As the
"epitome," he stands in and for the rest (i.e the model
has currency because it is e pluribus unum) . The
American-ness of the narrative is structured by a
homology between "the nation" and "the people": a rising
nation, a rising people. The teleology representing
American history is progress, a shining future. For the
immigrant, America represents a break with the past. The
"mechanism" of the new country enables him to escape the
poverty and dependence of Europe: the nation
"extinguishes all his European prejudices." Crevecoeur's
paradigmatic American is part of the enunciation of the
"imagined community" of the nation; he joins the nation
only to have his specific history replaced by his
ascendancy as a subject. The nation becomes his
community; it nourishes him like a "family"; it gives
him sustenance; its "good effects" provide him with

food, friends, property, position. If he works hard, he
will have "future prosperity"; he will improve his
condition and the condition of his family. His new
government, like his new community, offers him "new
felicity" and "protection." With the purchase of
property, this "nothing" becomes a citizen; he becomes
autonomous; he serves no man— his past life vanishes and
he becomes an "American."
Within the legal territory of the United States,
then, the essential quality of the national subject is
his autonomy. Just as the legal and political structures
of the new nation constituted the territory and
governing apparatus of the nation, so too the ideology
of the subject-set-free (re)constituted and mapped out
the new citizen. As the epic hero of the American story,
the autonomous subject became a symptom of Americanness, or what Homi Bhabha calls the objectification of a
"national pedagogy," whose narrative power rests in its
ability to create a "unisonant" discourse that
interpellates individual citizens— a process that
inscribes individuals as subjects of/to the nation by
providing cultural identification and cohesiveness.3
Eugene O'Neill's experience of the national pedagogy
is (was) "disjunctive"; his writing resists the

3 For a further discussion of the concept of
national pedagogy see Bhabha ("DissemiNation") 291-322.

totalizing or essentializing narrative of the nation.
His plays, especially the surviving Cycle plays and the
late plays, are a supplement to the already inscribed
narrative of national identity. His stories are
constructed around what Homi Bhabha calls the
"liminality" of the nation: the gaps and fissures that
expose the apparent plenitude of the national subject as
incomplete. As Bhabha writes,

"Counter-narratives of the

nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing
boundaries— both actual and conceptual— disturb those
ideological manoeuvers through which 'imagined
communities' are given essentialist identities"
("DissemiNation" 300).
More specifically, O'Neill disrupts the
"simultaneity" or "temporality" of the nation by
rewriting it, by substituting isolation for community,
greed for progress, repetition for ascendancy, and
alienation for autonomy. In his last plays, the imagined
trajectory of American history and the rising subject of
American history come to a grinding halt: America has
stopped moving forward. As Larry Slade says in The
Iceman Cometh. "It's a great game, the pursuit of
happiness"

(572).4 Or, as Jamie Tyrone says in A Moon

for the Misbegotten. "There is no present or no future-

4 All references to O'Neill's plays are from Eugene
O'Neill: Complete Plavs. 1932-43.

-only the past happening over and over again— now"
(920). Or, as Simon Harford remarks in More Stately
Mansions. "As if Freedom could ever exist in Reality! As
if at the end of every dream of liberty one did not find
the slave, oneself, to whom oneself, the Master, is
enslaved"

(365). The pursuit of happiness has not

liberated the citizen, has not provided him with the
"satisfying new One to replace the surviving religious
instinct." In fact, the very thing— self-interest— that
was supposed to liberate the American citizen had
enslaved him and destroyed any possibility of community.
This contradiction, or "duality" as Louis Sheaffer calls
it, is best figured in the character of Simon Harford
(the male protagonist of More Stately Mansions) .
According to Sheaffer,

"Simon's duality symbolized a

rending duality in American life, a basic condition in
which the forces of greedy materialism were ascendant
and threatening to destroy all that was ennobling in our
national heritage"

(481).

The Second World War, as O'Neill's comments above
suggest, destroyed his faith in the old values.
Everything had become a shell game for him, a matter of
knowing the angles. History had ended. The nation had
betrayed itself. Utopia had turned into "cunning

acquisitiveness.1'5 The plays written during this period
represent faith or meaning as a lack, or a fiction, as a
drive that is just a drive— a representation of meaning
without providing meaning; this is what O'Neill called
"hopeless hope." The two plays that I will discuss in
this chapter— A Touch of the Poet and More Stately
Mansions— suggest that O'Neill believed American
citizenship is constructed around a necessary lack (he
calls this lack "pipe dreams") which simultaneously
prolongs and destroys the life of the subject. That is,
to use O'Neill's language, men (and women) need their
illusions to survive, but these illusions alienate them
from the two things that would give their lives meaning:
themselves and other people.6 To quote Larry Slade
5 In a letter to Sophus Keith Winther on December
26, 1942, O'Neill writes: "I am sorry if I have said
anything to affront your faith in an upward spiral of
mankind. Because I myself believe that perhaps a million
years from now it may begin to dawn on Man...that he has
been a damned fool. But I hope you put your upward
spiral in hock during the next peace conference.
Otherwise, you will surely be rudely goosed by the hard
fact behind the flimflam, and fall and maybe severely
fracture your tamborine. As Rabelais said, or would have
said if he thought of it, you can't build Utopia out of
turds!" (Bogard and Bryer 539).
6 Slavoj Zizek insists that alienation is a
fundamental structure of "the democratic abstraction":
"There is in the very notion of democracy no place for
the fullness of concrete human content, for the
genuineness of community links: democracy is a formal
link of abstact individuals.... Critics of democracy are
thus correct in a way: democracy implies a split between
the abstract citoven and the bourgeois bearer of
particular, 'pathological' interests, and any
reconciliation between the two is structurally

85

again:

"To hell with the truth! As the history of the

world proves, the truth has no bearing on
anything....The lie of the pipe dream is what gives life
to the whole misbegotten mad lot of us, drunk or sober"
(570). In other words, the desire to possess something
outside the self (the "satisfying new One"), in order to
fill a lack or absence in the subject, gives the subject
meaning. But that same desire is also destructive
because the end of that desire does not satisfy the
drive to attain it, because there is no end to that
desire; there is only the fictional means to reach
toward it. In O'Neill's mind, there is only the desire
to satisfy the desire, which leads the subject outside
himself into a quest that has no ending point. There is
no ultimate meaning behind this quest. Meaning or
satisfaction is understood as the process of the quest,
and not as a specific destination or ending point. To
use a more mundane formation (and one that is suggested
by the last plays): materialism (or what O'Neill called
the "economic phase" of self-determination) cannot
fulfill the subject because its fruits— "power and

impossible. Or, to refer to the traditional opposition
between Gesellschaft (society, as a mechanical, external
agglomeration of atomized individuals) and Gemeinschaft
(society as a community held together by organic links):
democracy is definitely bound up with Gesellschaft; it
literally lives on the split between the 'public' and
'private,' it is possible only within the framework of
what was once...called 'alienation'" (164).

wealth and possessions"— lead only to desire and the
desire for more things. As 0"Neill pointed out, "life is
a struggle, often,

if not usually, unsuccessful

struggle; for most of us have something within us which
prevents us from accomplishing what we dream and desire.
And then, as we progress, we are always seeing further
than we can reach"

(qtd. in Bigsby l: 42). My

investigation of A Touch of the Poet and More Stately
Mansions, then, will focus on the lives of the male
protagonists of each play— Cornelius Melody and Simon
Harford— as they "progress" and see further than they
can reach. My investigation of these male characters
will be supplemented with a discussion of how their
desire affects the women closest to them: Nora Melody
and Sara Melody Harford, respectively.
***

In Eugene O'Neill's New Language of Kinship. Michael
Manheim argues that A Touch of the Poet is the precursor
text for Long Day's Journey (8).7

More specifically,

7 This idea is commonplace; it was originally
suggested, in print at least, by Arthur and Barbara Gelb
in their biography of O'Neill (1960). According to them,
"Despite its period setting and historical context, the
play fA Touch of the Poetl was, like so many of his
others, emotionally and psychologically the story of his
own family" (800). This reading obscures what the Gelb's
previously assert about the cycle, namely that in
preparing to write it, O'Neill was, in their words,
"deep in books about the political, financial,
spiritual, and cultural history of the United States"
(799). Virginia Floyd notes, for instance, that one of
the books O'Neill read during this period was Matthew

Manheim asserts that "There should be little doubt that
A Touch of the Poet is primarily a play about James
O'Neill, Sr"

(106-07). Like James O'Neill/James Tyrone,

1,Con Melody is a proud man who, having known success in
his earlier days,

is now forced to live in what he

considers undeserved obscurity. He is also like the old
actor in that the past he recalls seems linked to the
role O'Neill's father played throughout so much of his
career. Con thinks of himself as having once been a kind
of young Edmond Dantes in his brilliant Napoleonic
uniform, and like that character Con feels wronged by
ill-meaning adversaries.... Con, like James Tyrone, uses
his illusions about his glorious past to obscure his
humble, shanty-Irish origins"

(106-07). While Manheim's

comparison is accurate, his description of the
correspondences between Con Melody and James
O'Neill/James Tyrone is, obviously, skewed.
Nevertheless, in trying to read Poet as an ur-text for
Long Day's Journey. Manheim glosses over the
complexities of the texts to insist upon a homology. My
point here is this: by granting primacy to the
"autobiographical motifs" of the earlier play, in order

Josephson's The Robber Barons: The Great American
Capitalists. 1861-1901 (217). Additionally, although
O'Neill finally completed work on Poet in 1943— two
years after he finished Long Day's Journey— he began the
play in 1935, four years before he started writing Long
Day's Journey.
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to read it as an incomplete version of the later play,
the historicity that O'Neill gives to Poet is lost. A
more specific example will illustrate my point. Although
the uniform that Con Melody wears throughout the play is
from the Napoleonic era, it is not, per s e .
"Napoleonic." In other words, unlike the Edmond Dantes
character that James O'Neill played during his lifetime,
Melody is not, nor does he think of himself, as a French
aristocrat. For Melody wears the "brilliant scarlet
full-dress uniform of a major in one of Wellington's
dragoon regiments"

(228; italics removed), and he views

himself as an English aristocrat. Con Melody, in fact,
fights against Napoleon's forces in the Peninsula War,
and, significantly, the action of Poet takes place
ninteen years to the day that Major Cornelius Melody
distinguished himself at the Battle of Talavera. By
ignoring this difference in favor of a homology, Manheim
effaces the specific subject position that O'Neill
creates for Melody (and, for that matter, for James
Tyrone in Long Day's Journey) . To be fair to Manheim,
Melody's character is, of course, overdetermined, but to
reduce his importance by way of a convenient comparison
that sees Melody as a figure for O'Neill's father, or
the play as another working out of O'Neill's oedipal
problems, is to ignore the context in which the author
places his characters and the lives he creates for them.

The subject position that O'Neill gives to Con
Melody belies the disjunctive nature of O'Neill's
experience of American-ness, a fissure or gap that
threatens the plenitude of the imagined subject.
Melody's father, Ned Melody, an Irish peasant by birth,
was, as the barkeep Mickey Maloy says, "a thieven
shebeen keeper who got rich by moneylendin' and
squeezin' tenants and every manner of trick. And when
he'd enough he married, and bought an estate with a pack
of hounds and set up as one of the gentry"

(185). Ned

Melody's newly acquired money and property, however,
were not enough to gain him access to the class to which
he aspired since "none of the gentry would speak to auld
Melody"

(185), nor would they let his son Con near their

daughters. Neverthless, Ned Melody wanted his son to be
a "true gentleman, so he packed him off to Dublin to
school, and after that to the College with sloos of
money to prove himself the equal of any gentleman's son.
But Con found, while there was plenty to drink on him
and borrow money, there was few that didn't sneer behind
his back at his pretensions"

(185). After college, Con

Melody joined the British Army where he served as a
cavalry officer in the Peninsula War and distinguished
himself at the battle of Talavera where he earned the
rank of major. According to his cousin Jamie Cregan, who
fought with him in Spain,

"[Con] was strong as an ox,

and on a thoroughbred horse, in his uniform there wasn't
a handsomer man in the army. And he had the chance he
wanted in Portugal and Spain where a British officer was
welcome in the gentry's houses*1 (186) . Shortly after the
Battle of Salamanca, Melody is dismissed from the army
and sent home in disgrace for killing a Spanish nobleman
in a duel over his wife. Melody returns to Ireland where
his wife Nora has given birth to his daughter, Sara.
According to Jamie Cregan,

"He married [Nora] because

he'd fallen in love with her, but he was ashamed of
h e r ...because her folks were only ignorant peasants on
his estate, as poor as poor"

(187). Melody "Then raised

what money he still was able," and took "[Nora] and Sara
here to America where no one would know him"

(187). Once

in America, Melody buys a "tavern" in a "village a few
miles from Boston"
directions,

(183). According to O'Neill's stage

"The tavern is over a hundred years old. It

had once been prosperous, a breakfast stop for the
stagecoach, but the stage line had been discontinued and
for some years now the tavern has fallen upon neglected
days"

(183) .

Con Melody's immigration to America, however, has
not given him the status that he enjoyed during the
Peninsula War as an officer in the British army.
According to Mickey Maloy, "The Yankee gentry won't let
him come near them....But once in a while there'll be

some Yankee stops overnight wid his wife or daughter and
then you'd laugh to see Con, if he thinks she's gentry,
slidin' up to her, playin' the great gentleman and
makin' compliments, and then boasting afterward that he
could have them in bed if he'd had a chance at it"
(186). Maloy also notes ironically that Melody
"considers the few Irish around here to be scum beneath
his notice"

(186).

It is, of course, by design that O'Neill sets the
action of the play a few miles from Boston. He places us
in (or near)

"the cradle of the American Revolution,"

presumably Lexington or Concord. This allows him to tie
the action of the play to the Revolution and its
founding documents, especially the pursuit-of-happiness
clause in the Declaration of Independence. Notably, the
welcoming act of the local gentry is to "swindle" the
newly arrived Melody, just as Melody's first act as an
American is to be swindled. Sara Melody describes her
father's "American estate" as "a bit of farm land no one
would work anymore, and the rest all wilderness!"

(195).

In their pursuit of happiness the local gentry steal
money from Melody and his family, and in his own selfinterest Melody impoverishes himself and consequently
his family (more about this below). Melody's action is a
repetition of a desire that returns him to where his
father began, a run-down bar. His desire to be other

than he is, to be one with the local gentry,

is also a

repetition of his actions in Ireland. Here again, Melody
aligns himself with a class that has nothing but
contempt for him because he is Irish. O'Neill makes this
point clear in a conversation between Nora and Sarah
Melody:
Nora: ...I'm worried about your father. Father Flynn
stopped me on the road the yesterday and tould me
I'd better warn him not to sneer at the Irish around
here and call thim scum, or he'll get in trouble.
Most of them is in a rage at him because he'll come
out against Jackson and the Democrats and says he'll
vote with the Yankees for Quincy Adams.
Sara: ...Faith, they can't see a joke, then, for
it's a great joke to hear him shout against mob
rule, like one of them Yankee gentry, when you know
what he came from. And after the way the Yanks
swindled him when he came here, getting him to buy
this inn by telling him a new coach line was going
to stop here. (193)
O'Neill underscores Melody's self-alienation here by
having him support John Quincy Adams in the election of
1828, thereby aligning himself with the Anglo-American
ruling class that has swindled Melody and regards him as
a "drunken Mick"

(249), just as in Ireland he aligns

himself with the Anglo-Irish ruling class. Both
political structures allow him to participate in the
imagined community of his adopted country without giving
him access to the status or power that would make him a
gentleman. Like Wellington, who was also Irish, Melody
ironically fights to protect the commercial interests of
a colonial power. While Melody is in Spain fighting

Napoleon and helping to break a boycott on British
exports, the ruling apparatus of British Imperialism is
exploiting Irish land and labor. Indeed, at the time,
the Irish-Protestant ruling class that Melody aligns
himself with was responsible for the exploitation of
Ireland's predominantely Catholic peasants— the class
that Melody and his wife are both born into. The AngloIrish ruling class was also the beneficiary of the Act
of Union (1800), which officially made Ireland part of
the United Kingdom and set up an administrative
apparatus for the "colony" open, for the most part, only
to members of Protestant sects.8
Viewed retrospectively, from the position of recent
post-colonial theorizations of the subject, Melody's
position as an Irishman resembles what Salman Rushdie
calls a "chamcha," an Urdu word which means spoon and
which Rushdie uses to describe a class of natives who
"suck up" to the colonial ruling class, or its
surrogates, in order to gain power. Rushdie argues that
the "British Empire would not have lasted a week without
such collaborators among its colonized people"

(8).9

8 For further details on this period of Irish
history see MacDonagh 13-52. See also Boyce 123-191.
9 Melody's formative years would have been spent in
what Abdul JanMohamed calls the "hegemonic phase" of
British colonialism in Ireland: "By contrast, in the
hegemonic phase (or neocolonialism) the natives accept a
version of the colonizers' entire system of values,
attitudes, morality, institutions, and, more important,

Melody's internalization of the empire's values— he
speaks the Queen's English and has been educated as an
English gentleman— is constructed around his lack of
status; that is, he desires to be like them because he
is not (Frantz Fanon calls this phenomenon the "native's
envy").10 For the subject, this involves a negation of
the self and the assumption, or introjection, of an
imaginary other, which stands outside the self and
presents to that aliented self a plenitude. The process
is similar to Lacan's mirror stage during which the
(m)other reflects back to the baby a "specular image" in
order to give the child a unity or coherence that the
child does not yet possess. Initially, subjectivity for
the child is constructed around this alienated image.
According to Jacqueline Rose, "This image is a fiction
because it conceals, or freezes, the infant's lack of
motor co-ordination and the fragmentation of its drives.
But it is salutary for the child, since it gives it the
first sense of coherent identity in which it can
recognize itself"

(30). However, as Rose points out, the

mode of production. This stage of imperialism does rely
on the active and direct 'consent' of the dominated,
though, of course, the tthreat of military coercion is
always in the background" (62). Although JanMohamed is
writing about the colonization of Africa, his
theorization is applicable to Ireland's condition at the
end of the eighteenth century.
10 For details see Fanon 35-105.

"image in which we first recognize ourselves is a
misrecoanition (30; italics original).11
Con Melody's identity as a subject is constructed
around a similar misrecognition, which operates along
the same lines as Lacan's mirror stage. This reading is
suggested by O'Neill's presentation of Melody in the
play. His behavior is described in the stage direction
as "that of a polished gentleman," but "Too much so":
"He overdoes it and one soon feels that he is
overplaying a role which has become more real than his
real self to him"

(197-98; italics removed). The excess

11 Shoshana Felman's reading of the miror stage is
also pertinent here, especially in light of the unity
that Melody tries to construct by gazing in the mirror:
"Self-reflection, the traditional fundamental principle
of consciousness and conscious thought, is what Lacan
traces back to 'the mirror stage,' to the symmetrical
dual structure of the Imaginary. Self-reflection is
always a mirror reflection, that is, the illusory
functioning of symetrical reflexivity, of reasoning by
the principle of symmetry between self and self as well
as between self and other; a symmetry that subsumes all
difference within a delusion of a unified and
homogeneous individual identity" (61). It should be
noted here also that Melody's dual structure resembles
what W.E.B. DuBois theorizes as a "double consciousness"
that affects African-American subjects: "the Negro is a
sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world,— a world which
yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him
see himself through the revelation of the other world.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness,
this sense of always looking at one's self through the
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape
of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (45).

in his manner is evidence of his lack of status.12 He
overacts in order to protect himself from the symbolic
order. Melody's self-alienation is most clearly seen in
his relationship with the mirror which hangs in his bar;
he is continually looking in this mirror throughout the
play, and it is only when he sees himself in the forth
act— after the intervention of the law— that he sees his
"real" self. The first three times that Melody looks in
the mirror, he cannot see his excess. In what has become
a ritual act, he sees himself only as a gentleman:
"Thank God, I still bear the unmistakeable stamp of an
officer and a gentleman"

(203). O'Neill writes that

"[Melody's] eyes are drawn irrestibly to the mirror. He
moves in front of it, seeking the satisfying reassurance
of his reflection there"

(215; italics removed). The

gestures accompanying the first three lookings are
"exact" repetitions, followed by Melody's reciting his
favorite lines from Lord Byron's Childe Harold's
Pilgrimage:
I have not loved the World, nor the World loved me;
I have not flattered its rank breath, nor bowed
To its idolatries a patient knee,
Nor coined my cheek
to smiles,— nor cried aloud
In worship of an echo: in the crowd
They could not deem
me one of such— Istood
Among them, but not
of them.... (203)
12 Melody's excess also allows members of the
ruling class to sterotype him. In his flirtations with
Deborah Harford, for instance, in which he overplays the
role of a "gracious, gallant gentleman," she asks him
"Is this— what the Irish call blarney, sir?" (218).

The intended irony of these lines, which, of course,
Melody is unaware of, is that in his desire to be a
gentleman Melody has committed all the sins that he uses
Byron to rail against;13 he has "flattered" rank,
"bowed" to idolatries, as well as "coined" his cheek to
smiles. More important, however, he has "worshipped" an
echo, which is a reflection of sound, by worshipping an
image in a mirror, which is a reflection of an image.
The last line of the passage— "I stood/Among them, but
not of them"— also points to Melody's confusion about
his subject position. By quoting Lord Byron, Melody
identifies with Lord Byron. Like Byron, he believes he
is a victim of the ruling class (the Anglo-Irish and,
later, the Anglo-American), but, unlike Byron, he is not
born into that class. Melody misrecognizes his position
by misidentifying with Byron; he believes that he is
"among" the ruling class, but "not of them." This
construction allows Melody to marginalize, or avoid, his
present condition by making himself superior to the

13 Commenting on this stanza from Childe Harold's
Pilgrimage (III, 113), Jerome McGann writes: "whenever
Byron says, 'I have not loved the world, nor the world
me' he is uttering a desperate and piteous lie. The
truth is that he has loved it much too long and far too
well, and that in this love his illusions (which are
part of his loves) have always been threatened with
collapse. Byron's poetry is born in the conflict of love
and illusion, in the contradictions which are a
necessary part of that conflict" (144). Likewise,
Melody's illusions, and the contradictions they produce,
are a necessary and sustaining part of his life.

class that refuses to grant him admission. O'Neill also
uses the line to suggest, ironically, that Melody's
class identification has aliented him from his wife and
the men who frequent his bar. He stands, literally,
among them, but his pretensions function to make him
"not of them."14 In worshipping his cultural other,
Melody denies himself access to those around him.
Nowhere is Melody's worship of the other made more
apparent by O'Neill than in the mirror scene in act
three. In this scene, Melody stands in front of the
mirror in his British cavalry uniform, which he is
wearing to celebrate the anniversary of Talavera; he
looks at his reflection and begins to recite the stanza
from Childe Harold. O'Neill tells us that he does this
"seeking satisfying reassurance." Like Lacan's child,
Melody is imagining himself as other using the image of
his cultural other to sustain a coherent self. The image
granted by the mirror, by England, as I suggest above,
is self-alienating; in this misrecognition, Melody finds
the satisfying reassurance that allows him to maintain
his imaginary identity. His lack is subsumed by his
glance, which constructs a unity that covers over what
is missing.
14 In her article on A Touch of the Poe t . Laurin
Porter argues, convincingly, that Con's cousin Jamie
Cregan and the "Irish locals"-— Dan Roche, Paddy O'Dowd,
and Patch Riley— represent "Ireland and a past which Con
seeks to escape" (371).
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Like Lacan's child, however, Melody cannot maintain
this "one" indefinitely.15 In fact, as Melody begins to
look into the mirror in this scene, he is interrupted by
Henry Harford's lawyer, Nicholas Gadsby.16 Gadsby has
come to Melody's bar to offer Melody a bribe so as to
prevent Sara Melody from marrying Simon Harford (Henry
Harford's son). Melody, at first, mistakes Gadsby's
intentions and believes that he has come "to arrange, on
Mr. Harford's behalf, for the marriage of his son with
my daughter"

(247) . Gadsby, however, informs him that

Harford is "unalterably opposed" to any relationship
between Sara and Simon since "There is such a difference
in station"

(247). Gadsby then offers to pay Melody

three thousand dollars if he and his family "leave this
part of the country"

(247) . Insulted and enraged, Melody

orders "his soldiers" Roche and O'Dowd to throw Gadsby
15 As Laurin Porter points out, this
"transformation is destined to fail. In the first
instance, as a Gael, the status he enjoys as a British
officer is temporary at best; the English are still the
enemy. Moreover, one efficacious ritual is missing: a
communitarian context. Rituals emerge from a shared
belief system, articulate the faith and hope of the
community, and derive their power form communal
participation. Con's incantations can only be performed
when he is alone; an audience would not only break the
spell, it would render the moment ridiculous" (373) .
16 Gadsby's name is a fusion of character names
from Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsbv: Jay Gatsby and Nick
Carraway. O'Neill uses a similar combination in Strange
Interlude when he combines the painters Charles Sheeler
and Marsden Hartley to come up with Charles Marsden.
O'Neill does this to suggest a duality in the character.
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out of the bar. Melody then sets off with Jamie Cregan
to extract an apology from Henry Harford, or "By God,
I'll face him at ten paces or across a handkerchief"
(249).
When Melody and Cregan arrive at Harford's mansion,
they are met at the door by Harford's servants. Melody
demands to see Harford by insisting on his rights as a
British officer. As Cregan narrates it, "Con spoke with
the airs av a lord.

'Kindly inform you master,' he says,

'that Major Cornelius Melody,

late of his His Majesty's

Seventh Dragoons, respectfully requests a word with
him'"

(265). The servants refuse Melody's request and

then insult Melody and Cregan by calling them "drunken
Micks" and saying "'the place for the loiks av you is
the servants' entrance'"

(266). A fight begins, and

Melody and Cregan manage to overpower Harford's
servants. But just as they are about to enter the
mansion, the police arrive and drag Melody and Cregan
into the street, where Melody and Cregan are savagely
beaten; they are then jailed and released only after
Henry Harford intervenes on their part. At the end of
the night, Cregan returns to the bar "half-supporting,
half-leading" Melody.
O'Neill's stage directions indicate that Melody's
condition does not signify "drunkenness," but something
more serious:

"It is more as if a sudden shock or stroke

had shattered his coordination and left him in a stupor"
(264; italics removed). O'Neill continues: "His scarlet
uniform is filthy and torn and pulled awry....His eyes
are empty and lifeless. He stares at his wife and
daughter as if he did not recognize them (246; italics
removed). In this state, Melody conflates his drunken
brawl with the police and the Battle of Talavera, after
which he curses himself— "like a rum-soaked trooper,
brawling before a brothel on a Saturday night, puking in
the gutter"

(267)— and runs to the barn where he kills

his thoroughbred mare ("the livin' reminder...av all his
boasts and dreams" £273]). Melody then begins to speak
with a brogue and act as "auld Nick Melody's son"

(274).

He rejects his desired identity— "I'll be content to
stay meself in the proper station I was born to"

(274)—

and gives his daughter "a bit av fatherly advice":

if

she wishes to rise in the world, she should "Remember
the blood in your veins and be your grandfather's true
descendant." In other words, Sara "must make the young
Yankee gintleman [Simon Harford] have you in his bed,
and afther he's had you, weep great tears and appeal to
his honor to marry you and save you"

(274). Sara and her

mother are confused and outraged by Melody's behavior,
which they attribute, respectively, to his "play-acting"
or a blow to the head during his fight with the police.
Melody assures them that he is not playing a game—
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"You'll find it's no game. It was the Major played a
game all his life...and cheated only himself"

(274)— and

returns to the bar as "fresh as a man new born"

(277) to

drink with his Irish-American peers, where he tells
Cregan, Maloy, O'Dowd, Roche, and Riley that "I'll vote
for Andy Jackson, the friend av the common men like me"
(279) .
Before joining his friends, however, Melody stands
in front of the mirror for a fourth and final time. In
his dirty, torn British uniform, he says, "To hell wid
Talavera!"

(277) and begins to recite the familiar

stanza from Byron's Childe Harold, but this time, as
O'Neill indicates in the stage directions, there is a
difference; his gestures are not a repetition:

"He

strikes a pose which is a vulgar burlesque of his old
before-the-mirror one" (277; italics removed, emphasis
added). The "old before-the-mirror one" has
disintegrated in the face of the symbolic order.
Melody's rebirth, as O'Neill describes it, is his
belated entry into the symbolic.17 The unity of the
17 Laurin Porter sees Melody's "abortive attempts
at establishing himself as a businessman and American
aristocrat" as "valiant exertions of his imagination
[i.e. imaginary]" (373). Further, she argues, "only when
he is disgraced in his attempt to duel Henry Harford, a
real aristocrat... is he finally forced to acknowledge
the changes that time has wrought, to re-enter the
stream of history. But even then, he eludes reality,
shadowboxing with the present. In discarding the role of
the Major he accepts another, becoming not 'himself,' if
you will, a distinguished but poor proprietor of a New

mirror is interrupted first by Harford's lawyer and
then, more dramatically, by the local police— both
force, or enjoin, Melody to take up his position as a
subject relative to a social hierarchy, or structure,
that Harford has the power to control. For Melody, there
can be no admission to Harford's house; he cannot gain
access, for his admission would be a transgression that
Melody's "Irishness" will not permit. To Harford and his
servants, Melody represents a stereotype— another
"drunken Mick"— that should recognize his place and use
the servants' entrance. The outcome of the brawl is that
Melody submits, or takes up, the position assigned to
him by the symbolic order. Sara and Nora interpret his
actions as either the result of his perverseness or of
an injury. Melody, on the other hand, interprets his
actions, as do many critics, as a consequence or
comeuppance of/for his "ambition." These
interpretations, while they are at least partially
accurate— he is perverse, his change does occur after
the police club him on the head, and his pride is
destructive— -ignore the cultural apparatus that
functions to subjugate Melody.

England
becomes
because,
role as

inn, but his father, with a brogue so broad it
self-parody" (373). I disagree with Porter
as I suggest below, Melody does not accept his
an Irish-American; he is forced to accept this role.

Like Lacan's child in the mirror stage, Melody's
unified "one" is disrupted by "the name of the father"—
that place in the order of culture represented by the
father's function in the castration complex. In the
structure of the castration complex, the father becomes
the "expression" of a "paternal metaphor" that initiates
the child into the already-existent values and
representations of a culture (i.e. the law[s] of the
father). In Juliet Mitchell's reading of Lacan, "The
castration complex is the instance of the humanisation
of the child in its sexual difference....If the specific
mark of the phallus, the repression of which is the
institution of the law, is repudiated then there can be
only psychosis"

(19). The oneness of mother and child is

broken by the intervention of the father, and the
normative cultural values the father stands for (and
stands in for) enjoin the child to take up a position in
the symbolic order as either male or female. In much the
same way, the intervention of the law (Nicholas Gadsby
and the police, acting for Harford)

acts as a catalyst

that forces Melody to accept his difference. From this
point of view, his earlier class pretensions appear as a
kind of psychosis as he refuses to be subjected to (or
by) the cultural order in which he lives.
Melody's preten(d)sions make him a disjunctive force
because he is, in some ways, an absolute believer in the

national pedagogy, and this absolute belief makes him
disjunctive; that is, he refuses to yield to the order
of culture that makes his value only seeming. As his
daughter Sara says, "he's the easiest fool that ever
came to America!" because "when he came here the chance
was before him to make himself all his lies pretended to
be. He had education above most Yanks, and he had money
enough to start him, and this is the country where you
can rise as high as you like, and no one but the fools
who envy you care what you rose from, once you've the
money and the power that goes with it" (193-94). Sara,
of course, believes that Melody is self-dispossessed
because he allows himself to be tricked by the Yankee
gentry into buying a worthless piece of property, but
Melody is not just self-dispossessed; he is ripped off
by a hereditary aristocracy that controls the wealth of
the community into which he moves his family. Melody
believes he is a member of this community because he
possesses the criteria that should enable him to join
its apparatus: he has money, and he has been properly
educated. His "lies," as it were, represent a cultural
capital that should open doors. Like many immigrants,
Melody believes in Jefferson's concept of a "natural
aristocracy," an aristocracy based on education and
individual merit and not inherited wealth and power.
Unfortunately for Melody, the local gentry does not
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recognize his merits. In fact, his "gentlemanliness,"
like his drinking, becomes an "excess" that makes his
difference visible to the ruling class; his "overplaying
a role"

(197) makes him "unnatural" to a community that

values priority and the proper ethnicity as the
standards for gentlemanliness. Melody,

like Crevecoeur's

farmer or Jefferson's natural aristocrat, fails to
acknowledge the constraints established by the pre
existent structures of a class system, a system which
the founding of the nation was supposed to erase.
Viewed in this light, Melody's subjectivity is
disjunctive; he is not autonomous since his life in the
United States is a repetition of his life in Ireland.
America has not eliminated the class mechanisms of
Europe— the old subjectivities and dependencies do not
disappear in Massachusetts because they have been
transported to America, along with quasi-European class
structures (what Melody calls "old-world standards"
[205]). American history does not represent a break with
the past, but a repetition. Subjectivity becomes
recursive since Melody is subject to the same
inequalities as in Ireland. In other words, the new
nation becomes a stage on which Melody reenacts his
colonial relationship with England. In Po e t , the
community is not a "melting pot" where everyone is
welcome, but rather a space where opportunity is

107

transformed into greed and radical self-interest, which
act in tandem to destroy the community by alienating
individuals.
In P o e t , the structure most disrupted, or alienated,
by masculine desire is the family. In other words,
Melody's desire to be other is most problematic for his
wife and daughter. Travis Bogard comments that this
pattern is the central concern of O'Neill's last plays:
"What happens to a man who cannot deny his dreams? What
happens to his woman when he fails to deny them?"

(389).

In Po e t , as in all of the late plays, the answers are
inextricably linked, for Melody is dependent on his wife
and daughter to define his dreams. Like any proper
gentleman, he needs servants to insure his superiority.
He models his "American estate," as his daughter calls
it, on the patriarchal forms of European civilization,
but the space in which he operates as lord of the manor,
a bar, serves only to parody his aristocratic
pretensions. Nevertheless, as O'Neill suggests, Melody's
treatment of Nora has consequences that are other than
comic. Because Melody feels their marriage is exogamous,
he treats Nora as a social inferior, as a servant. While
he rides his mare and entertains his friends, Nora and
Sara are de facto responsible for the daily operations
of the bar. In fact, the bar would not function— and
thereby earn the family a living— without Nora and Sara.
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Nora acts as cook, and Sara is the bar's only waitress.
Melody, however, hires a bartender so that he will not
have to work.
Melody's desires have also put the family in debt.
Any cash earned in the bar is spent on feed for Con's
horse, while the mortgage and grocery bills are left
unpaid. Nora and Sara are also responsible for
negotiating with creditors when payment is demanded. In
addition, Nora's rheumatism is never treated because
Melody spends the family's money on his horse. As Sara
says, "The mare comes first, if she takes the bread out
of our mouths....he cares more for a horse than he cares
for us"

(191). Although Nora and Sara have more control

over their lives, Melody exploits his family in the same
manner that Harford exploits his hired servants. Because
Melody sees them as peasants, especially his wife, when
he speaks to them "His tone condescends" and he
addresses them as if they are persons of "inferior
station"

(198; italics removed). Melody complains to his

wife, "I tried my best to educate you, after we came to
America— until I saw that it was hopeless....You won't
even cure yourself of that damned peasant's brogue. And
your daughter's becoming as bad"

(201). Commenting on

these lines, C.W.E. Bigsby suggests that "Nora Melody's
subservience is underlined by her accent, as her
daughter's rebelliousness is by hers." Bigsy also
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suggests that Nora's "linguistic reticence marks...her
social impotence"

(95) . Another mark against her, in

Melody's eyes, is her physical appearance:

"For God's

sake, why don't you wash your hair? It turns my stomach
with its stink of onions and stew"
responds:

(202). To which Nora

"I do be washin' it often to plaze you. But

when your standin' over a stove all day"

(202).

Melody, on the other hand, is immediately attracted
to Deborah Harford, who O'Neill deliberately contrasts
with Nora's "peasant" qualities. While Nora is
overworked and "worn," making her look "much older" than
her forty years, Deborah is "forty-one, but looks to be
no more than thirty"; while Nora is "dumpy...with
sagging breasts, Deborah has a "fragile, youthful
figure"; while Nora is dressed in "old clothes" with
"cracked working shoes," Deborah "is dressed in white
with calculated simplicity"

(190, 215-16; italics
t

removed). Deborah embodies Melody's desire in that she
represents an object of exchange which Melody believes
he can use to gain status, just as he was able, albeit
temporarily, to gain access to the ruling class in Spain
by possessing a nobleman's wife.
When Sara points out to her mother that Melody
devalues her by treating Nora like a slave, Nora insists
that "I've pride in my love for him....For the love of
God, don't take the pride of my love from me...for

without it what am I at all but an ugly, fat woman
gettin' old and sick"

(192-93). Nora's "pride of love"

is her pipe dream. Her pride is also what O'Neill views
as the culturally specific behavior of a "typical pure
Irish family." In a letter to Eugene O'Neill, Jr.,
O'Neill describes the quality:

"My family's quarrels and
'TV-

tragedy were within. To the outer world we maintained an
indomitable united front and lied and lied for each
other. A typical pure Irish family. The same loyalty
occurs, of course,

in all kinds of families, but there

is, I think, among Irish still close to, or born in
Ireland, a strange mixture of fight and hate and
forgive, a clannish pride before the world, that is
peculiarly its own"

(Bogard and Bryer 569). Nora's love

for Melody, then, can be seen in the context of the
play, and in O'Neill's experience of his "Irishness," as
a way to hold the family together, as an attempt to
build a community where there is none, or where none is
provided. Nora's endurance of Melody, and the hardship
he exposes the family to, is a product of her habitus
(i.e. the internalization of her class position—
Catholic Irish peasant). Her "clannish pride" is a
residual practice of her peasant background, which
enables her to survive in a Protestant culture, first in
Ireland and later in the United States.

In Emigrants and Exiles. Kirby Miller uncovers a
"series of basic distinctions...between native Irish
Catholic culture and Protestant Irish, British, and
American cultures": "In broadest terms, much evidence
indicates that, in contrast to the Protestants they
encountered in Ireland and North America, the Catholic
Irish were more communal than individualistic, more
dependent than independent, more fatalistic than
optimistic, more prone to accept conditions passively
than to take initiatives for change, and more sensitive
to the weight of tradition than to innovative
possibilities of the future (107). Historically, Kirby
argues, these practices were created so Irish Catholic
peasants could survive the deprivations of rural poverty
and a rigid class system that prevented mobility. It is
somewhat ironic that Nora Melody is forced to employ
Kirby's categories in order to survive in America.
Certainly, there is an economic change in her station
since her days in Ireland, but she still uses what
Crevecoeur would call the "mechanisms of dependency,"
for the community she has entered is not, as the
national pedagogy asserts, assimilatory. In fact, in
many ways, O'Neill suggests that America is the same as
Europe. Nora's communal approach to life is a repetition
of her life in Ireland; she has not been liberated from
the oppressive class system of Europe by coming to

America; she does not better her condition. Ultimately,
she is left with Melody's debts and eventually retires
to a convent. In O'Neill's mind, America provides the
same opportunities for exploitation as Europe; there is
little difference. Immigrants do not escape their past—
the New World subject is recursive.
***

The sequel to A Touch of the Poet is More Stately
Mansions. In Mansions. Sara Melody has risen from the
poverty of her youth by marrying Henry Harford's son,
Simon. The play begins four years after the action of
Poet (1836) and traces the marriage of Sara and Simon
Harford until 1842. In Mansions. the overt political
context of the setting (i.e. the rise of Jacksonian
Democracy)

is not as foregrounded as in Poet. One

possible reason for this is that the manuscript is
unfinished and survives merely by chance. O'Neill did,
in fact, believe he had destroyed the play. Another
possible reason for this adjustment is that in Mansions
O'Neill turns his attention more specifically to the
pathology of "cunning acquisitiveness"

(i.e. the big

subject), to which he gives a psychological reading
(Freudian).18 That is, success, or the desire for
success,

is not attributed to some positive, simplistic

18 O'Neill's knowledge of Freud is well-documented.
See Bogard 345-47 and Sheaffer 244-45.

113

national pedagogy, but rather a maternal lack within the
male subject. Men are not materialistic because they
choose to be successful, or because they possess
opportunity and mobility, but because they
psychologically have to be. In O'Neill's mind, men are
acquisitive because they lack the "satisfying new One"
that would give their lives meaning. More important,
their desire is not the projection of an autonomous
will; it is predetermined by the structure of the preoedipal relationship with the mother. In fact, the
desire for autonomy (what O'Neill calls "selfsufficiency" or "self-possession") is only ever
expressed in absolute terms and is therefore always
destructive, which is what O'Neill evokes when he uses
the phrase "possessors, self-dispossessed."
To help readers identify the psychological
dimensions of Mansions. O'Neill provides us with a clue
in the second scene of Act III, where Simon retells a
"fairy tale" that his mother has told him as a child:
There was once upon a time, long ago in the past, a
young King of a happy and peaceful land, who through
the evil magic of an evil enchantress had been
dispossessed of his realm, and banished to wander
over the world, a homeless, unhappy outcast. Now the
enchantress...had in a last moment of
remorse...revealed to him that there was a way in
which he might regain his lost kingdom. He must
search the world for a certain magic door....She
told him that there was no special characteristic to
mark this door from other doors. It might be any
door, but if he wished to find it with all his
heart, he would recognize it when he came to it, and
know that on the other side was his lost kingdom.
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And so he set forth and searched for many years, and
after enduring bitter trials, and numberless
disappointments, he...found himself before a door
and the wish in his heart told him his quest was
ended. But just as he was about to open it...he
heard the voice of the enchantress speaking from the
other side...."Before you open I must warn you....If
you dare to open the door you may discover this is
no longer your old happy realm but has been
changed...into a barren desert, where it is always
night, haunted by terrible ghosts....So you better
be sure of your courage,” the enchantress called
warningly, "and remember that as long as you stay
where you are you will run no risk of anything worse
than your present unhappy exile befalling
you” ....She did not speak again, although he knew
she remained there...waiting to see if he would dare
open the door...But he never did....He felt she was
lying to test his courage. Yet, at the same time, he
felt she was not lying, and he was afraid. He wanted
to turn his back on the door and go far away, but it
held him in a spell and he could never leave it.
(443-44)
In the context of the play, Simon's story is an allegory
of male desire. The "young King" is Simon Harford as a
child, while the "beautiful enchantress" is Deborah
Harford, his mother. The "happy and peaceful land"—
"long ago in the past"— is the pre-oedipal unity, or
oneness, shared by son and mother,

in which "all [was]

happiness and beauty and love and peace." In this state,
Simon's relation to his mother is "presocial"; he has
not yet taken up his position in the symbolic order. As
Nancy Chodorow argues in a different context, he "is not
yet under the sway of the reality principle. The child
does not originally recognize that the mother has or
could have any separate interests from it. Therefore,
when it finds out that its mother has separate
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interests,

it cannot understand it" (79). The young

King's banishment or exile from the kingdom, then, marks
his entry into the symbolic order through the structure
of the castration complex; he is forced to give up his
mother as an object of desire and find "suitable"
substitutes. For Simon, this is the moment of the "lost
kingdom," after which he is forced "to wander over the
world, a homeless, unhappy outcast."
All is not lost, however. In an effort to recreate,
or "regain," the oneness of the pre-oedipal
relationship,

"He must search the world for a certain

magic door." This magic door, identified only by the
article "a," has "no special characteristics" to mark it
from other doors. It can only be discovered or
recognized by his desire (i.e. "with all his heart").
But his search for the door, unfortunately, never ends,
for after he pursues the door "for many years...and
numberless disappointments," he finds himself standing
"before a door"

(not "the" door) that he cannot enter:

the enchantress warns him that if he enters the door
(behind which she stands), he may discover that the lost
kingdom is really a "barren desert...haunted by terrible
ghosts." If he does not enter, however, he will remain
as he is in his "present unhappy exile"

(what Freud

views as normal adult unhappiness). In the end, Simon
can neither turn his back on the door nor can he enter
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the door, so he remains "standing before the door...a
beggar, whining for alms"

(444). The final gesture— the

inability to enter or to leave— marks Simon's
ambivalence toward his mother.19 Because he still
desires the oneness of their primary relation, he is
both angry at her and attracted to her; he is still
dependent on her (because he desires her) at the same
time that he desires not to desire her. As Simon tells
his mother,

"You dispossessed [read: abandoned] yourself

when you dispossessed me. Since then we have both been
condemned to an insatiable unscrupulous greed for
substitutes to fill the emptiness, the loss of love we
had within us"

(534) .

The "necessary concrete symbol"

(533) of this

emptiness, or loss, becomes the structure of desire
revealed in the fairy story, the search for a magic
door. The door can never be entered; it can only be
sought after as a door because the original object ("the
One")

is irretrievably lost to the subject. This is the

lack that, in Lacan's view, constitutes desire. Simon's

19 Linda Ben-Zvi argues that this ambivalence is
paradigmatic of male identity in many of O'Neill's
plays; she identifies the structure as the "pull
between... two seemingly dichotomous poles": "freedom and
fixity." In Mansions. for instance, Simon represents
"the dual image of the man who would go and the man who
would stay...O'Neill presents in [Mansions] one
character with a dual self, desiring both movement
toward individuation and a commensurate movement back to
infancy, mother and primal home" (21-2).

117

goal can never be reached because its completion would
bring incest (and madness), and so in seeking out
substitutes for his mother, he never attains, or catches
up to, his mother. Yet his mother is always "speaking
from the other side" of each door that he finds himself
before. In many ways, Simon's quest resembles what
Slavoj Zizek describes as the "paradox" of Lacan's
object petite a ;
A goal, once reached, always retreats anew. Can we
not recognize in this paradox the very nature of the
psychoanalytic notion of driTve, or more properly the
Lacanian distinction between its aim and its goal?
The goal is the final destination, while the aim is
what we intend to do, i.e., the way itself. Lacan's
point is that the real purpose of the drive is not
its goal (full satisfaction) but its aim: the
drive's ultimate aim is simply to reproduce itself
as drive, to return to its circular path, to
continue its path to and from the goal. The real
source of enjoyment is the repetitive movement of
this closed circuit. (5; italics removed)
The structure of desire (drive/goal/aim)

in the play is

constructed around Simon's loss of the pre-oedipal
object, his mother. He then compensates for this
separation by finding substitutes for his desire. As he
says,

"What has been taken for me, I take back"

(529).

His abandonment marks his entry into the symbolic order,
in which he gives up his mother as an object and
identifies with his father's role, a feat that is only
fully accomplished when Henry Harford dies.
The literal loss of the imaginary in Simon's life is
marked by his abandonment of his vocation as a poet, as
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a would-be writer of utopian tracts. When he gives up
his mother, who encourages his writing, and becomes as
his father (a husband, a father, a rich businessman), he
also renounces his utopian project, the authorship of a
book "to show people how to change the Government and
all the laws so there'd be no more poor people, nor
anyone getting the best of the next one, and there'd be
no rich but everyone would have enough"

(305). Simon

begins his project in Poet, where he lives, after
graduating from Harvard and refusing to work for his
tycoon father, in a cabin— which he builds— by a lake.
The cabin's measurements, as described in O'Neill's
stage directions, are the same as those of Thoreau's
cabin on Walden Pond, according to Virginia Lloyd.20
O'Neill links Simon to Thoreau in order to underscore
Simon's eventual rejection of Thoreau's politics, which
are embodied in Simon's desire to construct a society,
as David Robinson remarks in another context,

"of social

and economic equals, made independent through their
ecomomic dependence on the land alone yet bound together
in a supportive and compassionate community"

(17).21

20 Floyd calls the cabin "an exact replica of
Thoreau's hut at Walden" (217).
21 This rejection is underscored in the stage
directions at the beginning of Act Two, where O'Neill
describes the cabin as "[giving] evidence of having been
abandoned for years. The mortar between the stones of
the chimney has crumbled and fallen out in spots. The
moss stuffing between the logs hangs here and there in
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O'Neill links the action of Mansions to the ideology of
the Revolutionary fathers in order to underscore the
spiritual abandonment of the principles of the
Revolution. That is, Simon's rejection of Utopian
politics for the greedy acguisitiveness of a robber
baron parallels a similar rejection in the collective
values of the nation; and given Simon's subject
position, O'Neill sees this trajectory as inevitable; he
becomes like his father because he can be nothing else,
or, to put this in terms that I have already used, his
life is structured by a structure that, O'Neill
suggests, is at once universal and particular.
As I suggest above, the structure that most
determines Simon's life is the oedipal structure within
his particular family. Inseparable from this
construction— indeed part of it— is the specific class
habitus O'Neill gives to Simon. That is, as a
child/member of the ruling class, Simon has access to a
network of opportunity (a set of specific social
relationships) that is denied to someone born into a
lower class (Sara Melody, for example). Simon's class
position therefore enables him to compensate for the
straggly strips. The windows have baords nailed across
them" (314). As Simon becomes more corrupt, he is unable
to remember how he built the cabin or even how to repair
it without using the labor of others: "I shall have to
send someone out here to repair things. I wish I could
do it myself. What labor it cost me to build this
without help. Yet I was never happier" (318).

maternal lack in very specific ways. Simon's start in
business, for instance, is provided by a loan from his
mother, which he uses to buy into a friend's textile
mill. These doors are not open to either Con or Sara
Melody, or even to Simon's mother. Further, after his
father dies, Simon is invited by his family to take over
the Harford Company, which he then merges with his
cotton mills to form a corporation ("His Company must
cease to exist. There must be only my Company" [375]).
His assumption of his father's role, however, as Laurin
Porter notes, leads to a "complication":

"Unlike his

father [Simon] is not content with the role of business
tycoon. Having experienced the world of the imagination
at his mother's feet...he knows that life holds more
than the thrill of concluding another deal"

(377). Yet

while he may recognize this, he is powerless to change
his life precisely because he sat at his mother's feet
in the imaginary, and so his desire oscillates back and
forth between the maternal and the material. As he says
to Deborah,

"I'll admit I do get deathly sick of the

daily grind of the counting house— the interminable
haggling and figuring and calculation of profits, the
scheming to outwit the other man, the fear that he may
outwit you— a life where Mammon is God, and money the
sole measure of worth! It is not the career I would have
chosen. I would have lived here [his cabin] in freedom
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with Nature, and earned just enough to support myself,
and kept my dreams, and written my book"

(331). At the

same time, however, as his wife argues, "when he's
himself, there's no one takes more joy in getting ahead.
If you'd see his pride sometimes when he comes home to
tell me of some scheme he's accomplished"

(306).

Simon's "duality," as Travis Bogard calls it,
gradually gives way to an insatiable greed. He renounces
his utopian book in order to become the "King of
America," a phrase that O'Neill often juxtaposes with
the word "Napoleon." Deborah, in fact, often refers to
Simon as "the Company's victorious little Napoleon" or
"the conquering Napoleon"

(434, 515). This combination

is not accidental; it is used not only to comment on
Simon's character, but also the "character" of the
nation. From O'Neill's perspective, as the nation became
more interested in "commerce," it betrayed its
democratic principles in favor of a "false aristocracy"
of Industry, just as in France, Napoleon the Liberator
betrayed the French by becoming Napoleon the Tyrant, a
dictator who, in the name of freedom, attempted to
enslave Europe. O'Neill also uses Napoleon as a figure
to represent what he saw as the brutality of the "greedy
capitalist ruling classes" who were destroying the
country for profit and eliminating what he referred to
as the "Forgotten Class": "the small businessman, shop
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keeper, white collar worker, professional man, small
farmer, etc....The people who are the finest type of
American"

(Bogard and Bryer 528-29, 539).

Simon, of course, is a representative of the former
and, like Napoleon, becomes so greedy that he cannot see
when his own greed begins "devouring itself"

(Bogard and

Bryer 529). Phrased differently, he becomes a slave to
his "possessive instincts," which he mistakes for
freedom, autonomy, and self-sufficiency. As he insists,
"the possession of power is the only freedom"

(392).

This is the "foundation of the new morality" that, in
his mind, replaces the utopian dream:
The game of Commerce has its own ethics, and they
are more frank and honest— and so, more honorable!—
truer to the greedy reality of life than any
hypocritical personal ones. The only moral law here
is that to win is good and to lose is evil. The
strong are rewarded, the weak are punished. That is
the sole justice which functions in fact. (388)
A codicil to the new moral law is the "true revelation
of [man's] nature":

"What he desires is what he is"

(361). In Simon's mind, the objects of his desire
ostensibly replace the pre-oedipal self-sufficiency of
the mother-child relationship. As I have been
suggesting, his desire enacts a substitution that is
supposed to compensate for the loss of the mother, but
the loss is never satisfied. Significantly, every
accomplished deal leaves Simon feeling empty: "It's the
usual reaction. I concentrate all my mind and energy to
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get a thing done. I live with it, think of nothing else,
eat with it, take it to bed with me, sleep with it,
dream of it— and then suddenly one day it is
accomplished— finished, dead!— and I become empty,
exhausted, but at the same time restless and aimless and
lonely, as if I had lost my meaning to myself— facing
the secret that success is its own failure"

(389) .

At this point, the quest for the lost object begins
again. As he tutors his wife,

"You must keep your eyes

fixed on the final goal of your ambition....Keep your
whole mind and will concentrated on what must still be
accomplished before your Company can be out of danger,
safe and absolutely self-contained, not dependent on
anything outside itself for anything, needing nothing
but itself. Until that is done, how can you enjoy any
true freedom within yourself— or any peace of happiness"
(499). The outcome, however, will always be the same:
emptiness,

loss, frustration. The consequence of this

revenge against the maternal is that the objects of
Simon's desire have no use value, only exchange value.
Caught up in a circuit of horizontal expansion, he
accumulates possessions that bring him no satisfaction
or meaning,

just endless repetition and a desire to

"complete the chain"

(499). That is, in order to make

his cotton empire self-sufficient, he not only buys
cotton mills but also slaves, plantations, slave
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dealers, slave ships, shipping companies, banks,
railroads, retail stores; and his "crowning
achievement," that "would complete the circle with a
vengeance," is to "conceive a scheme by which the public
could be compelled to buy...cotton goods"

(500). In the

end, however, as Simon says, "One finally gets a sense
of confusion in the meaning of the game, so that one's
winnings have the semblance of losses"

(413).

Simon's confusion, or lack, ultimately leads him
full circle to his mother, the inaccessible object. In
Act IV, Simon attempts to give the fairy tale a "happy
ending" by entering his mother's "forbidden summerhouse"
(445).22 As Deborah says in an earlier conversation with
Simon, "I remember how resentful you were at the
[original] ending. You used to insist I imagine a new
ending in which the wicked enchantress had reformed and
become a good fairy and opened the door and welcomed him
home and they both were happy ever after"

(444). Simon

then confesses that he has confused the door in the
story with the door to his mother's (real) summerhouse.
In the climax of the play, Simon tries to stage the
happy ending by passing through Deborah's door in order
to reconstitute the imaginary:

"Mother....All I ask is

that you go back and change that— change the ending—

22 In Poet Deborah calls the summerhouse "a little
temple of liberty" (224).

open the door and take me back....There will be only
love and faith and trust in life....There will be only
you and I! There will be peace and happiness to the end
of our days!*' (535). Simon's return to the maternal,
however, is doomed to failure because it signifies
psychosis. Crossing the threshhold of the "forbidden"
door would be incest, an absolute transgression because
it is a denial of the symbolic. Simon's act will not
bring, as he desires,
with what we have"

"greedless security and content

(535); it can only bring only madness

and suffering for him and for Deborah. In the end,
however, Sara upholds his position in the symbolic by
maintaining her position; by acting as his wife, and not
an acquisitive whore (more about which in a moment),
Sara rescues Simon by restoring him to his proper postoedipal role, father and husband. Ultimately, her
actions force him to forget his mother.
Sara begins the play as Simon's business partner. As
Simon's chief advisor, she is conspicuously involved in
the daily operations of the Harford Company. But as
Simon's appetite grows, a traditional division of labor
arises. Sara becomes more and more responsible for the
children and the household, while Simon focuses
exclusively on making deals. Simon becomes so obsessed
with business that he eventually stops sleeping with his
wife and moves to another bedroom. To alleviate her

loneliness, Sara begins a friendship with her mother-inlaw that eventually excludes Simon from the domestic
operations of the home. As Simon complains,

"I was never

anything more than a necessary adjunct of a means to
motherhood— a son in one case, a husband in the
other...so I am left alone, an unwanted son, a discarded
lover, an outcast without any meaning or function in my
own home"

(391). At this point, as Laurin Porter notes,

"He becomes a fondly tolerated outsider who wrests a
living from the world and returns home at night, a
member of the family in name more than essence"

(374).

Feeling "left entirely out of it" (389), Simon prepares
to "take back what belongs to me"

(391). Using the

knowledge he has gained as "a Napoleon among traders,"
Simon sets in motion "the strategy of dividing in order
to conquer— of creating strife and rivalry, and waiting
until the two opponents are exhausted destroying each
other— then I step in to take advantage of their
weakness to possess them both"

(392-93). In the end,

however, Simon possesses nothing since his strategy
eventually leads to Deborah's madness and death and to
Sara's spiritual transformation.23
23 It should be noted here, albeit perhaps too
briefly, the implicit criticism of the bourgeois family
structure that Porter sees in the play. That is, because
the family is necessarily constructed around the demands
of a the market, because the father travels out everyday
to the world of commerce to support the family, he
becomes a member of his family in name only. He becomes,

Sara's spiritual rehabilitation occurs only after
she succumbs to and then rejects the dominant values of
the play, which Simon represents. This is also O'Neill's
way of denouncing the dominant, acquisitive (masculine)
values of American culture. As Simon's wealth and power
increase, Sara's goal, at first, is to build "more
stately mansions" on the property where his utopian
cabin stands in ruins. About this property, Sara says to
her mother: "There's over two hundred acres, and he
bought it for a song, and the little lake on it is
beautiful, and there's a grand woods that would make a
fine park. With a mansion built on the hill by the lake,
where his old cabin was, you wouldn't find a better
gentleman's estate"

(305). Hearing this, Nora tells Sara

"Glory be, but you sure av havin' your way"
which Sara responds,

(305). To

"I am, Mother, for this is America

not poverty-stricken Ireland where you're slave! Here
you're free to take what you want, if you've the power
in yourself"

(305). The irony of this statement is that

in rising Sara becomes a "slave," or enslaved, by her

as O'Neill suggests, an outcast without any meaning or
function in his home. He does, however, have a meaning,
and this meaning, as Nancy Chodorow argues, is
reinforced by his absence: "Although fathers are not as
salient as mothers in daily interaction [within the
family], mothers and children often idealize and give
them ideological primacy, precisely because of their
absence and seeming inaccessibility, and because of the
organization and ideology of male dominance in the
larger society" (181).

desire. As she puts it, "for where is the glory of life
if it's not a battle where you prove your strength to
rise to the top and let nothing stop you!"

(305). Like

Simon, however, enough is never enough; there is no end
to accumulation or consumption. Sara's original dream,
"to make him [Simon] retire, a landed gentleman the
minute we've enough"

(336) never materializes because

Simon is never satisfied. O'Neill, again, as in P o e t ,
constructs Sara's desire as different from Simon's. Her
subject position, and its habitus, does not give her the
same options as does Simon's— although, interestingly,
it gives her the same goals: wealth and power. As she
tells Simon, "I'm a fool always dreaming of wealth and
power...even while I know in my heart that it doesn't
matter at all, that your love is my only wealth— to have
you and the children. But I can't help dreaming.... I've
known what you haven't--poverty— and the lies and dirt
and hurt of it that spits on your pride while you try to
sneer and hold your head high"
vein, she tells Deborah,

(308-09). In a similar

"I may have greed in me. I've

had good reason to have. There's nothing like hunger to
make you greedy"

(335).

Nevertheless, because she is essentially
subordinated to Simon's desire, because of her unequal
gender and class status within the marriage, the family,
and the culture, she enslaves herself by embracing his
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desire; she identifies too closely with his masculinity.
In other words, her possession of power is always once
removed and always dependent on the other; she can only
have access to power through her husband, through his
desire. In this respect, she resembles, for a brief
period, what Shari Benstock calls "woman-in-thefeminine." The role she plays, or represents, for the
masculine acts as a "guarantor" of the cultural system
that oppresses her.24 She participates in his desire
when Simon, as part of his "campaign" to destroy the
union of mother and wife, asks Sara to become his
"mistress." In order to repossess his house, to "become
absolute master"

(396), Simon negotiates a deal with

Sara whereby she agrees to become his business partner
by becoming his whore:
This is a new secret life for us...which concerns
the Company's life, since it will be lived here in
it. So it must be strictly a business partnership, a
deal for profit on both our parts. A double life of
amorous intrigue for each of us....You will be
revenging yourself on your husband who has grown
bored with his virtuous wife, by selling yourself to
a lover. And I think the husband will be keeping a
beautiful mistress to take my wife's place. (411)
Sara's payment for her services will be a "piece by
piece," or trick by trick, acquisition of "the whole
Company," which is already bankrupt, made worthless by
Simon's desire for complete autonomy. At this point,

24 For a detailed discussion of
feminine" see Benstock 3-46.

"woman-in-the-
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Sara is a symptom of Simon's desire since he cannot get
pleasure but through acquisition. For him, all purchase
has become equal,

in business and in love. Again,

everything has only exchange value. Sara's "use”
satisfies nothing; it is merely a trick he plays on
himself by becoming dependent on his desire.
As Sara gradually purchases the business, she
becomes like Simon. She acts as if she is "an understudy
learning to play [his] part"

(414). "As you learn,"

Simon says, "I will let you act in my stead now and then
until finally you will find yourself capable of taking
my place"

(414). It is only, however, when she stands in

his place— in the position of male power and dominance—
that she is able to reject Simon's desire and thereby
overcome her own. In the penultimate scene of the play,
Simon gives her "full authority" to act for him in a
meeting with Benjamin Tenard (492). He instructs Sara to
"humiliate" Tenard— a former bank president who Simon
has "ruined"— so that Tenard will come to work for the
Harford Company. According to Simon, Tenard's "oldfashioned ethics and honor" made him "open to attack
and...easy to ruin"

(491). Simon's final words of advice

to Sara before he turns the meeting over to her are
"Just bear in mind that the end you desire always
justifies any means and don't get life confused with
sentiment"

(491).

Fortunately, for both Tenard and Simon, Sara does
confuse life with sentiment, or feeling. As she is
acting as Simon, trying to "swindle" Tenard by forcing
him to submit to Simon's brutality, which s/he can do
only because Tenard is unemployed and has a family to
support, Sara can imagine herself only as the other of
Tenard and Simon. When she tells Tenard that he will be
required "to conduct [her] banking business with the
entire ruthlessness as to the means used of a general in
battle," and that "where it is necessary, you must
faithfully do things which may appear to your old
conceptions of honor like plain swindling and theft"
(495), he refuses her offer of a job. "I'd rather starve
in the gutter," he says (495). Enraged Sara berates
Tenard:

"Arrah, God's curse on you for a manI You and

your pride and honor! You're pretending to love your
women and children and you're willing to drag them down
with you to suffer the bitter shame of poverty, and
starve in the gutter..."

(495). Tenard thanks her for

reminding him of his "duty," and he then accepts the
job. O'Neill's stage directions describe Sara's outburst
in the following way: "[she] suddenly bursts out in a
strange rage as if he had touched something deep in her
and infuriated her— [she lapses] into broad brogue,
forgetting her office attitudes"

(495; italics removed).

Sara's forgetting of her office decorum is caused by a
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recollection of the destructiveness of masculine desire,
specifically her father's pride, which she and her
mother experienced as suffering and deprivation. Because
of the unequal family relations of her youth, Sara can
only know herself through her previous subordination,
and she is therefore ultimately unwilling to align
herself with Simon and his male perspective. In other
words, she can imagine herself as Tenard's daughter or
his wife and does not want them to suffer as has she. In
regaining this knowledge, Sara in turn renounces the
end-justifies-the-means business practices, or
acquisitiveness, that O'Neill sees as the dominant mode
of American masculinity, and which Sara sees as the
cause of her suffering. She warns Simon that she'll
leave the Company and "take my children and go to the
old farm and live a decent, honest women working in the
earth"

(496). And she makes good on her promise, for in

the epilogue of Mansions, Simon and Sara and their
children are living on the "old farm" in Simon's "old
cabin by the lake," where they are content and working
the land (548; italics removed). Here, Sara tells Simon,
who is recovering from a "brain fever," that she'll
never ask him "to succeed again"

(556) and that they are

at last free "from the soul-destroying compulsion to
keep on enslaving [themselves] with more and more power
and possessions"

(555).

On O'Neill's part, the gesture of Sara's return to
the Thoreauvian cabin by the lake partially represents a
nostalgia for an agrarian utopia as set forth in the
writings of Crevecoeur, Jefferson, and Thoreau, a
strategic retreat from the complex historical problems
the nation was facing in the 1940s. Sara's refusal,
however, also represents a utopian moment amidst the
despair of O'Neill's late plays, where any kind of
redemption seems to be illusory, or a necessary fiction.
The return to the cabin is a genuine committment on
Sara's part, and O'Neill's, to recover America's utopian
book ("the old values"), to construct an imagined
community where "there'd be no more poor people, nor
anyone getting the best of the next one, and there'd be
no rich but everyone would have enough"

(305). Sara's

plan, however, is always in danger of being disrupted by
a repetition of masculine desire, an eruption of the
national subject, for as her son Jonathan says in the
epilogue:

"No, I don't want to be a farmer....There's no

money in farming. You can't get ahead. And I'm going to
get ahead"

(550). The ambiguity created by the

juxtaposition of Sara's and Jonathan's speeches (and the
ideologies they represent) at the end of the play works
to supplement the more sanguine message of Mansions. and
produces a reading more in line with the pessimism of
O'Neill's final plays. That is, by suggesting that

Simon's sons will repeat their father's mistakes, just
as Sara and Simon reenact their fathers' pathologies,
O'Neill underlines the recursive, predetermined nature
of American subjectivity, a pattern that the national
pedagogy denies. In addition, O'Neill also suggests, as
do Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller a few years
later, that men have little choice about what they
become; their lives are predetermined. O'Neill's more
"psychological" interpretation of American culture,
however, stresses that the basic structures of American
life— the family and the economy— provide men with
little satisfaction or meaning.

Chapter Four
Tennessee Williams and the Instrumentality of Reason
During the 194 0s, the Frankfurt School theorized a
new stage of capitalism, what Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno called late-capitalism; and, as Frederic Jameson
reminds us, their model stresses two fundamental points:
first, "a tendential web of bureaucratic control... and
[second] the interpenetration of government and big
business... such that Nazism and the New Deal are related
systems"

(Postmodernism xviii). What this

"interpenetration" of government and industry meant was
a fascistic organization of society. As Herbert Marcuse
argued, fascism "is not only a terroristic political
coordination of society [i.e. Nazi Germany], but also a
non-terroristic economic-technical coordination [that]
operates through the manipulation of needs by vested
interests [i.e. American big business]," which also
"precludes the emergence of an effective opposition
against the whole"

(One-Dimensional Man 3). The

Frankfurt School redefined fascism in order to record
the emergence of similar tendencies in Germany and the
United States; according to Horkheimer and Adorno in
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), "One day the edict of
production, the actual advertisement... can turn into the
open command of the Fuhrer. In a society of huge Fascist
rackets which agree among themselves what part of the
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social product should be allotted to the nation's needs,
it would seem anachronistic to recommend the use of a
particular soap powder. The Fuhrer is more up-to-date in
unceremoniously giving direct orders for both the
holocaust and the supply of rubbish” (160). Horkheimer
and Adorno's comparison of Nazi propaganda— "blarring
from radios, movies, and bullhorns”— and the commericial
media in the United States, or what they called ”the
culture industry,” is not simply a warning about the
brutality of the Fuhrer; it is a radical reformulation
of the idea of the subject, a reformulation which is
historically determined by the rationalization of two
related systems, Nazism and American mass consumerism.
The figure of the Fuhrer is more ”up-to-date” only
because it represented a hyper-rationalization of
production that made the "edict of production” in the
United States, by comparison, seem "anachronistic."
Indeed, as Andrew Hewitt asserts, the "key analytical
observations [in Dialectic of Enlightenment! arise from
the insights afforded by the comparison of capitalism
and fascism," which Horkheimer and Adorno use to "insist
upon a historical mutation in the structure of
subjectivity, a mutation brought about by capitalism as
the rational instantiation of Enlightenment thought"
(144-45; italics removed). By identifying the subject as
an effect of the "technological rational" that dominated
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late-capitalist cultures, Horkheimer and Adorno
suggested that representations and models of the liberal
subject (constituted by the culture industry and always
present in memory) were being used repressively to
reduce subjectivity to a series of "protocols" or, as
Marcuse argued,

"pre-given external standards."

Their discovery was a radical rewriting of Freud's
theory of introjection. In other words, as Marcuse
suggested at the time, introjection no longer described
how individuals internalized social controls because it
represented "a variety of relatively spontaneous
processes by which a self (Ego) transposes the 'outer'
into the 'inner,'" a process that was hostile to
external standards and modes of behavior and therefore
created "an individual consciousness and an individual
unconscious apart from public opinion and behavior."
Under late-capitalism, or what Marcuse called "the
machine age," "inner freedom" or "private space" had
been "invaded and whittled down by technological
reality":

"Mass production and mass distribution claim

the entire individual.... The result is, not adjustment
but mimesis: an immediate identification of the
individual with his society and, through it, with
society as a whole"
original).

(One-Dimensional Man 10; italics
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Horkheimer and Adorno in turn argued that this
claiming, or interpellation, of the subject produced
instrumental reason:

"Through the countless agencies of

mass production and its culture the conventionalized
modes of behavior are impressed upon the individual as
the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. He
defines himself as a thing, as a static element, as
success or failure"

(28). They believed that individual

consciousness was being reduced to a series of
homogenous codes or modes of operation found on the job,
on the radio, in the movies, and in the then emerging
television industry. For Adorno, these standardized
models signaled the end of the liberal subject since
"motivation in the old, liberal sense" was being
appropriated and "systematically controlled and absorbed
by social mechanism which are directed from above"
("Freudian Theory" 13 6). In other words, the subject's
desire for success— for material wealth,

to "get

ahead"— , which the subject believed was self-generated,
was,

in fact, his identification with the rationale of

the apparatus, which had programmed individual
consumption as spontaneous thought or reason or the
assertion of individual will.
The effect of their rewriting of the subject
radically destabilized received cultural knowledge about
masculine autonomy and revealed desire as a self-

139

alienating structure constituted by the other. In
effect, they revealed the national subject of American
culture as a contradiction, as a sort of Orwellian
cliche (i.e. conformity is freedom), and in so doing
tarnished the most sacred object of American life— the
self-made man, the rugged individual, the exceptional
American. The effect of Dialectic of Enlightenment was
to reduce the hero of the nation to its hated opposite,
the victim. His desire was constituted and structured by
the edict of production; his reason had become
instrumental; it was used by the apparatus for profit.
Thought had become anachronistic and reappeared as
"stereopathy," the desire to conform. In Horkheimer's
estimation, reason was merely "the ideological
projection of a false universality which now shows the
autonomy of the subject to have been an illusion":
"exploration of meanings is replaced by an acquaintance
with functions"; to be successful, the subject need only
"sound like the vocal chords of the radio, film and
magazine"

("The End of Reason" 36-40).
•kick

I do not want to suggest here that Tennessee
Williams was an avid reader of the Frankfurt School— he
was not. Nor do I want to suggest that he was a cultural
theorist. What I do want to suggest, however, is that
many of Williams' plays written in the forties reflect
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the transformation of subjectivity theorized by the
Frankfurt School, and that he linked these changes to
political movements in Europe. More specifically, he
compared the construction of American masculinity to the
practices of European fascism. In my opinion, he would
have agreed with Marcuse's argument that fascism is the
coordination of "society" from above, which masks the
agenda of vested interests and blocks the emergence of
humane social relations.1 This belief is especially
evident in his two most famous plays, The Glass
Menagerie (1945) and The Streetcar Named Desire (1947),
in which artistic figures struggle against a
homogenizing, repressive masculinity that seeks to
eliminate difference. Scholars and critics have resisted
such overt "political" readings of Williams' plays
because they have been too interested in defining his
"Southernness," or they have been too interested in
universalizing his aesthetic using neo-Aristotelian
1 In his Memoirs. Williams suggests that he was
interested in discovering a "new social system": "One
day Leonard Bernstein and I were both invited to lunch
by a pair of very effete American queens. Bernstein was
very hard on them and I was embarrassed by the way he
insulted them. 'When the revolution comes,' he declared,
'you will be stood up against a wall and shot.'
Bernstein has since been accused of something called
'radical chic.' But looking back on that luncheon, I
wonder if he is not as true a revolutionary as I am, the
difference being that I am not interested in shooting
piss-elegant queens or anyone else, I am only interested
in discovering a new social system— certainly not
Communist, but an enlightened form of socialism, I would
suppose" (93-4).
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categories in order to bring it in line with New
Critical ideologies. A third tendency has also emerged,
most notably in readings of The Glass Menagerie; that of
reading the plays using the playwright's biography or
family history (notably absent in this narrative, until
recently, however,

is any concrete theorization of the

author's homosexuality).2 While these approaches
somtimes yield interesting results, they fail to account
for the author's realoolitik during the decade of the
forties. In fact, in the hands of many critics,
Williams' politics are reconstituted as a non-politics,
as a kind of neo-Romantic evasion of the political.
Like Arthur Miller, Williams was acutely aware of
the economic and technological changes taking place
during the two decades that followed the Depression. The
more autonomous practices of labor were slowly becoming
obsolete as scientific innovation further homogenized
the workforce and often reduced work to a series of
"Taylorized" movements. The "managerial revolution" that
took place during these two decades, which brought large
numbers of white males into the middle class, programed
men to fit into a homogenous corporate structure. Like

2 Two recent and notable exceptions to this trend
are John Clum's Acting Gav: Male Homosexuality in Modern
Drama and David Savran's Communists. Queers, amd
Cowboys; The Politics of Masculinity in the Work of
Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams. See Clum 149-66
and Savran 76-174.
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their working-class counterparts, the labor of these men
was often reduced to a series of repetitive tasks.
Culture too was being homogenized as the emergent
entertainment technologies (radio, movies, television)
were used to produce consumers. The consumer became an
"abstract" projection of the publicity apparatus of
capital; the white, male, heterosexual American citizen
was now the universalized consumer. In other words, the
wishes of the "individual"

(an empty category, according

to Horkheimer) were equal to the desires of the machine,
of which the individual was a function.
***

One of the earliest plays in which Williams deals
with the standardization of American culture is The Last
of Mv Solid Gold Watches, a one-act written circa 1940.
In the play, Charlie Colton, "the last of the Delta
drummers"

(Wagons 75) lectures Bob Harper, a young

corporate salesman, about the changes in the economy:
The road is changed. The shoe industry is
changed.... You can take it from me — the world that I
used to know...is slipping and sliding away from
under our shoes....The ALL LEATHER slogan don't sell
shoes anymore. The stuff that a shoe's made of is
not what's going to sell it anymore! No! STYLE!
SMARTNESS! APPEARANCE! That's what counts with the
modern shoe-purchaser, Bob....Why I remember the
time when all I had to do was lay out my samples
down there in the lobby...A sales-talk was not
necessary. A store was a place where people sold
merchandise and to sell merchandise the retaildealer had to obtain it from the wholesale
manufacturer, Bob! Where they get the merchandise
now I don't pretend to know. But it don't look like
they buy it from wholesale dealers! Out of the air—
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I guess it materializes! Or maybe stores don't sell
stuff any more! Maybe I'm living in a world of
illusion! (Wagons 81-2; italics removed)
Colton goes on to tell Harper that "Initiative...selfreliance. .. independence of character," the "old sterling
qualities that distinguished one man from another," are
"Gone with the roses of yesterday"

(Wagons 83-4; italics

removed). Harper, bored with Colton's speechmaking,
insists that Colton has missed the "vital statistics"
and that Colton belongs to the "past"

(Wagons 84).

Furious, Colton, with a final warning, throws Harper out
of his hotel room: "My point is this: the ALL-LEATHER
slogan is not what sells anymore— not in shoes and not
in humanity, neither. The emphasis isn't on quality.
Production, production, yes"

(Wagons 84).

Colton's exchange with Harper reflects Williams'
understanding of the structural changes taking place
within monopoly capitalism during the first four decades
of this century: in theory, the shift from monopoly
capitalism to late capitalism represents itself as the
eventual elimination of the "Delta drummer" in the face
of the organizational man, Bob Harper, who Williams
views as a product of the restructuring of the economy.
The further rationalization of production, which was
intensified by the advent of World War II, made the
qualities that Colton values— initiative, self-reliance,
independence— obsolete, at least as these qualities were

embodied in the practices of a drummer. Likewise,
Colton's complaint about the disappearence of the
wholesale manufacturer points to a consolidation of
production and distribution brought about by centralized
corporate planning, a practice which also eliminated
traditional practices and meanings. In Williams' view,
the standardization of production represented by Harper
reduces social relations to "vital statistics" so that
men (and women) became interchangeable. That is, the
symbolic apparatus deployed to construct consumers
constituted them as generic so that they became
indistinguishable from one another. The transubstantion
of meaning represented by the replacement of "ALL
LEATHER" with "STYLE! SMARTNESS! APPEARANCE!" marks the
advent of the publicity apparatus, the illusion, the
simulacra. Meaning is no longer immanent in the
material; it has been detached from the object so that
it can be used to program consumption.3 Desire is
thereby transformed, and the subject is now merely a
consumer— an abstract projection subject to the same
slogans and desires as all consumers, a statistic.
Bob Harper represents Williams' earliest critique of
a standardized masculinity determined by intrumental
reason. He is also an early version of both Jim O'Connor

3 For an explanation of style, or preplanned,
obsolescence see Marchand 156-63.
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and Stanley Kowalski.4 Harper also resembles another
salesman, Willy Loman, in that like Willy Loman, Harper
is a consuming/producing identity; he consumes the massproduced objects of commodity culture— Williams has him
carrying a comic book throughout the play— , and he
generates sales for the concern of "Schultz and Werner."
His surname is meant to remind readers of Harper's
Magazine. and, as such, it suggests a standardization of
the subject by making Harper conterminous with the
commodity form. And this is precisely the
rationalization of consciousness

(conformity) that

Williams sought to oppose in his plays.
As he wrote in 1945, "art is a kind of anarchy, and
the theater is a province of art"

(Wagons vi i ) :

Art is only anarchy in juxtaposition with organized
society. It runs counter to the sort of orderliness
on which organized society apparently must be based.
It is a benevolent anarchy: it must be that and if
it is true art, it is. It is benevolent in the sense
of constructing something which is missing, and what
it constructs may be merely criticism of things as
they exist. (Wagons vii-viii)
Here Williams was commenting on the function of
community theater, which he felt had become too

4 Charlie Colton, on the other hand, with his
insistence on "tradition," is meant to represent what
Williams perceived as the passing of Southern
aristocratic culture, the collapse of a traditional
social structure in which relationships were regulated
by rigid social codes and a class hierarchy based on
race, gender, and inherited wealth and property. In this
sense, Colton resembles both Amanda Wingfield and
Blanche DuBois.

"respectable"

(i.e. "the province of grey-suited

corporate lawyers and...their wiv e s ... impeccably lady
like" [Wagons vii]). But he was also commenting on the
conformity of American life in general, which, he
argued, was a reaction to European Fascism and
Communism— and the opposite of the "Democratic impulse"
as envisioned by Jefferson and Lincoln (Wagons x i ) . For
Williams, this enforced conformity resulted from a
paranoia (Williams calls it confusion) that threatened
to eliminate the "freaks":

"It seems to me, as it seems

to many artists right now, that an effort is being made
to put creative work and workers under wraps. Nothing
could be more dangerous to Democracy, for the irritating
grain of sand which is creative work in a society must
be kept inside the shell or the pearl or idealistic
progress cannot be made. For God's sake let us defend
ourselves against whatever is hostile to us without
imitating the thing we are afraid of" (Wagons xii); and
in Williams' mind, America had come to imitate "the
thing" it feared, as the antagonism between the
"irritating grain of sand" and the progress of the
nation became more one-sided in favor of repressive
forces. At this point, Art, or artistic labor, became a
kind of resistance, criticism, or anarchy that sought to
oppose standard modes of thought or conduct.
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Williams specifically calls for a "new" artistic
praxis in the "Production Notes" to The Glass Menagerie,
where he aligns himself with the European avant-garde by
calling for "a new, plastic theater" that would "take
the place of the exhausted theatre of realistic
conventions"

(GM 7); this "must" be done, he argued, if

"the theatre is to resume vitality as a part of our
culture"

(GM 7).5 Commenting on these lines, Esther

Merle Jackson notes that Williams associated "vitality"
with "the return of the theatre to its natural fuctions:
to joyous and irreverant entertainment, to shock and
terror, to symbol-making, and to the figurative
exploration of life"

(Broken World ix). Neverthless,

Williams' adoption of expressionist techniques in The
Glass Menagerie was, in my opinion, primarily driven by
his opposition to realism, which he associated with the
homogenizing forces, or "orderliness," of "organized
society."6 Realism, which he describes as "the
5 Because it is the most widely circulated version
of the play, I have used the "reading edition" of The
Glass Menagerie . For an explanation of the debate
surrounding the "reading" and "acting" editions, see
Rowland 62-74.
6 By "expressionist" I mean to suggest an attitude
or praxis rather than a specific artistic style that can
be defined as expressionistic. That is, many of the
"isms" of the modernist or avant-gardistist movements
are opposed to the status quo of institutionalized art
and hegemonic cultural arrangements. For discussions of
Williams' "expressionism," see Esther Merle Jackson 342. See also Frank Durham 121-34 and Nancy Tischler 31-41.

unimportance of the photographic in art"

(GM 7), had

become ineffective for conveying the "truth":
"Expressionism and all other unconventional techniques
in drama have only one valid aim, and that is a closer
approach to truth"

(GM 7). He was attempting to discover

"a more penetrating and vivid expression of things as
they are" because "truth, life, or reality is an organic
thing which the poetic imagination can represent or
suggest... only through transformation, through changing
into other forms than those merely present in
appearance"

(GM 7). For Williams,

"the merely present in

appearance" was the dominant way of narrativizing
experience in a commodity culture, a structure or way of
seeing that led away from the truth. By adopting a
position antagonistic to the realistic narrative of
American culture, then, he hoped to resist the "meansends rationality" dominating state "Democracy." One of
the models he chose for such a task was Picasso's
Guernica.
The word "Guernica" appears twice in The Glass
Menagerie, and most critics have assumed that Williams
used it merely as part of the "social background" of the
play (GM 23). Readers will remember that the city of
Guernica was leveled by German and Italian fighters and
bombers on the afternoon of April 26, 1937. The city
burned for three days, and over three hundred people
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were killed, mostly civilians. The destruction of
Guernica was part of a Nazi policy to use the "Spanish
Civil War as an arena for trying out the airmen and
planes of [Goering's] new Luftwaffe"

(Chipp 24, 32-34).

This early coordination of land and air forces also
became the model for the Nazi Blitzkreia; that is, the
attack on Guernica was part of the Nazi concept of
"total war." As German military journals argued at the
time,

"war [was] not just between armies but between

whole peoples— thus justifying the bombing of civilians
as well as of the armed forces"

(Chipp 22). It is clear

that in bombing Guernica no effort was made to
differentiate between military and civilian targets. Key
military targets were, in fact, not even touched, and
eyewitnesses reported seeing German fighters kill
peasants and townspeople by strafing the streets and the
countryside. Guernica marks the first atrocity of the
Second World War— a bloody example that would be
followed by the firebombing of Dresden, Shanghai, and
London, the nuclear conflagrations of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and the Holocaust. Goering's "laboratory
experiment" was also paradigmatic of the type of
masculine violence and domination that led to mass
slaughter and annihilation: men were programed by the
war machine to kill one another, and they were joined
together with other instruments (guns, tanks, airplanes)
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in order to accomplish their killing in a more efficient
manner. Organized by their alienation and fear, men
became parts of the killing machine that destroyed other
human beings.
In mentioning Guernica, critics have systematically
taken Tom Wingfield at his word— that as part of the
"social background" of the play, Guernica is only an
isolated reference to the social, and it is therefore
not essential to the play's (universal) meaning. A good
example of this type of reading is found in Gilbert
Debusscher's "Tennessee Williams's Unicorn Broken
Again." In this essay, Debussher attacks Grigor Pavlov
for misrepresenting the following lines from Tom
Wingfield's opening narration:
In Spain there was revolution. Here there was only
shouting and confusion. In Spain there was Guernica.
Here there were disturbances of labor, sometimes
pretty violent, in otherwise peaceful cities such as
Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis...
This is the social background of the play. (GM 23)
Pavlov, according to Debussher,
in the following manner:

interprets these lines

"That was a time of profound

social and political upheaval in the bourgeois world."
Debussher claims that Pavlov's "description of the late
thirties illustrates his characteristic method of
twisting the work out of shape to fit his preconceived
[read: political] views"

(50). He goes on to berate

Pavlov for presenting the narrator's comments "out of
context," thereby "imply[ing] that the destruction of

the Basque city, and more generally, the events of Spain
are comparable in impact to the social unrest prevalent
in American urban centers"

(50). According to Debussher,

"What Tom says...is precisely the opposite of what Mr.
Pavlov leads us to believe: compared to Spain, where
World War II was in rehersal, America witnessed only
minor disturbances"

(50). Quoting the critic Joseph N.

Riddel, he then argues that Williams was "grouping for a
more universal statement"

(51) . And just what was that

more universal statement? "It is less the social picture
in itself that Williams is interested in than the effect
of strained circumstances on his characters, less
middle-class America under financial stress than man in
general reacting to adversity of any nature"

(51).

But Williams has not specified general adversity; he
has specified adversity of a very specific nature— "the
fiery Braille alphabet of a dissolving [American]
economy"

(GM 23), which Williams, as Pavlov suggests,

compares to events in Europe. Debusscher chooses to deny
this link, and in so doing becomes like "the huge middle
class of America [that] was matriculating in a school
for the blind"( GM 23). His eyes have failed him, and he
thereby becomes a reader very much like Amanda Wingfield
who rereads the social text by repressing it and
engaging in nostalgia (Debussher, for his part, prefers
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the untainted categories of Aristotelian analysis.).7
Further, his repression of history from the text as a
way to rescue it from contamination (or "false"
contextualization)

leads to an eventual and violent

return of the repressed, much like Chamberlain's
strategy of appeasement led to genocide. The connection
for Williams, as I suggest above, is that by making
European Fascism or Communism the Other of American
Civilization, difference is repressed, and we become the
thing we fear.8 Historically, the "disturbances of
labor" that Tom Wingfield mentions in his introduction
are the first instances of a renewed battle over the
instrumentalization of the workplace, which is finally
accomplished in the full-blown late capitalism of the
Reagan era. The disturbances of the thirties mark the
initial engagements of this centripetal movement; as
"big business" and the state began to consolidate their
7 Debussher also misses another of Williams'
gestures meant to comment on the blindness of the
middle-class. In scene five, Amanda sits on a newspaper
whose "enormous headline reads: 'Franco Triumphs'" (GM
56; italics removed). Amanda ignores current events as
"She spreads [the] newspaper on a [fire escape] step and
sits down, gracefully and demurely as if she were
settling into a swing on a Mississippi veranda" (GM 56;
italics removed); this gesture can also be read as the
author s[h]itting on Franco. Jim O'Connor makes similar
(mis)use of the newspaper when he spreads it on the
dining room table to prevent candle wax from staining
the finish.
8 Michael Rogin has theorized this mindset as the
"countersubversive mentality." See Rogin 44-80.
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control over the apparatus, a homogenization of
consciousness was produced that eventually manifested
itself as McCarthyism.9
I would now like to return to Guernica to expand on
an earlier point: that it provided an important example
for Williams. My remarks here will also serve as a
transition to more specific remarks about the The Glass
Menagerie. Picasso's painting, as Herschel Chipp notes
in his study of Guernica,

"became the most discussed

work of art of the time, and the story of the tragic
defense of the Republic might have faded from world
consciousness much sooner had it not been for Picasso's
powerful imagery"

(166). Indeed, as soon as the painting

arrived in New York in May of 1939, it became a cause
celebre for the artistic left and an object of derision
for more conservative elements in the artistic
community. Its arrival corresponded with the opening of
the Modern Museum of Art in New York, which had mounted
a forty-year retrospective of Picasso's work to
celebrate the occasion. Guernica was also exhibited in
Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago to raise funds
for the Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign. The American
avante-garde championed the painting as the most
important example of modernist art yet seen in the
9 For a detailed explanation of the defeat of the
American labor movement during this period see Mike
Davis 52-101.
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United States. Defenders of realism, or what Chipp calls
traditionalism, however, ridiculed the painting as
"cuckoo art"

(163). In a review in the New York Times,

for instance, the influential critic Edwin Allen Jewel
attacked Guernica's "foreign values" and was upset by
the "grotesque shapes, human and animal, flung into a
sort of flat maelstrom"

(qtd. in Chipp 162).10

Williams was certainly aware of the debate
surrounding the painting, and it is very probable that
he saw Guernica since, as Donald Spoto documents, he was
in New York during the time the painting was first
exhibited there.11 Picasso's masterwork would have
interested him for two reasons. First, Guernica's
fragmented imagery represented a type of modernism that
Williams was trying to adapt for the stage, an
"expressionism" that would challenge the realism that
conformed to the instrumentality of organized society.
The montage, in effect, was a way for the artist to
construct a "higher truth"; this is precisely what
Picasso's mural aimed to do, and this is what Esther
Merle Jackson argues Williams was attempting to do with
his art:
For the images created by Williams are not conceived
as copies of any known reality. If there is a
10 For an extended discussion of "Guernica in
America" see Chipp 156-79.
11 See Spoto 64-114.
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nature, a state, an individual, a reality, a truth,
or a God in the universe of Williams, it has been
derealized. For Williams, reality itself lies
shattered. In the fragmentary world of his theatre,
new images are pieced together form partialities:
they are composed from splinters of broken truths.
(Broken World 36)
Second, the critique of Picasso's painting from the
right— that it was ugly, that it was political, that it
was subversive— also figured for Williams the experience
of the artist in a culture that was increasingly
dominated by rationalistic ways of thinking, a
conformity that endangered modernist artistic practices.
As C.W.E. Bigsby notes,

"Williams w a s ... inclined to see

the public world as an image of determinism that could
never be successfully defeated or transformed by the
impact of the moral will, but only resisted by the
imagination"

(2: 30). The rationality that dominated the

public world, that determined male conduct, was in
conflict with non-productive forces of art and the
imagination freed from the efficiency of the apparatus;
this antagonism between two opposing forces plays itself
out in many of Williams' dramas where two different
types of masculinity (or ways of being)— the
instrumental or the heteronomous and the artistic or
spontaneous— produce the conflict which sustains the
momentum of action.
The appearance of Guernica/Guernica in the text of
The Glass Menagerie acts as a link between the type of
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German nationalism (Nazi instrumentality) Picasso was
protesting and the type of fascism Williams saw as
latent in the dominant American masculinity, or
nationalism. Williams' intervention can thus be
theorized as an example of what Homi Bhabha calls "the
antagonistic perspective of nation," whereby the
marginalized intervenes in discourses that "rationalize
the authoritarian, 'normalizing' tendencies within
cultures in the name of national interest"

(Introduction

4). Williams did not intervene only from the marginal
position of the artist, however; he also intervened, as
Gore Vidal points out, from the marginal position of a
gay man who was always aware of his "otherness"-— in a
culture that sought to extirpate every vestige of
homosexuality (xix-xxv). Nowhere is Williams'
intervention into the dominant masculinity more
pronounced than in The Glass Menagerie.
***

The setting of The Glass Menagerie marks the same
economic consolidation and resulting crisis of the
subject that we see in Death of a Salesman and in the
theorizations of the Frankfurt School:
The Wingfield apartment is in the rear of the
building, one of those vast hive-like
conglomerations of cellular living-units that flower
as warty growths in the overcrowded urban of the
lower middle-class population and are symptomatic of
the impulse of this largest and fundamentally
enslaved of American society to avoid fluidity and
differentiation and to exist as one interfused mass
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of automatism....At the rise of the curtain, the
audience is faced with the dark, grim rear wall of
the Wingfield tenement. This building is flanked on
both sides by dark, narrow alleys which run into
murky canyons of tangled clotheslines, garbage cans,
and the sinister latticework of neighboring fire
escapes. (GM 21; italics removed).
The rationalization of the economic and the social
structures of the nation ("The Century of Progress") has
not, in Williams7 estimation, resulted in the liberation
of the lower middle-class, or any class (except,
perhaps, those who run the apparatus). "Symptomatic" of
this class' enslavement, Williams suggests,

is its

homogenization by the forces of production; its members
are like worker bees, instruments that move to the tempo
of the apparatus; they thus lack "fluidity" and
"differentiation." They are not only self-alienated, but
they are also alienated from each other in the
"sinister," "murky," "tangled" environment of the
tenements, a system of habitation that enforces
isolation and alterity. People living in this space
exist as atomized producer/consumer bits of a
homogenized workforce.
These buildings are also the "warty growths" of what
Southern cultural historians like to call the "New
South," the "hive-like conglomerates" of the working
class that sprung up in cities like St. Louis during the
process of industrialization— a process that is
narrativized as the "collapse" of Southern culture.

(i.e. the "Old South"). According to Joseph Davis, the
narrative is a synthesis of W. J. Cash's The Mind of the
South and Paul Gaston's The New South Creed. In this
conceptualization, Southern "history" emerges by
repressing slavery and constructing "the Old South...as
an almost idyllic agricultural society of genteel people
and an aristocratic way of life, exemplary in its
pattern and content. A visionary moment of the American
dream occured and past; now its history transformed into
the story of a fallen order, a ruined time of nobility
and heroic achievements that was vanquished and
irrevocably lost"

(203). The tenements represent

elements of this "fallen order." Davis calls them
"landscapes of the dislocated mind"

(192), and he argues

that Williams employs the imagery of a tenement in order
to problematize Amanda Wingfield's nostalgia for the
"Old South." That is, because Amanda is unable to
understand her historical situation, she invents (or
goes along with) a "pseudo-history" which condemns her
to a "marginal, inauthentic existence"

(Davis 203). As a

result, for Davis, Amanda becomes the "prototype for all
of Williams' southern women":
...Amanda is directly responsible for the terrible
and permanent alienation of Laura and Tom. Because
she herself has withdrawn from reality, preferring
rather dreams of a lost time in the South, Amanda
has handed her children over to a similar, if not a
worse, psychology and grim fate. The Glass
Menagerie, in effect, gives us Williams' poignant
dramatization of the dreadful human waste of
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illusions. The majority characters in this play are
so warped and their lives so distorted and perverted
by fantasies that each is left with only broken
fragments of what might have been. (205)
Two things strike me about Davis' reading of Amanda.
First, he deals with Amanda unfairly, and, second, his
reading is melodramatic in the sense that it is
reductive. I agree with Davis that Amanda is unable to
understand her historical position, but he places too
much responsibility for her children's "dreadful”
illusions on Amanda's shoulders. I would argue, in fact,
that her children have no illusions— they realize that
the culture in which they live is hostile to artists and
"cripples.” As Nancy Tischler suggests, Williams
”endow[s] the mother with some masculine practicality,
thus giving Amanda Wingfield an exceedingly complex
personality"

(34). "Although she has approached much of

her life unrealistically," Tischler writes,

"her plans

for her children and her understanding of their
shortcomings are grimly realistic.... She tries to find
Laura a protective corner of the business world. When
this fails, she rallies for the valiant but hopeless
attempt to marry the girl off"

(35). In the absence of

the father, Amanda acts as the father.
What concerns me here, however, in regard to both
Davis' and Tischler's remarks are the ideas of agency
represented by both. Davis sees Tom and Laura as
distorted or perverted by the psychology of their

mother. Tischler, more the diplomat, sees the faults of
the children as "shortcomings, *' politely suggesting that
the children have failed to conform to a normative model
of behavior. The comments of both, however, reveal an
interesting problem for readers of the play, a problem
which Tischler is more self-conscious of than Davis.
Namely, as she suggests, all the characters fall outside
the Aristotelian or Neo-Classical categories of the
tragic. In describing Amanda's failure to marry off
Laura as "tragic," Tischler notes that her "use of the
term tragic corresponds with Mr Williams's":

"I do not

see most of his people as having the stature of
classical or neo-classical tragic heroes, but in their
symbolic value they do express heroism. Their status and
their values are not so exalted as in the older plays.
They are more realistic and pathetic than the
traditional hero was allowed to be.

(35)

Tischler seems to be suggesting that although
Williams' characters express or embody "the heroic,"
they are somehow diminished because they lack the status
and/or values of kings, queens, or aristocrats. One of
their "shortcomings" is that they lack agency or
autonomy— the fundamental criteria of the tragic hero
and not coincidentally the "quality" our culture most
values, at least in males.

In the eyes of Davis and

Tischler, Amanda seems to be "short" this quality, just
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as are Tom and Laura. A similar subtext often motivates
criticism of Death of a Salesman since, as I suggest in
the last chapter, Willy Loman is programed by the
apparatus to fit the body of capital; he is therefore
not responsible for his subjectivity because he has
none, at least in the normative sense of the word. The
Wingfields and their "gentleman caller" are a bit
different than the Lomans, however.
Amanda,

like Willy, is only too willing to become an

instrument of the apparatus. Amanda's nostalgia is, in
fact, appropriated by the publicity apparatus of the
machine; that is, in an effort to keep her from thinking
herself as a subject the apparatus instrumentalizes her
desire using the narrative of romance. Her desire for
the "Old South" is represented by her constant retelling
of courtship stories from her youth: "One Sunday
afternoon in Blue Mountain— your mother received—
seventeen!— gentleman callers! Why, sometimes there
weren't chairs enough to accomodate them all....My
callers were gentleman— all! Among my callers were some
of the most prominent young planters of the Mississippi
Delta— planters and sons of planters

(GM 26). Amanda's

romance, however, ends unhappily; she married the wrong
man— not a gentleman, but "a man who worked for the
telephone company"

(GM 82)— and he deserted her. In an

attempt to rewrite history, Amanda tries to provide her
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daughter with the "happy ending" that has eluded her. As
Tom reports, after his sister has failed to become a
typist,

"the idea of getting a gentleman caller for

Laura began to play a more and more important part in
Mother's calculations"

(GM 37).

In order to accomplish this task, to raise money to
"properly feather the nest and plume the bird"

(GM 37),

Amanda sells subscriptions to The Homemaker's Companion.
Tom describes the magazine as "the type of journal that
features the serialized sublimations of ladies of
letters who think in terms of delicate cuplike breasts,
slim, tapering waists, rich, creamy thighs, eyes like
wood smoke in autumn, fingers that soothe and caress
like strains of music, bodies as powerful as Etruscan
sculpture"

(GM 37). In her telephone sales pitch (an

early version of telemarketing) to Ida Scott, Amanda
raves about a "new serial" by Bessie Mae Hopper:
Oh, honey, it's something you can't miss! You
remember how Gone with the Wind took everybody by
storm? You simply couldn't go out if you hadn't read
it. All everybody talked about was Scarlett O'Hara.
Well, this is a book that critics already compare to
Gone with the W i n d . It's the Gone with the Wind of
the post-World-War generation! (GM 38)
Later, this time speaking to Ella Cartwright, she pushes
the same author:

"It's by Bessie Mae Hopper, the first

thing she's written since Honeymoon for Three....It's
has a sophisticated, society background. It's all about
the horsey set on Long Island!"

(GM 55).

Williams, of course, is critiquing Amanda's taste in
literature; this is, after all, the same woman who
refuses to have the novels of D. H. Lawrence in her
house since she prefers the virtues of subliminated sex
to "That hideous book by that insane Mr. Lawrence [Lady
Chatterlv's Lover? 111 (GM 39). Amanda, in essence,
resists the type of artistic production that her son
finds liberating. The "literature" that she reads and
that she peddles to her sisters in the D.A.R. represents
a homogenization of form that Williams sees as
repressive. Harper's comic books in The Last of Mv Solid
Gold Watches are another example of the mass-produced
fiction that Williams hated and so ofter parodied in his
plays.

(The plot of The Glass Menagerie, as Rodger Stein

points out, is, in fact, a "failed" romance [136].) The
standardization of "romance" represented by Bessie Mae
Hopper's latest novel has appropriated Amanda's desire
for the "Old South"; Amanda's description of the novel
suggests that antebellum Georgia and modern Long Island
have become the same thing (exotic locations) which only
appear to be different. As mise en scene, these
locations are emptied of their specificity and become
fields in which interchangeable characters act out
scenes for interchangeable plots. Romance and desire
have been instrumentalized.

My characterization of the popular romance, as
Janice Radway would certainly point out, is reductive
and pessimistic, for as she argues in her research,
women often read romances as an oppositional act that
Radway calls "combative and compensatory"

(211).

Nevertheless, as Radway herself admits, the social
practice of reading (consuming) a romance helps the
reader to engage "in an activity that shores up her own
sense of her abilities, but she also creates a
simulacrum of her limited social world within a more
glamorous fiction. She therefore inadvertently justifies
as natural the very conditions and their emotional
consequences to which her reading activity is a
response"

(214). My point here is also Williams'— that

Amanda's consumption of romance fiction helps her to
create a simulacrum within the oppressiveness of the
tenement, which is a flight from history: the other
justifies her misery. In her desire,

like Willy Loman,

she is (has become) a consuming/producing identity. She
consumes by reading; she produces by selling the desires
of others to others. She also reproduces, or attempts to
reproduce, the desire of the other in her children. This
is manifest by what Erich Fromm calls "pseudo-thinking"
whereby, according to Adorno and Horkheimer,

"The might

of industrial society is lodged in [people's] minds"
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(Fromm 208-30; Horkheimer and Adorno 127). As with Willy
Loman, memory becomes the site of the other.
Amanda functions as a manager or regulator for the
apparatus because she attempts to assimilate her
children to the program of the machine; she wants them
to conform, to be "normal people" as she puts it (GM
75). She wants them to become instruments, not "freaks"
or "cranks." Indeed, as James Reynolds writes,

"Tom and

Laura are pushed into commercial careers that conflict
with their temperaments and aspirations"

(523). Amanda's

first words in the play are the words of the other:
Honey, don't push with your fingers. If you have to
push with something, the thing to push with is a
crust of bread. And chew-— chewI Animals have
secretions in their stomachs which enable them to
digest food without mastication, but human beings
are supposed to chew their food before they swallow
it down. Eat food leisurely, son, and really enjoy
it. A well-cooked meal has lots of delicate flavors
that have to be held in the mouth for appreciation.
So chew your food and give your salivary glands a
chance to function! (GM 24; italics removed)
Her "constant directions" and "calculations," as Tom
calls them, also include advice about health, work, and
success. At various points in the play, for example,
Amanda tells Tom to eat a good breakfast, drink less
coffee, and spend less money on cigarettes so that he
will be a productive worker:
Amanda:.... Eat a bowl of purina!
Tom: Just coffee, mother.
Amanda: Shredded wheat biscuit?
Tom: No. No mother, just coffee.
Amanda: You can't put in a day's work on an empty
stomach. You've got ten minutes— don't gulp!
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Drinking too-hot liquids makes cancer of the
stomach...Put cream in.
Tom: No, thank you.
Amanda: To cool it.
Tom: Noi No, thank you. I want it black.
Amanda: I know, but it's not good for you. We have
to do all we can to build ourselves up. (GM 49).
Elsewhere, when Tom informs his mother that he goes to
the movies every night because he "likes adventure"
("Adventure is something I don't have much of at work,
so I go to the movies"

[GM 51]), Amanda tells him that

"Most young men find adventure in their careers"
51). Tom responds,
warehouse"

(GM

"most young men are not employed in a

(GM 51). To which Amanda responds,

"The world

is full of young men employed in warehouses and offices
and factories"

(GM 51). She concludes the exchange by

reemphasizing that most men find adventure in their
careers, or "they do without it!"

(GM 52). Amanda

insists that Tom conform so that he can work his way up
the ladder: "Try and you will succeed!

(GM 49; italics

removed).
The lines of Amanda's just quoted are typical of her
idiolect— as such they represent the voice of the
publicity apparatus, or as Horkheimer and Adorno
suggest, the heteronomous knowledge of the non-subject.
Amanda believes that what she is thinking is hers, that
she has arrived at her beliefs through her own thought
processes, but this is an illusion. Most of what she
says and thinks is given to her by the other: magazines,
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radio, newspapers (when she reads them). Like Willy
Loman, she has been colonized from without, and the
subject/object, inside/outside split of identity has
collapsed. Her goals are determined externally. As
Horkheimer wrote in 1941 ("The End of Reason"), "The
individual has to do violence to himself and learn that
the life of the whole is the necessary precondition of
his own"

(30). Non-subjectivity has been

instrumentalized as subjectivity, as agency or
character.
Nowhere is this non-subjectivity in subjectivity— an
inversion that goes unrecognized by the subj ect— more
apparent than in her advice to Tom about success and in
her desire for "the gentleman caller"; both embody the
rationalization of the whole. AS both James Rowland and
Rodger Stein stress, Amanda's cliches about success are
part of the Horatio Alger/Dale Carnegie narrative of
masculinity. According to Stein, for example,

"Try and

you will SUCCEED!" "is another of Amanda's illusions,
[and] it is one shared by her fellow Americans, for 'try
and you will succeed' is the traditional motto of the
American dream of success, the theme of confident selfreliance canonized in the romances of Horatio Alger"
(Stein 137; Rowland 69). Stein might have said
"traditional model"; this would have been more accurate
because hard work and perseverance as the "keys" to
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success are the behaviors most often modeled by the
publicity apparatus in its formalized version of
American citizenship.
To Amanda, the gentleman caller embodies "this
image, this specter, this hope"

(GM 37). As she

interrogates Tom about Jim O'Connor, it becomes clear
that this is the type of man she wants, not only to
"replace" Tom but also to provide financially for
herself and Laura. But as we will see in a moment, Jim
O'Connor, as Rodger Stein points out, represents an
inversion of "democratic values"

(142). Because he

desires to use "knowledge to gain power and money,"
O'Connor is an "apologist" for the economic system that
has imprisoned the Wingfields (Stein 142).
When Tom tells his mother that O'Connor is a
shipping clerk, Amanda says, "Sounds like a fairly
responsible job, the sort of job you would be in if you
just had more get-up" (GM 63). Amanda also asks about
his salary and is pleased to learn that he earns
"approximently eight-five dollars a month"

(GM 63). What

really pleases her, however, is when she discovers that
O'Connor is the "type that's up and coming" and that "he
goes in for self-improvement"

(GM 64); this is

"splendid" news to her:
Then he has visions of being advanced in the world!
Any young man who studies public speaking is aiming
to have an executive job some day! And radio
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engineering? A thing for the future! Both of these
facts are very illuminating" (GM 65).
In contrast to her son, the gentleman caller has the
"get-up" needed to advance in the corporate world. Like
Willy Loman, O'Connor possesses the desire of the other,
the instrumentalized reason of the publicity apparatus;
he too is programmed to fit the body of American
capital. He is the hero of the Algerian romance; he
desires upward mobility, and he is preparing for this
expected eventuality by going to night school. What
appears in his "character'1 to be subjectivity (free
will, the desire to better himself)

is actually external

knowledge, the goals of every other that have been
determined by the other. Jim O'Connor is not unique.
Like Willy Loman, he is a "desiring machine" created by
the culture industry to fit the needs of the apparatus.
As a "type" he is necessary, but he does not necessarily
have to be successful; he can desire success as long as
he works and consumes, as long as he is not a "crank" or
a "cripple," as long as he avoids the "sin" of
inefficiency.
Jim O'Connor's conformity, however, has not brought
him success. Tom tells us that after moving in a
"continual spotlight" in high school, O'Connor's rise
has slowed: "He was shooting with such velocity through
his adolescence that you would logically expect him to
arrive at nothing short of the White House by the time
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he was thirty. But Jim apparently ran into more
interference after his graduation....His speed had
definitely slowed. Six years after he left high school
he was holding a job that wasn't much better than mine”
(GM 68). His "uniqueness" or "celebrity" achieved in
high school disappears as he enters the regulated
structure of the corporation; he becomes like all men.
In fact, Tom suggests that he is useful to O'Connor
merely because he can "remember his former glory"

(GM

68). In order to resume his rise, O'Connor embraces the
normative model of masculinity, the national identity,
the masculine unconscious. His decisive non-decision to
be unique (i.e. successful) represents an absolute
conformity to the apparatus; his desire for autonomy is
really its opposite. As Horkheimer and Adorno note, "The
perfect similarity is the absolute difference....Now any
person signifies only those attributes by which he can
replace everybody else: he is interchangeable, a copy.
As an individual he is completely expendable and utterly
insignificant"

(145-46).

Williams calls attention to Jim O'Connor's
instrumentality on the first page of the play, where he
describes Jim as "A nice, ordinary, young man"

(GM 5).

"[N]ice," "ordinary," and "young" are the only qualities
Williams assigns the character. What calls even more
attention to his description of Jim is that Williams

uses at least three sentences to describe the other
characters. Jim gets only five words. My dictionary
gives nine definitions of nice, four of which apply
here: ’’Pleasing and agreeable in nature; enjoyable” ;
"Having a pleasant or attractive appearance"; "Courteous
and polite; considerate"; "Of good character and
reputation (American Heritage 840-41). Jim could
certainly be described as "pleasing and agreeable,"
"pleasant" and "attractive," and "courteous." In fact,
he's a stereotypical "nice guy." That is, he conforms to
the dominant model of middle-class behavior: He's white,
heterosexual, optimistic, hardworking; he's the high
school hero that Laura worships; he's the the gentleman
caller that Amanda worships. In his banality, he's
indistinguishable from the matinee idol that embodies
what Williams calls "our national myth, the cornerstone
of the film industry if not Democracy itself," the
"Cinderella story": "Anyone with such beautiful teeth
and hair as the screen protagonist of such a story was
bound to have a good time one way or another, and you
could bet your bottom dollar and all the tea in China
that that one would not be caught dead or alive at any
meeting involving a social conscience"

(GM 11). He has

the commodified appearance that the publicity apparatus
engenders, but like the products he resembles, he is all
surface; he lacks depth. He resembles all the others; he
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is the normative, universal model that has reduced
difference to repetition.
Jim O'Connor is also "ordinary":

"Commonly

encountered; usual"; "Of no exceptional degree or
quality; average"

(American Heritage 875). In this, he

represents the standardization of American culture and
masculinity that Harper was a precursor of in The Last
of My Solid Gold Watches and that Stanley Kowalski
represents in Streetcar. In Williams' view, he lacks
imagination. He also represents the concept of
instrumental reason as described by the Frankfurt
School:

"His yardstick is self-preservation, successful

or unsuccessful approximation to the objectivity of his
function and the model established for it" (Horkheimer
and Adorno 28). Jim O'Connor, like Willy Loman, speaks
as the other, and this voice is most apparent in his
contact with Laura Wingfield.
Laura, as readers will remember,

is crippled, and

because of this, she is "terribly shy"; she is so shy,
in fact, that Amanda is unable to assimilate her into
the dominant modes of the apparatus. Laura is unable to
conform to the codes of Rubicam's Business College. As
her mother sarcastically says, "We won't have a business
career— we've given that up because it gave us nervous
indigestion!"

(GM 34). The name "Rubicam" is an allusion

to Raymond Rubicam, owner of, at the time, the nation's
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most famous and powerful advertising agency, Young and
Rubicam, which helped to develop the now hegemonic
practices of the advertising industry.12 Williams uses
the name to figure the kind of machinery that was
deployed to insure conformity. Just as ad agencies view
individuals as statistics to be manipulated, so too the
Rubicam Business College reduces Laura to the abstract
by employing a universal training method. The individual
matters to the other only because he or she is able to
become (to act, to perform)

like every other. Unable to

conform, Laura spends her days on the margins of the
culture she cannot join:
I went to the art museum and the bird houses at the
Zoo. I visited the penguins every dayI Sometimes I
did without lunch and went to the movies. Lately
I've been spending most of my afternoons in the
Jewel Box, that big glass house where they raise the
tropical flowers. (GM 33)
Laura's problem— her inability to standardize herself—
only arouses feelings of frustration in her
mother/manager, whose solution is to marry Laura off to
a "normal" man. Laura is apprehended by her
administrator as a problem; she is at odds with the
logic of the system and therefore must be reintegrated.
Amanda believes, as the song goes, that "love is the
answer," or at least romance and marriage.

12 See Marchand 33.
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The gentleman caller, however, does not bring the
"longed for" success. He is, as Tom Wingfield says, "an
emissary from a world of reality"

(GM 23), and as a

"real" man, O'Connor is a target in much the same way as
"real men" are targets for the gay community in the film
Paris Is Burning. His masculinity is "staged" from/by a
marginal position in order to expose its limits and
reveal it as socially constructed; it is not natural or
transhistorical. In fact, as we will see in a moment,
the hegemonic masculinity represented by O'Connor is a
threat.
Nancy Tischler argues that "Jim is not an especially
effective character study because Williams can feel
little sympathy with such a substantial and placid
citizen"

(37). "Yet," she claims,

"he is a kindly

reminder of the reasonable, normal human pattern,

like

the men Williams had met at the shoe factory--cleanliving, honest, sweet-natured, materialistic, eager
American businessman"

(37) . I would argue that Jim is

ineffectual rather than ineffective since he does not
produce the intended effect, at least in Amanda's mind.
To call him ineffective as a character study, however,
is to miss Williams' point. That is, his placidness is
meant to convey a banality which appears to be kindly or
reasonable but, in actuality, represents the
repressiveness of instrumental reason. In other words,

Williams desired the type of masculinity that Jim
represents because as its absolute other— artist and
homosexual— he was constantly comparing himself to it
and measuring himself against it. Jim performs a
normative masculinity that is essential to the
operations of American culture. Williams does not,
again, find his type either "kindly" or "reasonable,11
and to make this judgement is to misread the play, for
although he may appear to to be, Jim is neither
reasonable nor kindly. The text of the play suggests the
opposite. It is also important to note here that the
conflict between Tom (Wingfield and Williams) and Jim is
a precursor to a more brutal relationship; the conflict
between artistic being, or what Fromm calls
"spontaneous" being, which Tom and Laura represent, and
instrumental being, which Jim represents,

is compressed

and intensified in Streetcar in the conflict between
Blanche DuBois and Stanley Kowalski.
O'Connor's banality is what makes him a threat. His
banality is also what causes many critics to overlook
him, to dismiss him. His pursuit of happiness, his
desire for success, his

"clean-living, honest, sweet-

natured, materialistic," American-businessman eagerness
is perceived as the "normal human pattern." Like Willy
Loman, he is not a great man; he is not a king; he is
not in the papers, but like millions of others he

desires to be other than he is. His "archetype" is so
ingrained in the American grain as to be natural. He is,
as E. E. Cummings wrote, simultaneously "a yearning
nation's blueeyed pride" and a "blueeyed monster." To
underestimate Jim is to see him as inevitable, as comic,
as a "stumblejohn"

(from a superior position, of

course), and not as socially constructed and therefore
resistable. This misrecognition of the
instrumentalization of masculinity leads to a fatal
error, for as a type, as a domiant cultural tendency, he
is the uber mensch. As Jim says in 1945, "I'm Superman!"
(GM 88). And we would be foolish to ignore Williams'
implicit warning:
stretchl"

"Look how big my shadow is when I

(GM IQ2).

Jim claims to be Superman after Amanda asks him if
he can carry a candelabrum and a glass of wine. Read in
the context of American popular culture, Jim's remark
is, of course, an allusion to Superman the comic book
hero, who was first introduced by Action Comics in 1938.
Read in a larger historical context, however, the remark
is used to remind theatergoers and readers— then and
now— of Hitler's Final Solution and the men who
attempted to carry it out. The two readings might at
first appear to be contradictory, but they are not. That
is, Superman the comic book character was a response to
Nazi Germany; he was a freedom-fighter who represented
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"Truth, Justice, and the American way." He was the enemy
of the Third Reich; he was the enemy of the uber mensch.
But he was also like Hitler's superman in that his
freedom or autonomy expressed itself as a nationalistic
chauvinism or conformity. Although ostensibly less
brutal than Hitler's forces, he was still an instrument.
He was a weapon, and as a weapon he was totally
subordinate to the United States government, just as as
a reporter— as "mild-mannered Clark Kent"— he was
totally subordiate to the apparatus of The Daily Planet.
Like European fascists, he is controlled by the other—
just as is Jim O'Connor.
O'Connor's otherness represents itself as
(instrumental) reason programmed by the publicity
apparatus, as an absolute conformity that sees itself as
difference. Indeed, like Willy Loman, he is defined by
serial alterity, which keeps him isolated from others
and aliented from himself.
Sartre,

"In the series," argues

"everyone becomes himself (as Other than self)

in so far as he is other than the Others, and so, in so
far as the Others are other than him"

(262). The

consequence of this alterity, as Sartre points out, is
that individuals are different from each other only
because they are the same. Alterity is both a link
between individuals and, as such, a "paradoxical
structure":

"the Other has his essence in all the
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Others, in so far as he differs from them (263). Jim's
desire to be successful is like the desire of all
others, and this is how he becomes a "somebody," how he
defines his "uniqueness":
Why, man alive, Laura! Just look about you a little.
What do you see? A world full of common people! All
of 'em born and all of 'em going to die. Which of
them has one-tenth of your good points! Or mine! Or
anyone else's, as far as that goes— gosh! Everbody
excels in some one thing. (GM 99)
The essence of his masculinity, which he has in common
with all others, is what makes him special. Horkheimer
and Adorno call this "pseudo individuality":
"individuals have ceased to be themselves and are now
merely centers where the general tendencies meet"

(155).

He speaks the voice of the apparatus; he is not
conscious of the self. In fact, he wishes to eliminate
the self. Jim tells Laura, for example, that she
shouldn't be so "self-conscious"

(GM 93), that her

difference can be extirpated by self-alienation. Jim is
only conscious of the other, and he desires that others
conform. Any difference is an obstacle to be "overcome."
His advice to Laura is an expression of his conformity,
of his rationalization and the standardization of
consciousness that Horkheimer and Adorno theorize in
Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The voice that speaks through Jim is the voice of
the publicity apparatus. That "as a devoted student of
the science of self-improvement," as Delma Presley

commennts,

"Jim's attitude perfectly matches [Dale]

Carnegie's view of the ideal man, as outlined in How to
Win Friends and Influence People, a best-seller since
1936"

(60) . In his book, Carnegie stressed that "the man

who has technical knowledge plus the ability to express
his ideas, to assume leadership, and to arouse
enthusiasm among men— that man is headed for higher
earning power"

(qtd. in Presley 60). Jim advises Laura

as the other has advised him: he tells Laura that she
"low-rates" herself, that she has an "inferiority
complex":

"Yep— that's what I judge to be your principal

trouble. A lack of

confidence in yourself

as

a person.

You don't have the

proper amount of faith

in

yourself"

[GM 99). He "understands" her "case" because he has
experienced the same problem,

"until I took up public

speaking, developed my voice, and learned that I had an
aptitide for science"

(GM 99). Jim has conformed to the

model of the publicity apparatus. He has also discovered
the "one thing" at which he "excels":
Ji m : ....My interest happens to lie in electro
dynamics. I'm taking a course in radio engineering
at night school.... Because I believe in the future
of television...I wish to be ready to go
right up
along with it.
Therefore I'm planning to
get in on
the ground floor. In fact I've already made the
right connections and all that remains is for the
industry itself to get under way! Full steam— (His
eyes are starry.) Knowledge— Zzzzzp! Money—
Zzzzzzp!— Power! That's the cycle democracy is built
on! (GM 99-100; italics removed)
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Others, of course, also believe in the future of
television, and they will be ready "to get in on the
ground floor." They may also have made "the right
connections." They may even have the same blind faith in
"democracy," which the apparatus has transformed into
knowledge, money, and power. Commenting on these lines,
James Reynolds notes that "'Knowledge' means inventing
new technologies and capitalizing on their financial
success, which in turn gives the system power over those
without technology"

(525). That is, those who control

the system have power over those who are dependent on
the technology of the apparatus. This power is mystified
by the publicity apparatus in the form of the ideology
of progress, or what Williams calls the "Century of
Progress" after the Chicago Exposition of 1893

(GM 90).

The ideology of progress represents what Raymond
Williams calls "technological determinism," which, he
writes,

"is an immensely powerful and now largely

orthodox view of the nature of social change"
(Television 13). According to Williams,
New technologies are discovered, by an essentially
internal process of research and development, which
then sets the conditions for social change and
progress. Progress, in particular, is the history of
these inventions, which 'created the modern world.'
The effects of the technologies, whether direct or
indirect, foreseen or unforeseen, are as it were the
rest of history. The steam engine, the automobile,
television, the atomic bomb, have made modern man
and the modern condition. (Television 13; italics
removed)

The "rest of history" is further mystified by the
"levelling" process of the publicity apparatus, which
further marginalizes the effects of technology by
reducing knowledge about these processes to exchange
value. In this popular narrative, "Wrigley," "Franklin,"
and "Edison" blend together with "light bulbs," "Mazda
lamps," "victrolas," and "chewing gum" to produce
knowledge with no use value; these bits of information
become things a person might know, a universal cultural
capital that can be exchanged for recognition or status.
Most often, however, this type of knowledge (what E. D.
Hirsch calls "background information" or "cultural
literacy")

is used to control social relations by making

language (and reason) heteronomous. That is, like
advertising,

"the important individual points, by

becoming detachable, interchangeable, and even
technically alienated from any connected meaning,
themselves to ends external to the work"

lend

(Horkheimer and

Adorno 163). This transformation from usable knowledge
to publicity creates dependency rather than freedom. As
Amanda says when the lights in her apartment go out,
Isn't electricity a mysterious thing? Wasn't it Ben
Franklin who tied a key to a kite? We live in such a
mysterious universe, don't we. Some people say that
science clears up all the mysteries for us. In my
opinion it only creates more! (GM 86)
Amanda,

like Jim and Willy Loman, can name Ben Franklin

as the "discoverer" of electricity and "Mr. Edison" as
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the inventor of the "Mazda lamp," but she (and they)
cannot see "the rest of history." Knowledge has become
exchange value: universal bits of information that
marginalize the real processes of technology and
history.

"Distant from both the practical and

theoretical elements of technology," Reynolds suggests,
"[Amanda] is made its servant"

(524). Science has not

brought progress, just technology and profit for those
who control technology, whose history, as Raymond
Williams argues, is based on the "assumption" of
progress (Television 14).
As the "emissary" of progress, Jim O'Connor is
manufactured to serve the apparatus. He is a product and
a (re)producer. His desire is to remake Laura (and Tom)
in his own image; this desire produces the central
conflict of the play, which is "resolved" only when
Laura's unicorn is castrated and Tom runs off to Mexico.
As an artifact, the unicorn represents the antithesis of
Jim's instrumentation. On one level, it symbolizes the
hand-made craft of mercantile capital (like Willy
Loman's father's flute). More important for Williams the
artist, however,

is that the unicorn symbolizes the

position of the art object (and therefore the artist)

in

an increasingly mechanized world; it is the opposite of
the mass-produced shoes, gum, and newspaper sports
heroes that are identified with Jim O'Connor. As Fredric

Jameson argues in Postmodernism. "Modern art...drew its
power and its possibilities from a backwater and an
archaic holdover within a modernizing economy:

it

glorified, celebrated, and dramatized older forms of
individual production which the new mode of production
was elsewhere on the point of displacing and blotting
out. Aesthetic production then offered the Utopian
vision of a more human production generally; and in the
world of the monopoly stage of capitalism it exercised a
fascination by way of the image it offered of a Utopian
transformation of human life"

(307). Laura's collision

with Jim is a displacing or blotting out of older forms
that do not fit the dictates of the new economy. The
unicorn must become "like all the other horses" because,
as Jim says, "Unicorns— aren't they extinct in the
modern world?"

(GM 104, 101). Laura's renunciation of

her difference is complete with the breaking of the
horn. Although Jim "was the cause," Laura will "just
imagine he had an operation. The horn was removed to
make him feel less— freakish....Now he will feel more at
home with the other horses, the ones that don't have any
horns"

(GM 104). Ultimately, Laura cannot conform to the

values of either business or marriage, so she renounces
the real world in favor of the couch, where she plays
with her menagerie and listens to records. The
"operation" that breaks the unicorn's horn, as Thomas
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Scheye comments,

"takes on nightmare proportions"

when

we remember that Williams' sister Rose, on whom Laura
Wingfield's character is based, had a prefrontal
labotomy in order to make her less "freakish"

(211).13

Jim O'Connor also attempts to teach Tom how to "fit
in," but their collision is less violent. In the end,
Tom does not renounce the "real world" like his sister,
nor does he intergrate like his mother; he is in flight.
Like Jameson's utopian modernist, Tom attempts to escape
the world of late-capitalism by engaging in a form of
artistic production that Jameson calls "the aesthetic of
sheer autonomy, as the satisfactions of handicraft
transfigured"

(Postmodernism 307). Tom resists the

Taylorization of labor and consciousness by closeting
himself "in a cabinet of the washroom to work on poems"
(GM 68). Tom tells us his "secret practice" made "the
other boys in the warehouse [regard] me with suspicious
hostility"

(GM 68). "Jim," however,

"took a humorous

attitude toward me" and "Gradually his attitude affected
the others, their hostility wore off and they also began
to smile at me as people smile at an oddly fashioned dog
who trots across their path at some distance"
Jim's patronage (and patronizing)

(GM 68-9).

of Tom is an

effort to win Tom's confidence in order to teach him to
conform to the routine of work and the ideology of self
13 For an account of the tragedy see Spoto 59-61.
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improvement. In the process, Williams reveals Jim as
"suspicious” by demonstrating that his pedagogy is a
hoax. When Jim warns Tom that "You're going to be out of
a job if you don't wake up"
he has already awakened:

(GM 78), Tom tells him that

"I'm planning to change [Tom

has joined the Merchant Marine}," he says, which
confounds Jim because he can see "no signs" of Tom's
transformation. Jim cannot recognize the signs since, as
Tom teases,

"The signs are interior"

(GM 78). In fact,

Jim can only recognize the superficial, the standard
gestures and motivations that permeate his culture and
which appear as self-replicating, mass-produced models.
In his advise to Tom, Jim's speaks as the standard
gestures and motivations of the apparatus:
Jim: You know, Shakespeare— I'm going to sell you a
bill of goods!
Tom: What goods?
Jim: A course I'm taking.
Tom: Huh?
Jim: In public speaking! You and me, we're not the
warehouse type.
Tom: Thanks— that's good news. But what has public
speaking got to do with it?
Jim: It fits you for— executive positions!
Tom: Awww.
Jim: I tell you it's done a helluva lot for me.
Tom: In what respect?
Jim: In every! Ask yourself what is the difference
between you an' me and men in the office down front?
Brains?— No!— Ability?— No! Then what? Just one
little thing—
Tom: What is that one little thing?
Jim: Primarily it amounts to— social poise!Being
able to square up to people and hold your own
on any
social level! (GM 77).

Tom understands in advance that Jim is selling him "a
bill of goods." Jim "ordinariness," however, prevents
him from seeing "his" advice as collusion or selfdeception because, as Andrea Dworkin writes about
Stanley Kowalski, he is "untouched by the meaning of any
experience because he has no interior life, he is
invulnerable to consequences, he has no memory past
sensation. He is ordinary"

(41). Jim's language further

indicts "self-maki n g when he describes his night course
as "fitting" him for executive positions— that is, he is
being shaped by the other to conform, just as are the
others in his class. Williams makes it clear that Jim is
participating in his own deception because his public
speaking has done nothing for him; he has gone nowhere
in the six years after graduating from high school, and
Williams gives us every indication that this pattern of
moving without moving will continue. Jim will continue
to be deceived by his desire, and like Willy Loman, he
will continue to believe in his autonomy at the same
time he is exploited by the apparatus.
Williams also undermines the ideology of selfimprovement by showing that ability and hard work are
not rewarded, but rather the artificial,

interchangeable

practices of late-capitalism. It is more important for
Jim to "make the right connections"
people only as "social contacts")

(he can imagine

and manipulate social

appearances (i.e. have "social poise") than it is for
him to have "brains" or "ability." It is more important
for him to conform to the mass-produced values of the
other. In this practice, he resembles not the valorized
autonomous male of the American Culture Industry, but
rather the standardized mode that the same apparatus
produces. As Horkheimer and Adorno argued, "On the faces
of private individuals and movie heroes put together
according to the patterns on magazine covers vanishes a
pretense in which no one now believes; the popularity of
the hero models comes partly from a secret satisfaction
that the effort to achieve individuation has at last
been replaced by the effort to imitate, which is
admittedly more breathless"

(156). Jim O'Connor is

breathless in his imitation, not only because he desires
the "excitement" the perfect copy brings, but also
because desiring machines too are without breath, dead,
corpse-like. In respect to the latter, Jim O'Connor does
not subvert the practices of democracy by using "his"
knowledge to gain money and power; he is rather the
perfect copy of a citizen; he is what the apparatus
desires. He uses his knowledge to exploit himself and
others.
Delma Presley is correct when she sees a
correspondence between Jim O'Connor and David Riesman's
"other-directed man": "Jim splendidly represents

Riesman's other-directed man who operates as though he
were controlled by radar, constantly sending out signals
and adjusting his movement to conform to his
environment"

(57). Presley also argues that Tom rejects

"other direction" "in favor of engaging in a quest for
adventure"

(57). According to Presley,

"[Tom] generally

fits the 'new' type of personality Riesman sees on the
horizon, the autonomous man....He obtains sustenance
from the inner-directed pattern of existence. He has an
internal guidance system...and he does not constantly
adjust his behavior to fit the expectations of his known
and unknown peers (57-8). While Presley's
characterization of Tom's autonomy may ring true for
some readers, I believe her reading is too optimistic.
His autonomy, or freedom, is always limited because he
is in flight from the values of the other. As Horkheimer
and Adorno put it, "Every bourgeois characteristic, in
spite of its deviation and indeed because of it,
expressed the same thing: the harshness of the
competitive society"

(155). As a non-supporter, Tom too

bears a disfiguring mark, a mark that makes him
suspicious to his co-workers and his mother, or freakish
like Laura's unicorn. As an artist, the closeted poet,
he desires Jameson's utopian transformation of the
economic and social forces that control his life, yet
his flight from these forces embodies what Peter Burger

sees as the central contradiction of modernist art: the
"autonomy aesthetic...contains a definition of the
function of art: it is conceived as a social realm that
is set apart from the means-ends rationality of daily
bourgeois existence"

(10) . At the same time, however,

because of the rationalization of the social under late
capital,

"Only in the isolated form of monad-like works

of art can truth still be spoken about this society.
This is the function of art that Adorno [refers] to as
'functionlessness' because it can no longer be hoped
that art will provoke change"

(11). By being

"functionless," Tom's writing of poetry on company time
is a protest against "what is"; however, his secret act
also affirms "reality" by offering only compensation for
repressive social conditions. In this respect, Tom's
seclusion in the bathroom is analogous to the atomistic
moments of consumption witnessed throughout the play:
Amanda's reading of romances, Jim's reading of the
sports page, Laura's listening to records, and Tom's
viewing of movies.
The standardization of the economy also turns social
relations into relations of production. As Tom says
about his job, "The warehouse is where I work, not where
I know things about people!

(GM 113). Workers move as

isolated units suspicious of any part that does not
conform to the gestures or values of the apparatus. As

Tennessee Williams observes in the "Production Notes" to
The Glass Menagerie, modernization has not brought
progress because technology has not been used to
liberate men and women:

"We should do more for ourselves

or let the machines do for us, the glorious technology
that is supposed to be the light of the new world. We
are like a man who has brought a great amount of
equipment for a camping trip...but who now, when all the
preparations and the provisions are piled expertly
together,

is suddenly too timid to set out on the

journey but remains where he was yesterday and the day
before and the day before that,

looking suspiciously

through white lace curtains at the clear sky he
distrusts. Our great technology is a God-given chance
for adventure and for progress which we are afraid to
attempt"

(GM 15). To underscore this point in The Glass

Menagerie— that technology has not been used to
liberate, to light the new world— Williams borrows the
central image from Picasso's Guernica.
At the top center of the painting, there is a light
bulb, complete with filiment, enclosed in a disk-shaped
form that illuminates the chaos and death of the
bombing. Picasso,

in my reading, does not use the

electric light to symbolize hope or "enlightenment," as
some have suggested. On the contrary,

it seems to me he

uses the image of the light bulb for the opposite
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reason— to express his profound doubts about the way
technology has been used to destroy human life. In the
painting, the light merely illuminates the slaughter of
the bombardment; it is part of the narrative of progress
that has promised salvation but, in fact, has brought
destruction and death. The light is like the light of
the bombs; it produces illumination but not
understanding; it hangs suspended above the scene and
appears as if by magic. Yet like the "celotex" lights
that illuminate the warehouse where Tom Wingfield works,
which he finds so oppressive, Picasso's light only
illuminates brutality and in turn mystifies the values
that structure social relations— "knowledge," "money,"
"power." The oppressiveness of the celotex light is
Williams' deliberate borrowing and transformation of
Picasso's image, as is his use of the light imagery
throughout the play. In their dominant form, these
images represent an ideology at odds with what Williams
sees as his more humanistic values. As James Reynolds
argues,

"Those without access to the real power of

technology are limited as mere users unable to
understand and control it. They remain outside the
sphere created by larger cultural forces that place
technology not as the servant of humanity but as a
venture for capital investment, nationalistic rivalries,
and costly toys"

(526). Those unable to sustain,
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purchase, or represent the instrumental values of
technological progress, as Lee Iacocca says in a recent
commercial, had better "get out of the way."
Nowhere is Williams more critical of these values
than in the final lines of the play. Here the assumption
of progress that informs our cultural institutions— *
education, the media, science, and industry— is
deconstructed in a gesture which fuses individual and
international history, his sister's lobotomy and the
bombardments of World War II. The lightning of Ben
Franklin's discovery and the light of Thomas Edison's
mazda lamp are turned into the bombardments of the
Second World War, for, as Tom says, "nowadays the world
is lit by lightning"
light is blown out:
so goodbye"

(GM 115). A t the same time, Laura's
"Blow out your candles, Laura— and

(GM 115). Williams' sister Rose, of course,

did not blow out her candles; she was the victim of a
technological experiment, just as were the citizens of
Guernica. For Williams, both events are symptomatic of a
historical crisis in which technology was increasingly
being used to subdue or destroy human beings who did not
conform to the dominant values, whether those values
were American or Nazi. Both systems demand that subjects
conform to the whole; any resistance is suspicious. In
an American context, the dominant masculine model— with
its attendant ideologies of self-improvement and

mobility— is used to fit individuals to the corporate
whole, reducing men to the role of instruments who are
exploited by those above them for profit. In reality,
the desire to be unique or successful is, as Williams
points out, the desire to be "ordinary"; it is the
desire of every other. Men are only valuable, then, when
they become like the "cellular living-units" in which
the Wingfield family lives, which in 1945 Williams saw
as "symptomatic" of the "lower middle-class":

"to avoid

fluidity and differentiation and to exist and function
as one interfused mass of automatism"

(GM 21). In the

meantime, the "impulse" of this class has become the
impulse of every other since the apparatus has
penetrated, every sphere of social life. Men today are,
more than ever, valuable to others (and to themselves)
only when they conform to the dictates of the machine,
only when they tacitly adjust themselves to fit what is.
Tennessee Williams' construction of Jim O'Connor (and
later Stanley Kowalski) was prophetic. In a recent essay
on Poland's conversion to a "free market" economy, for
example, Lawrence Weschler reports that the most coveted
men in Poland are the old party "nomenklatura." These
career bureaucrats are valued by Western companies
because they fit; the "skills" they learned in the
Communist bureaucracy have given them the ability to
conform to a Western corporate model. No one, Weschler

ironically notes, is rushing out to hire former
Solidarity members

(58).

Chapter Five
"What's the Secret?":
Willy Loman as Desiring Machine
Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman (1949) conveys
its critique of American capital in a far more complex
and subtle manner than critics have thus far recognized.
Most criticism of the play, as Sheila Huftel points out,
is "governed by the need...to know and understand Willy
Loman"

(103). Unfortunately, much of the energy expended

to understand Willy has been too narrowly focused on
analyzing the individuated character traits of the
protagonist and the attendant issue of tragic stature.
The problem with these arguments is that they assume
Willy has a character, that he is an autonomous subject.
The play, in fact, suggests just the opposite— that
Willy is not autonomous, self-generated, or self-made
(even in "failure"), but that he is completely other to
himself; he is more puppet than person, more machine
than man, and as such he announces the death, or
disappearance, of the subject, the death of the tragic
hero, and the birth of "the desiring machine."
Most critics recognize that Arthur Miller intends
Willy Loman as a victim of "society." But Willy's
construction as a victim is interpreted within the
parameters of a self-generated individual and is used as
the main reason conservative critics deny Salesman
195
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tragic status. As a victim, the argument runs, Willy has
no understanding of his situation; he is, in the words
of Dan Vogel,

"too commonplace and limited"

(91). Unlike

Oedipus or Hamlet or Lear, Willy is incapable of selfknowledge and is therefore not heroic but pathetic; "he
cannot summon the intelligence and strength to
scrutinize his situation and come to some understanding
of it," writes Irving Jacobson (247). Even liberal
critics like Thomas Adler and Ruby Cohn, who are
generally sympathetic towards Willy, judge him harshly;
in their estimation he is either incompetent because "he
is the victim of himself and his choices," or he is a
failure because he "has achieved neither popularity nor
success as a salesman, and has failed as a gardener,
carpenter, and father"

(Adler 102; Cohn 44). Even as

astute a critic as Thomas Porter finds fault with
Willy's "character" when he argues that "the
Salesman...has accepted an ideal shaped for him and
pressed on him by forces in his culture"

(24) . Willy's

problem (or part of his problem), then, according to
these critics,

is that he accepts his fate; he does not

possess the vision, volition, capacity, strength,
knowledge, pluck to fight against the cultural forces
that shape his life.
The underlying assumption of these arguments is that
Willy can change his life— with a little hard work,

perhaps— but that he will not. Behind these arguments is
a model, what I call the national subject and/or the
masculine unconscious: the autonomous, active male
subject. The subject that determines itself, that makes
itself, the liberal subject, the rugged individual, the
exceptional American. Whatever linguistic sign the
masculine unconscious uses to communicate itself,

it is

wholly other to the subject since it is "enjoined" on
the subject by the publicity apparatus of latecapitalism. Miller calls this other the "law of
success":

"The confusion of some critics viewing Death

of a Salesman...is that they do not see that Willy Loman
has broken a law without whose protection life is
unsupportable if not incomprehensible to him and to many
others; it is a law which says a failure in society and
in business has no right to live. Unlike the law against
incest, the law of success is not administered by
statute or church, but it is very nearly as powerful in
its grip upon men"

(Collected Plays 35; hereafter CP).

In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno identify the "law of success" as an
effect of the "technological rationale" which dominates
the cultural and economic institutions of modern
industrial nations:

"Through the countless agencies of

mass production and its culture the conventionalized
modes of behavior are impressed upon the individual as

the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. He
defines himself as a thing, as a static element, as
success or failure"

(28). That is, under what Horkheimer

and Adorno call late capitalism,

individual behavior is

reduced to a series of "protocols" or stereotypical
responses found on the job, on the radio, in the movies,
and in the then emerging television industry. For
Adorno, these standardized models of behavior signaled
the end of the liberal subject since "motivation in the
old, liberal sense" was being appropriated and
"systematically controlled and absorbed by social
mechanism which are directed from above"

("Freudian

Theory" 136). In other words, the subject's desire for
success (e.g. for material wealth, to "get ahead"),
which the subject believes is self-generated,

is, in

fact, his identification with the rationale of the
apparatus, which has programmed individual consumption
as spontaneous thought or reason or the assertion of
individual will.
Viewed in light of Horkheimer and Adorno's
discovery, the operations of Willy Loman's mind reflect
this change in subjectivity. Specifically, Willy assumes
that his desire is spontaneous, when in fact, as Miller
suggests in Timebends

(1987), it has been "hammered into

its strange shape by society, the business life Willy
had lived and believed in" (182). Willy's desire does
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not make him autonomous; it makes him "common" since
that desire is what motivates all the men in the play
and indeed most men in our culture. In constructing
Willy, Miller exposes the liberal subject as a fiction,
as part of a structure of value that is an effect of the
economy. To dismiss Willy as "pathetic" because he does
not have the strength of character to understand his
situation or because he has made the wrong choices is to
recode the play according to the protocols of the
apparatus (i.e. a man is either a success or he is a
failure). Willy chooses nothing; he merely follows a
blueprint. Like a machine, he operates according to
plan. The publicity apparatus tells Willy that if he
works hard like "Edison," that if he persevers like
"Goodrich," that if he is "well-liked" like Dave
Singleman, then he will rise like Charley and become
rich and powerful like "J.P Morgan." The blueprint also
tells Willy that if he does not become "a success," that
if he does not become like a "Gene Tunney" or a "Red
Grange," then he is a failure— and that this is his
fault. Willy's question to Ben and to Bernard— "What's
the secret?"— is therefore by design. Willy cannot see
that there is no secret— that success or status is
largely determined by extrinsic factors.1
1 Willy's question also signals the breakdown of
the machine. The machine has started to malfunction; it
can no longer perform its labor because it drives off
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In more recent remarks made in his autobiography,
Timebends (1987), Miller has also made it clear that
Willy Loman was intended to challenge the expansion of
American capital after World War II: "there was the
smell in the air of a new American Empire in the making,
if only because, as I had witnessed, Europe was dying or
dead, and I wanted to set before the new captains and
the so smugly confident kings the corpse of a believer"
(184). He hoped that the play would be a time bomb
"under the bullshit of capitalism, this pseudo life that
thought to touch the clouds by standing on top of a
refrigerator, waving a paid-up mortgage at the moon,
victorious at last"

(Timebends 184). In other words,

Miller sought to counter the agenda of the new American
Empire by exposing the citizen (read: obedient consumer)
as a fraud or a corpse. Before examining how Miller
accomplishes this subversion, however,

it is first

necessary to contextualize the play in terms of the
cultural forces that Miller was attempting to resist.
The consolidation and expansion of American business
and the state that took place during and after World War
II produced a cultural transformation that signaled the

roads and talks to itself in the backyard. It is "tired
to death" (CP 131), and it has started to ask questions
it was not designed to ask. In fact, the machine is
becoming self-conscious, becoming aware of its self
alienation. But the machine is designed too well— it
will, according to plan, seek its own repression.

beginning of the Cold War. The economic policy of the
United States government during the war, George Lipsitz
points out, "permanently altered economic and political
power relations within American society, and produced a
totalitarian oligarchy of the major interest groups," so
much so that the "elite that emerged from the war held
unprecedented control over government and the
economy....[and] unprecedented control over the lives of
ordinary citizens"

(Class 2).2 At the same time that

political and economic power became increasingly
concentrated, industry and the government acted to
regulate the economy by keeping levels of consumption at
(high) wartime levels, since they believed this spending
would cause the economy to expand. The rebuilding of
Europe and Japan was an effort to gain control of
foreign markets that the United States had supplied
during the war. The Marshall Plan became the focal point
of the "Truman Doctrine," which asserted a "vital
connection between foreign policy and domestic well
being":

"Truman identified American interests as

contingent upon three connected principles: world
stability, expanding markets, and the defense of
freedom. In practice, the three principles collapsed

2 For a detailed discussion of this process see
Lipsitz (Class and Culture) 1-12, 135-42. See also C. W.
Mills 3-54. For a related discussion see Diggins 54-94,
177-219.
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into one, as stability came to mean security for
American business and the measure of freedom became the
extent of Western-style 'free' enterprise in any given
country” (Lipsitz Class 136).
The market for consumer goods and services at home
was also reconfigured— that is, labor markets were
recategorized, and the practices of saving and community
that developed and evolved during the Depression and the
war were reconverted into spending and individualism.
The nuclear family emerged as the locus for the new
emphasis on consumption. Using network television,
government propaganda films, Hollywood movies, and
advertising, the publicity apparatus of American capital
helped transform the labor market. Women and minorities
were urged to return to their homes or low-paying jobs
so that veterans could have their (presumably) old jobs
back, thus returning them to the position of
paterfamilias. Mass cultural models set before men once
again stressed self-agrandizement. As Robert Mitchum
says in Till the End of Time (1946), "We were a team in
the war— everybody was together....Now we're civilians,
rugged individuals. We're on our own, all of us"

(qtd.

in Lipsitz Class 181). The Western was resurrected— My
Darling Clementine (1946) and Fort Apache (1948), for
example— and again focused its attention on male
autonomy and self-assertion. Magazine and newspaper
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biography continued to report and describe the lives of
successful men: military heroes, actors, politicians,
athletes, businessmen, inventors. These men were, of
course, model citizens; they were assertive, hard
working men who had risen to the top of their profession
and had achieved great power and wealth, and their
status as cultural celebrities confirmed their
worthiness.
The masculine paradigms constructed by capital's
publicity machine were, as C. Wright Mills notes, based
on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conceptions of
masculinity and success (xiii-xv). These paradigms
combined with the discourse of advertising, which
pervaded all mass cultural practices, to produce, or
sponsor, gendered consumption. The result of the fusion
of residual masculinity with the consumer ideology was
that male autonomy or self-determination was again
manifest by the practice of social aspiration through
conspicuous consumption. Success and competence were
defined as the ability of the national subject to
provide for his family, and it was through this
expression of "love" that masculinity, or power, was
asserted.3
3 Lipsitz argues that the goal of male labor in
early network sitcoms— The Goldbergs. Hey. Jeannie. The
Life of Riley. I Remember M a m a . The Honevmooners— was to
obtain "material reward to enhance one's standing within
the family or to obtain some leisure-time commodity"

The new medium of television provided the publicity
machine with a mass audience whereby the home became the
primary site of the struggle between older, more
traditional cultural identities and the new consumer
identity that television was constructing. "Television,"
Lipsitz argues, "advertised individual products, but it
also provided a relentless flow of information and
persuasion that placed acts of consumption at the core
of everyday life" (Time Passages 42-6). Early network
television was especially effective at shaping this
transition. As Lipsitz notes,

"Commercial network

television emerged as the primary discursive medium in
American society at the precise historical moment when
the isolated nuclear family and its concern eclipsed
previous ethnic, class, and political forces as the
crucible of American identity. Television programs both
reflected and shaped that transition, defining the good
life in family-centric, asocial, commodity-oriented
ways"

(Time Passages 55).

Post-war movies also redefined family life in
asocial, commodity-oriented ways. Mr. Blandings Builds
His Dream House (1948) is typical of many Hollywood
films (and network sitcoms) produced between the years
(Time Passages 59). Women were interpellated in two
ways; they were expected to care for the family by
managing domestic consumption and to be a "helpmate" to
the husband/father as he progressed up the corporate
ladder.

of 1946 and 1955. In the film, James Blandings, a New
York advertising executive, played by Cary Grant, moves
his wife and two daughters out of their cramped
Manhattan apartment to suburban Connecticut. In the
process, Blandings and his wife (Myrna Loy) discover
that the house they have purchased is structurally
unsound, and Blandings reluctantly agrees to build a new
one. Through a series of comic accidents and
misunderstandings, the price for the new house escalates
until Blandings almost gives up the project; but Myrna
Loy persuades him to pay the money and finish the house
("We're not just building a house. We're building a
home!" she says, and this, naturally, convinces him to
finish). In the end, however, everything is accomplished
with relative ease: the house is built, the construction
problems are quickly forgotten, and Blandings writes a
book about his "dream house."
The most interesting thing about Mr. Blandings is
that it is a lesson in consumption (specifically, how to
buy property and build a home). Much of the film is
taken up watching architects, contractors,

lawyers,

artisans, and laborers consume money and materials; and
although the film pokes fun at Blandings,

it also

valorizes his role as the head of the household; he is a
model of success, and the tableau that ends the film,
which resembles an advertisement, explicitly underscores
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this point. As the camera pulls back, Blandings, pipe in
hand, sits comfortable on a lawn chair in front of his
large house. His beautiful wife sits near him, and his
two daughters play with the black maid. The camera pulls
back again, and we see Blandings' property:

lawn, trees,

and the sky. No other houses are visible. His daughters
run into the house with the maid; his wife follows, and
Blandings, smiling and relaxed,

is left alone on his

spacious lawn. The cramped apartment in Manhattan is
completely forgotten.
Like Mr. Blandings. other movies, advertisements,
and television shows produced during this period were
used by the publicity apparatus to program consumption
or desire in order to further stimulate the economy. As
a cultural practice or symptom, their technology
represents a rationalization of production that
transformed subjectivity, a process recorded by the
operations of Willy Loman's mind. Specifically, Willy
assumes that his desire is spontaneous, when in fact, as
Miller suggests in Timebends. it has been "hammered into
its strange shape by society, the business life Willy
had lived and believed in" (182). Willy's desire does
not make him autonomous; it makes him "common" since
that desire is what motivates Blandings as well as
himself. As I suggest above, in constructing Willy,
Miller exposes the liberal subject as a fiction, as part
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of a structure of value that is an effect of the
economy. To dismiss Willy as "pathetic” because he does
not have the strength of character to understand his
situation is to recode the play according to the
protocols of the apparatus.
Conservative critics, such as Vogel and Joseph Wood
Krutch, will not recognize Willy as an effect of the
economy because the critical field in which they operate
does not permit this. For them, he is a problem, not a
cultural symptom. Critics from the left, such as Raymond
Williams, Michael Spindler, and John Orr, while they see
Willy as a symptom of capitalist culture, have focused
more on Willy's objectification than on his relationship
to the apparatus that produced him.4 Williams, for
instance, argues that "Willy Loman is a man who from
selling things has passed to selling himself, and has
become, in effect, a commodity which like other
commodities will at a certain point be discarded by the
laws of the economy"

(104). While Williams's argument

concerning Willy is certainly accurate, given Willy's
desire to "make an appearance in the business world"
146), I would like to suggest a different way to read
Willy, which is more in keeping with the model of
subjectivity theorized by Horkheimer and Adorno in

4 See Williams 103-05, Spindler 202-13, and Orr
208, 225-37.
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Dialectic of Enlightenment. and which, I believe, more
fully represents the rationalization of consciousness
brought about by the symbolic apparatus of late
capitalism.
In their book Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia (1983), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
problematize previous models of subjectivity by
eliminating the opposition around which the subject is
constructed:

"There is no such thing as either man or

nature now, only a process that produces the one within
the other and couples the machines together. Producingmachines, desiring-machines...the self and the non-self,
outside and inside, no longer have any meaning
whatsoever"

(2). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the

cognitive subject no longer exists since the subjectobject split on which its identity is based has
collapsed. The boundary between subject and object
collapses, they argue, under the weight of the publicity
apparatus of late capitalist cultures, which colonizes
the subject from without by pouring its narratives
inward. They replace the cognitive model with a quasicybernetic model, the desiring machine. The desiring
machine runs on information from the outside; its goals,
writes Jean-Francois Lyotard, are "programmed into it"
and therefore it cannot "correct in the course of its
functioning"

(16). The man/machine is programmed to fit
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the body of capital, to adjust to the demands of
efficiency of the larger system. Deleuze and Guattari
stress that the identity produced by the system is "a
producing/product identity"

(7). That is, the machine

produces, or in Willy's case reproduces, not only
biologically but also ideologically, for the system at
the same time that it is produced or constructed by the
system.
A more effective way to interpret Deleuze and
Guattari's "producing/product identity," especially when
we consider Willy Loman and the other men in Salesman.
is to see it as a producing/consuming identity. The male
subject desires to reproduce itself (pass itself on) at
the same time it desires to consume success narratives,
cheese, Chevrolets, Studebakers, aspirin, women,
refrigerators, etc. The male subject reproduces itself
by having children and acting as a model for those
children. Willy, for instance, wants his sons to learn
the law of success embodied by his brother Ben:

"when I

walked into the jungle, I was seventeen. When I walked
out I was twenty-one. And, by God, I was rich"

(CP 159-

60). The male subject consumes by buying products.
Listen to Happy:
...suppose I get to be merchandise manager? He's a
good friend of mine, and he just built a terrific
estate on Long Island. And he lived there about two
months and sold it, and now he's building another
one. He can't enjoy it once it's finished. And I
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know that's just what I would do. I don't know what
the hell I'm workin' for. (CP 139)
Or listen to Howard Wagner talk about his wire recorder:
"I tell you...I'm gonna take my camera, and my handsaw,
and all my hobbies, and out they go. This is the most
fascinating relaxation I've ever found"

(CP 178).

Willy's desire has also been programmed; listen to Linda
tell us why he bought a "Hastings" refrigerator: "They
got the biggest ads of any of them!"

(CP 148).

The three passages suggest that Miller is aware that
(re)production and consumption are programmed. Desire is
mediated by an other, by the publicity apparatus of
capital. The "subject" merely occupies a circuit or an
outlet, or, to use Lyotard's word, a "post," through
which messages or units of information pass (15). Willy
(or Happy or Howard Wagner) is reduced to the function
of a receptacle/transmitter; information travels through
him and in him. In this process, memory (the site of the
other) becomes a depository for and a transmitter of the
masterprograms or "masternarratives" of the system in
which the desiring machine operates. The machine's
program can thus be viewed as a metanarrative that is
used to reinscribe or recode reality into a pattern that
the larger system finds acceptable. The metanarrative
acts like the unconscious because it is wholly other to
the subject and because it works through the subject to
structure social life. This operation is seen in Happy's
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description of the merchandise manager's mindless
consumption,

in his building of houses which he soon

deserts only to build new houses; his desire spins
metonymically out of control seeking difference or
fulfillment in what is essentially the same. Neither man
understands why he buys things or why he works, yet they
both buy and work without question. Presumably they work
to "get ahead," to "accomplish something," but in
reality they are, like Willy, programmed for the body of
capital; it doesn't matter if they get ahead, if they
succeed, or even if they become "number-one man." What
does matter, however, is that everybody desire to work
so that everybody can afford to consume. Desire, to use
Sartre's term, has been "massified."
At this point, we turn our attention to Willy Loman
in order to more specifically explore how the dreams of
capital have programed his "life." Throughout the play,
Willy consumes and then reproduces models and axioms
that are part of the masculine unconscious:
Be liked and you will never want.

(CP 146)

A man oughta come in with a few words.

(CP 149)

I gotta overcome it. I know I gotta overcome it. I'm
not dressing to advantage, maybe. (CP 149)
Everybody likes a kidder, but nobody lends him
money. (CP 168)
But remember, start big and you'll end up big.
168)

(CP
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Start off with a couple of your good stories to
lighten things up. It's not what you say, it's how
you say it— because personality always wins the day.
(CP 169)
Business is definitely business....

(CP 180)

It's who you know and the smile on your face.
184)

(CP

These axioms (and the model they represent) appear in
the text as isolated linguistic events, as the
recitations of a lone idiolect, but they are in fact
"splinters" or units

(traces) of the metanarrative of

national identity that speak through the idiolect.5
Willy consumes these bits of information just as he
consumes aspirins and cheese. Their presence indicates
that Willy has been interpellated by the publicity
apparatus. Another indication of Willy's interpellation

5 Their emphasis on personality indicates, as
Theodore Greene notes in another context, a historically
mediated adjustment in the narrative, and the emphasis
is consistent with the time period of Willy's "life."
According to Greene, around the turn of the century
masculine success models began to sound a "new note":
"The new note was one of power. It called for strength
of will, forcefulness, and what the period termed
'animal magnetism.' It was a change of emphasis not
ideology" (112). In other words, new models were
deposited on top of residual models with the authority
of the residual models remaining in tact; this same
authority remained in tact during a similar adjustment
in the late 40s. This may seem a minor point, but it is
important to note that Miller locates his critique of
capital in an era once removed from the period which he
attacks; he does this so as to draw upon what he
witnessed first hand during the Depression— the lived
experiences of his father and brother.
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are his numerous contradictory statements.6 Early in the
play, for instance, Willy calls Biff a "lazy bum"
because Biff does not have a steady job. Three lines
later, however, after Linda tells Willy that Biff is
"lost," Willy replies incredulously,

"Biff Loman is

lost. In the greatest country in the world a young man
with such— personal attractiveness, gets lost. There's
one thing about Biff— he's not lazy"

(CP 134). Willy

then reminds Linda that Certain men just don't get
started till later in life. Like Thomas Edison, I think.
Or B.F. Goodrich"

(CP 135).

In this instance, the masterprogram operates to
allegorize the experience of the "subject" by making the
subject part of the national narrative of progress; the
process is therefore synecdochical

(e pluribus unum) .

The process reveals itself as a fusion or syndesis of
narratives, modes of masculinity from different
historical periods, that cover over the reality of the
present and mystify history. This fusion is first

6 Brian Parker sees these contradictions as
evidence of Willy's "incorrigible inability to tell the
truth even to himself"; they therefore express an
"emotional, nonlogical mode of thought, which allows him
flatly to contradict himself, and of which schizophrenia
is merely an intensification" (33). Bigsby argues that
Willy's "constant contradiction is a linguistic
reflection of the collapse of rational control, but,
more fundamentally, for all the Loman men it is
indicative of a basic contradiction between their
aspirations and the reality of their lives, between
their setting and the essence of their dream" (2: 177).
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discovered in the practices of late nineteeth-century
advertising, where the consumer ideology is bound
together with eighteenth- and nineteenth- century
conceptions of masculinity. The adjusted or emergent
narrative is deposited on the hegemonic narrative, which
in turn lends the newer representation its legitimacy or
authority.7
However, the crucial thing to note about the
masterprogram is the way in which Miller suggests it
operates through Willy to reinscribe his family history
as part of the success narrative of the national
subject. Willy desires to be the same as his father or
his brother Ben; he desires to be other than he is, to
inhabit earlier periods of capital through an other's
body, which is essentialized or universal. By banishing
differance, Willy hopes to construct a stable
subjectivity. He no longer wishes to feel "temporary"
(CP 159) about himself. He no longer wants to be part of
the body of capital, which is always (magically)
transforming itself, adjusting itself, expanding itself-like the neighborhood in which he lives. The desire to
be successful, then,

is the desire to connect himself to

a transcendental masculinity that erases the reality of
his present social position. This erasure is achieved,
7 For a detailed discussion of the emergence of the
consumer ideology see Jackson Lears ("Salvation to SelfRealization") 3-38.
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however, at a cost. The subject is restored to fullness
by transforming extrinsic social factors into personal
failure. Willy performs this function to empower
himself, to restore the independence of the subject,
which has been irretrievably lost. In the process,
however, he learns to misrecognize himself (and
Brooklyn). At the same time, Willy also learns to
marginalize other masculinities, the alternative men he
might represent,

in favor of the dominiant models

advocated by the culture industry (i.e. Edison,
Goodrich, etc.).
As C.W.E. Bigsby notes, "Willy Loman's life is
rooted in America's past"

(2: 184). More precisely, his

identity is rooted in models from two different periods
of American capital, which have become conflated in his
mind.8 Willy's father represents the unfettered and
8 Michael Spindler, for instance, writes that "In
Willy's family history we are offered a cameo of social
change in America, from the pioneering father who drove
his wagon and horses westward, to the elder brother who
gained a fortune in the great outdoors, and finally to
the travelling salesman hemmed in by the towering
tenement blocks of the modern big city" (204). Brian
Parker suggests a similar reading of Willy's family when
he argues that "the deterioration of American
individualism is traced through the Loman generations in
a descending scale, from the Whitman-like exhuberance of
Willy's father, through Ben, Willy himself, to the empty
predatoriness of Happy" (32). Thomas Adler also reads
Willy's family history as symbolizing a gradual
disappearance of American exceptionalism: "Willy's
ancestors represent and recreate within themselves
different stages in the country's history: Willy's
father as the last of the pioneers, a hardy, selfreliant carver and peddler of flutes who made his way
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unalienated labor of mercantile capital. His brother Ben
represents the accumulative processess of monopoly
capital. Both figures are mythic, that is, both figures
embody a heroic past that is disseminated by the
symbolic practices of capital and reproduced in
individual men. Together, Miller suggests, they
represent the (his)tory (not a history) of the (white)
race in America.9 Or, as Irving Jacobson suggests,

"What

Willy Loman wants, and what success means in Death of a
Salesman, is intimately related to his own, and the
playwright's, sense of the family. Family dreams extend
backward in time to interpret the past, reach forward in
time to project images of the future, and pressure

west across the continent; his brother, Ben, as a selfmade capitalist and living proof of the rags to riches
who went to Africa and discovered diamond mines. By the
time, though, that Willy, as a salesman who lived
through the Depression and World War II, tries to make
the dream of Ben Franklin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and
Horatio Alger operative, it has been reduced and even
become debased" (101). The above interpretations of
Willy's family history either ignore or underestimate
the effect of the dream on the present, how, in fact,
the dream creates an illusion which subverts its
potential reduction or debasement. For a reading of the
conflation of Willy's father and Ben, see Gross 405-10.
See also Bates 164-72.
9 Thomas Porter, for example, asserts that Willy's
"background fits an idealized model rather than any
plausible or realistic family-tree. As a typical
character, the salesman has a typical background; he
envisions his origin in terms of the American
experience. It is one version of the idealized
experience of the race" (29).
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reality in the present to conform to memory [ideology]
and imagination"

(248).

The flute "melody" that marks the beginning and the
end of the play, and which is heard periodically
throughout,

is the emblem or signature of Willy's lost

father. According to the stage directions,

"It is small

and fine, telling of grass and trees and the horizon"
(CP 130) . It is, as numerous critics point out, the
aural symbol of his "pioneer virtues"

(Brian Parker 33).

It is the sound of the unaliented commodity, which later
returns (transformed)

as the mass-produced "golden" pen

that Biff steals. It is the sound of the past in the
present, the still active residual model which operates
to marginalize the present. It represents the desire for
opportunity and mobility associated with westward
expansion. Willy's father, as Ben tells him, was a small
entrepreneur whose life was determined by the structures
of a mercantile economy:

"Father was a very great and

very wild-hearted man. We would start in Boston, and
he'd toss the whole family into the wagon, and then he'd
drive the whole team right across the country; through
Ohio, and Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and all the
Western states"

(CP 157). Willy's father was a "great

inventor" who would "stop in the towns and sell the
flutes he'd made on the way"

(CP 157). "With one

gadget," Ben tells Willy,

"he made more in a week than

man like you could make in a lifetime"

(CP 157).

Ben's last statement seems unlikely, and its
hyperbole marks a confusion in Willy's "mind" produced,
or mediated, by the other's desire. Willy desires to be
like his father because his father is like other
successful men, other "great" inventors; he is a model
citizen— he has amassed a fortune. He is like America's
first model citizen, Ben Franklin, who "invented"
electricity and the lightening rod. He is like Thomas A
Edison and B.F. Goodrich, both rich and famous because
of their inventions. Nevertheless, given the mercantile
economy in which Miller locates Willy's father, it is
unlikely that he would have produced a "gadget" that
earned him more in a week than Willy earns in his
lifetime. This type of event was more common (but still
relatively isolated)
represents

in the period of capital Ben

(monopoly capital) when "great" inventors

like Edison and Goodrich did earn more money in a week
(by producing technology/inventions for an emergent
industrial economy) than a salesman could earn in
thirty-five years. The figure of Willy's father exists
simultaneously in Willy's "mind" with the figures of
Edison and Goodrich. The simultaniety of the FranklinEdison-Goodrich-father Loman narrative produces a
fusion, or syndesis, of the individual stories, which
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erases the specific history of the individual figures by
marginalizing their difference; this fusion, again, is
produced by the publicity apparatus of capital. Through
the other, that is, Willy plugs himself into the success
narrative as he rereads his family history.
A more elaborate example of this type of conflation
is found when we examine Ben Loman. On one level, Miller
uses the figure of Ben to link the formation of the
national identity to the founding of the Republic— that
is, Miller clearly chooses the name Ben to remind his
readers of Ben Franklin's paradigmatic American
masculinity. Ben's continual repetition of the rags to
riches story— "Why, boys, when I walked into the jungle,
1 was seventeen. When I walked out I was twenty-one.
And, by God, I was rich"

(CP 157)— is a deliberate echo

of Franklin's Autobiography. in which Franklin tells his
readers that he walked into Philadelphia with the
clothes on his back and a loaf of bread and within a few
years became rich and famous. Notably, Miller conflates
the Franklin myth with another version of masculinity
from a later stage of American capital, not to
differentiate the two, but to suggest that they are both
operative, and that the latter version is just a
rearticulation of the former. The phrase "acres of
diamonds," which Ben continually uses, alludes to a
series of lectures and books written by the evangelist
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Russell Conwell in the 1890s "to spread the gospel of
material wealth"

(Innes 64-5; Porter 24-7). Conwell's

writings, which included The Safe and Sure Wav to Amass
a Fortune and Be a Benefactor, and Achieve Greatness,
were typical of the "success cult" that dominated
American magazine and popular book culture around the
turn of the century (Greene 111).
The assumptions about masculinity at the core of
Franklin's Autobiography are present in Conwell's
writings as well. Both writers construct masculinity in
very unproblematic ways by insisting that "success" is
the result of personal agency or character. Miller uses
Ben's speech, which Willy is remembering, to illustrate
that language has a history. The traces of Franklin's
and Conwells's stories survive as moments of the past in
the present, and because they have been decontextualized
by the operations of the publicity apparatus, they exist
only as ideology within memory (i.e. devoid of their
cultural context, they become part of the same moment,
the typology of American maleness and not products of
specific historical periods and circumstances). These
representations do, however, bear the mark of their
history, and, as such, their difference can only be
recognized when their history is restored. The
conflation of Franklin and Conwell in Ben's speech is
recognized when we try to account for the fact that Ben
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Loman and Russell Conwell inhabit an America radically
different from Franklin's. Ben's ascendancy to what
Willy calls "success incarnate"

(CP 152) takes place in

the late 1880s, a period marked by intense imperial
expansion and expropriation of native labor and
resources.10 As what Ruby Cohn calls a "ruthless
adventurer"

(41), Ben represents the accumulative

processes of monopoly capital (roughly 1880 to 1910).
Further, the mode of masculinity that Ben represents
is radically out of place in the America of the late
1940s (as is Willy's father's "pioneer" masculinity).11
Willy's desire to be like Ben and like his father
manifests itself as a nostalgia that seals him off from
the present. As a result, Willy cannot recognize
"reality," and he therefore engages in the success
fantasy given to him by the other. In addition, Miller
also suggests that the nostalgia for previous models or
paradigms is constituted by their ability to provide
10 From indications that Miller gives in the play,
Ben Loman was probably born around 1869; this would put
him in Africa between the years of 1886 and 1890. Biff
Loman, interestingly, was born in 1915, the same year as
Arthur Miller.
11 Brian Parker argues along the same lines when he
writes, "The values represented by Ben need not detain
us very long. Their inadequacy is apparent. Miller's
work, as a whole, does reflect a certain admiration for
the pioneer virtues of courage and self-reliance, but
this is matched by an awareness that such attitudes are
dangerous in modern society: the aggressiveness which is
admirable in combatting raw nature becomes immoral when
turned against one's fellow men" (33).
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ready-made (read: reductive)

interpretations of the

world; this operaton, as Hayden White suggests,

is

disabling (and therefore destructive) because it
prevents individuals and societies from constructively
confronting the problems of the present:

"history is not

only a substantive burden imposed upon the present by
the past in the form of outmoded institutions,

ideas,

and values, but also the way of looking at the world
which gives to these outmoded forms their specious
authority"

(39; italics removed).

One result of Willy's interpellation is that he
cannot see Brooklyn as it is— that is, he is not
satisfied with seeing it the way it is; he desires to
see it as other, as the old west or the frontier. As he
tells Ben, "It's Brooklyn, I know, but we hunt too"

(CP

158). Willy's desire to see Brooklyn as other is also a
symptom of the machine in crisis. The flute melody that
represents the fiction of infinite space and unfettered
masculine autonomy of the frontier (i.e. the mobility
that most Americans expect and desire)

is an ideological

formation directly at odds with Willy's "reality." Willy
can see the "towering, angular shapes" that surround his
house "on all sides"

(CP 130), and he is aware the

changes in his neighborhood:
The way they box us in here. Bricks and windows,
windows and bricks....The street is lined with cars.
There's not a breath of fresh air in the
neighborhood. The grass don't grow anymore, you
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can't raise a carrot in the back yard. They
should've had a law against apartment houses.
Remember those two beautiful elm trees out there?
When I and Biff hung the swing between them....They
should've arrested the builder for cutting those
down. They massacred the neighborhood....(CP 134-35)
Yet the cultural processes that allow the "they" to box
him in, to massacre the neighborhood, go unrecognized
because his models program him for "oversight." In other
words, his knowledge of the world is produced by the
models that act to exclude or screen out disruptive bits
of information. Willy's knowledge of his world
represents a desire for older modes that reduce his
understanding of his social position.
His models also prevent him from seeing the history
of his present (ultimately they push his vision inward,
which leads to annihilation). His question to Linda that
concludes the diatribe about the neighborhood— "How can
they whip cheese?"— outlines the contour or boundary of
his knowledge about the operations of capital; this
question marks the limits of his awareness, outside (or
inside) of which he cannot see or transgress. The
question represents his limit as a "subject." The
salesman does not understand how products are made. They
appear to him, as they sometimes did to Marx, "as
autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own"
(165). Willy's seemingly trivial question reveals how
effective the publicity apparatus
fetishization of consumption)

(with its

is in marginalizing the

effects of technological change. As William Brucher
points out, Willy's "unexpected, marvelingly innocent
question about whipping cheese reveals an ambivalence
toward technology livelier and more interesting...than a
simple dichotomy between farm and factory, past and
present"

(83-4). Willy's "marvelingly innocent question"

reveals a complete ignorance of the cultural processes
that affect his life, that cause him to lose his job.12
Willy's life is, in fact, a denial of the transformative
powers of capital. Any recognition of change is
subverted by the transcendent (fetishized) models that
he worships, which do not record or reflect any change.
Celebrity— the lives of B.F. Goodrich and Thomas Edison
and Dave Singleman— has replaced history. The
consumption of technological "progress," as Willy's
broken cars, refrigerators, fanbelts, and leaky shower
and roof attest, has replaced concrete social relations.
A second result of Willy's interpellation is that he
"embues" his sons with the values of the other, what he
calls the spirit of the jungle. These values are
12 In the conversation Willy has with Howard Wagner
immediately before Wagner fires him, Willy seems to
(almost) recognize that his job has become obsolete: "In
those days there was personality in it, Howard. There
was respect, and comradeship, and gratitude in it.
Today, it's all cut and dried, and there's no chance for
bringing friendship to bear— or personality. You see
what I mean? They don't need me anymore" (CP 181-82).
Willy's comments here also resemble the comments of Jack
Colton in Tennessee Williams' The Last of Mv Solid Gold
Watches.

mediated through the figure of Ben Loman.

"There was the

only man I ever met who knew the answers," says Willy
(CP 155). "There was a man started with the clothes on
his back and ended up with diamond mines"

(CP 152). How

does Ben achieve this goal? According to Willy,

"The man

knew what he wanted and went out and got it. Walked into
the jungle, and comes out, the age of twenty one, and
he's rich!"

(CP 152). And this is just what Willy wants

for his boys; when Ben comes to visit, Willy brags to
him that "That's just the spirit I want to embue them
with! To walk into the jungle!"

(CP 160). He's bringing

them up to be "rugged, well-liked, all-around"
Ben, of course, approves:

(CP 157).

"Outstanding, manly chaps!"

(CP 159). Willy's desire is therefore reproduced through
and in Biff and Happy; because of Will's pedagogy, they
become carriers of the program. Willy wants them, as Ben
advises him, to "Screw on your fists and...fight for a
fortune"

(CP 183). He doesn't want them to be "worms,"

like Bernard (CP 151). But as Brian Parker points out,
the aggressive practices Ben represents while "admirable
in combatting raw nature [become] immoral when turned
against one's fellow man"

(33).

I suggest above that Ben's aggressiveness represents
a brutality that Miller equates with American
imperialism. Another way to

read Ben's

"aggressiveness"— this time, within the boundaries of
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the nation— is as competition. Historically, as C.
Wright Mills notes, "for men in the era of classical
liberalism, competition was never merely an impersonal
mechanism regulating the economy of capitalism, or only
a guarantee of political freedom. Competition was a
means of producing free individuals, a testing field for
heroes; in its terms men lived the legend of the selfreliant individual"

(11). Whether or not what Wright

argues is historically representative,

it is safe to

assume that in a decentralized economy (an economy
without the hierarchy of industrialized structures),
individual competition through labor was a way for many
to create mobility and wealth. However, as the economy
of the nation became more centralized and hierarchical,
competition, as Willy says, became "maddening" because
it did not have the same results (imagined or otherwise)
as it did for men of Willy's father's and Ben's
generations.
In Willy's time, in fact, competition has become
war-like. After returning from a selling trip, for
instance, Willy tells his family he "Knocked 'em cold in
Providence, slaughtered 'em in Boston"

(CP 146). Willy's

gift to his sons on his return from this same trip is a
punching bag with "Gene Tunney's signature on it."
"[I]t's the finest thing for the timing," he tells his
apprentices

(CP 144). Elsewhere Willy describes business
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as "murderous"

(CP 159). When Biff goes to ask Bill

Oliver for a loan, Willy's advice is "Knock him dead,
boy"

(CP 170).
The violence of Willy's language echoes the

ruthlessness of his model, Ben— the man who attacks
Biff: "Never fight fair with a stranger, boy. You'll
never get out of the jungle that way"

(CP 158). Willy's

desire to emulate Ben's power thus leads him to bring
"the spirit of the jungle" into his home, where it
reveals itself as what Sartre calls "counter
finality."13 His positive intention of providing his
boys with a model for success results in the negative
legitimation of theft and fantasy.14
Miller pEQblematiz.es Willy's pedagogy by suggesting
that even sanctioned expressions of masculinity involve
theft. In the scene which follows Ben's fight with Biff,
for instance, Willy has his sons start to "rebuild the
entire front stoop"

(CP 158) because Willy doesn't want

Ben to think he is just a salesman; he wants to show Ben
that Brooklyn is not Brooklyn ("we hunt too"

[CP 158]);

13 For a detailed account of "counter-finality" see
Sartre 153-96.
14 Willy's positive intention of providing for his
family has also led to the isolation and betrayal of his
wife Linda (much like the career of James Tyrone in Long
Day's Journey into Night leads to the isolation and drug
addiction of Mary Tyrone). For extended discussions of
the representation of women in Salesman see Austin 5966, Stanton 67-102, and Mason 103-15.

he wants to show Ben what kind of "stock” his sons come
from: "Why, Biff can fell any one of these trees in no
time!"

(CP 158). Instead of providing the materials to

rebuild the front stoop, however, Willy directs his sons
to "Go right over where they're building the apartment
house and get some sand" (CP 158). Charley warns Willy
that "if they steal any more from that building the
watchman'll put the cops on them"

(CP 158). Willy

responds, addressing Ben, "You shoulda seen the lumber
they brought home last week. At least a dozen six-bytens worth all kinds of money"
course,

(CP 158). This, of

is a parody of Ben's logging operations in

Alaska, but it also suggests that the individualism that
the success ideology sanctions legitimates theft, just
as that ideology legitimates the expropriation of
foreign land and mineral resources. This is made even
clearer in the following lines, when Willy excuses his
sons' behavior because, as he says, "I got a couple of
fearless characters there"

(CP 158). Charley counters:

"Willy, the jails are full of fearless characters"

(CP

158), and Ben says, "And the stock exchange, friend!"
(CP 158). Again, these lines suggest that for Miller
even legitimized expressions of masculine behavior,
practices and beliefs, which the American publicity
apparatus valorizes,

involve theft.

A further example of Miller transforming the success
ideology into theft is found in the scene where Biff
"borrows" a football from his high school locker room so
that he can practice with a "regulation ball"

(CP 144).

Willy, predictably, laughs with Biff "at the theft," and
rewards the action by saying, "Coach'll probably
congratulate you on your initiative!"

(CP 144).

Initiative, even in Franklin's day, is one of the key
elements of masculine autonomy, and here Miller insists
that initiative is a form of theft. Later in the same
scene, Biff tells his father, "This Saturday, Pop, this
Saturday— just for you, I'm going to break through for a
touchdown"

(CP 145). Happy then reminds Biff that he is

"supposed to pass"

(CP 145). Biff ignores Happy's

warning and says, "I'm taking one play for Pop (CP 145;
italics mine). This taking is a pattern that will
eventually take over Biff's life, for as Biff tells
Willy at the end of the play,

"I stole a suit in Kansas

City and I was in jail....I stole myself out of every
good job since high school!"
for Miller, however,

(CP 216). More important

is that this one moment of taking

represents a typical moment in the dominant version of
American masculinity. Biff's theft of the play is
another instance of his initiative, another example
drawn from the headlines which celebrate individual
achievement. For a moment in Willy's mind Biff is like
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Red Grange or Gene Tunney. As he tells Charley,

"When

this game is over...you'11 be laughing out the other
side of your face. They'll be calling him another Red
Grange. Twenty-five thousand a year"

(CP 186). What is

lost in Biff's taking, however, is the team. Biff's
initiative and his desire to place himself above the
goal of the team has, for a moment at least, jeopardizes
the collective goal of the team— to win the City
Championship.
Miller addresses the counter-finality of fantasy in
the "climax" of the play, which is organized around
Biff's trip to Bill Oliver's office where he plans to
ask Oliver to "stake" him in a new business venture,
"The Loman Brothers," a line of sporting goods.15 This
fiction has been created as a way to deflect Willy's
fury at learning that Biff plans to "[s]crew the
business world!" and return to the West, because in the
West he can do as he pleases. That is, he can swim in
the middle of the day, and working as a carpenter, he
can whistle on the job; he also tells Happy that "we
don't belong in this nuthouse of a city! We belong
mixing cement on some open plain"

(CP 166). At the same

time, Biff expresses his hatred of the business world

15 HThe Loman Brothers" is an ironic echo of the
phrase "The Carnegie Brothers," which Andrew Carnegie
uses in his autobiography to describe his family's
industrial empire.

because "They've laughed at Dad for years"

(CP 166).

Willy responds in a characteristic manner:

"Go to

Filene's, go to the Hub, go to Slattery's, Boston. Call
out the name Willy Loman and see what happens!"

(CP

166). At this point, to quell Willy's anger, optimistic
Happy starts the familiar story— "He's going to see Bill
Oliver, Pop"

(CP 167)— that quickly developes into a

success fantasy before the fact: Happy's "feasible idea"
is to borrow money from Bill Oliver to start a line of
sporting goods (CP 167). Of course, Happy's idea is
neither feasible nor sensible; it is in fact absurd that
Biff believes he can borrow ten thousand dollars from a
man he has not seen in fifteen years and from whom he
stole merchandise.
At the end of the second act, however, Happy's "pipe
dream" comes apart as Biff begins to insist on the
"truth"; Biff tells Willy that he "was never a salesman
for Bill Oliver," that he was a shipping clerk. Willy
insists that Biff was a salesman for Oliver, and when
Biff tries to correct Willy by asking him to "hold on to
the facts," Willy says he's not "interested" in the
facts (CP 198-99). What he is interested in is another
"story," and Willy and Happy begin to work to reimpose
the success fantasy they have constructed at the end of
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the first act, but the fantasy is interrupted by Biff's
announcing that he has stolen Bill Oliver's fountain
pen.
The final confrontation occurs two scenes later when
Biff tells Willy "you're going to hear the truth— what
you are and what I am" (CP 216). Biff rejects Willy's
"phony dream" because
I ran down eleven flights [of stairs] with a pen in
my hand today. And suddenly I stopped....I saw the
things that I love in this world. The work and the
food and time to sit and smoke. And I looked at the
pen and said to myself, what the hell am I grabbing
this for? Why am I trying to become what I don't
want to be? What am I doing in an office, making a
contemptuous, begging fool of myself, when all I
want is out there, waiting for me the minute I say I
know who I am!. (CP 217)
This is an assertion of Biff's desire against Willy's
desire and the fantasy that Willy's desire constructs.
Because Biff recognizes that his father's dream is
"false," that his father has been positioned by the law
of success to believe in the autonomous male, he is in a
position to resist (at least partially) the ideology.
Biff does not believe in the version of universal
citizenship that Willy believes in. Biff recognizes that
he is "a dime a dozen"

(CP 217), that he will never be

B. F. Goodrich or Thomas Edison or Red Grange or J. P.
Morgan or Gene Tunney. He attempts to resist the
ideology of the success narrative because he doesn't
want to be other; he doesn't want to be number one: "I
am not a leader of men, Willy, and neither are
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you....I'm a dollar an hour, Willy....A buck an hour"
(CP 217). Willy, a believer to the bitter end, insists
that he is exceptional:
Biff Loman"

"I am Willy Loman, and you are

(CP 217).

At this point there is a complete repudiation of the
success fantasy: Biff screams, "Pop, I'm nothing! I'm
nothing, Pop"

(CP 217), and he begins to hug his father

and cry. Commenting on this scene, Miller writes that
Biff embodies "an opposing system which...is in a race
for Willy's faith, and it is the system of love which is
the opposite of the law of success"

(CP 36). However,

Miller claims that "by the time Willy can perceive
[Biff's] love, it can serve only as an ironic comment
upon the Life he sacrificed for power and for success
and its tokens"

(CP 36). Biff rejects the law that makes

men compete with each other and steal from each other in
order for them to be successful. Instead, through his
characterization of Bernard, Charley, and,

(at the end

of the play) Biff, Miller seems to offer the possibility
of a system where men love each other and try to help
one another, rather than exploit one another. His
solution to the problem of "individualism" is moral
rather than revolutionary, for as he points out, the
"most decent man" in the play "is a capitalist (Charley)
whose aims are not different from Willy Loman's"

(CP

37). The "difference" between Willy and Charley "is that

Charley is not a fanatic":

"he has learned how to live

without that frenzy, that ecstasy of spirit which Willy
chases to the end"

(CP 37). Likewise,

"Bernard...works

hard, attends to his studies, and attains a worthwhile
objective"

(CP 37). Miller

also notes that these

"people" all come from the

same social

yet Charley and Bernard do

not succumb to the "frenzy"

because,

they manage

in Miller's view,

class (CP 37),

to resist the law

of success and can act like decent men. What makes their
resistence possible? Miller offers no specific answer.
The play suggests that some men are able to do this
while others are not; it offers hope, but no specific
program:

"What theory lies behind this double view? None

whatever. It is simply that I knew and know that I feel
better when my work is reflecting a balance of the truth
as it exists"

(CP 37).

Nevertheless, because the play is organized around
the consciousness of Willy Loman, the play does not
reflect the balance that Miller seems to have intended.
Because Willy is such a "strong" presence, he pushes
Bernard and Charley to the margins of the play. Willy's
is the dominant voice, and it is through this voice that
Miller maps the discourse of national identity as it
interpellates the "low man." Through this process,
Miller attempts to construct a counter discourse by
exposing the contradictions within the dominant

understanding of the social world. The power of the
dominant discourse lies in the ability of its codes and
protocols to regulate understanding of the social world;
they allow individuals to interpret their experience
only in previously elaborated paradigms. In Salesman.
Miller shows how these codes and protocols are
reproduced through memory as they are recirculated and
repeated in the texts and representations of the
publicity apparatus. The epilogue of the play also
suggests that we are free of these representations only
in death. When Linda says "We're free....We're free"

(CP

222), Miller is not just ironically commenting on the
paid-up mortgage; he is also suggesting that Willy is
free from the law of success only in death.
D. L. Hoeveler suggests that Linda's lines are
ironic for another reason. Reading the drama as a
"psychomachia," Hoeveler stresses that the Requiem
functions as a final comment on "Willy's dream": "All
the characters who had previously functioned as parts of
Willy's dream or nightmare are now supposedly free of
him....But each of the characters continues to embody
the values that Willy demanded of them"

(80). These

"parts," however, to revise Hoeveler, not only embody
the values that Willy demands of them, but also they
embody the values of the dominant mode of production and
the cultural apparatus which reproduces that mode by
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reproducing its values. Willy is a part of the body of
capital, just as are Happy, Biff, Charley, Bernard,
Howard Wagner, and Linda; and as Mark Poster writes, the
capitalist mode of production forces human beings not
only to become "things...in appearance," but also "They
undergo...a profound interior alteration"

(53). They

become desiring machines, or as Sartre stresses in
Critique of Dialectical Reason, they become other to
themselves. They embody the values of the Other (the
publicity apparatus) that programs them to see others as
rivals. The irony of this operation, as Sartre points
out, is that in attempting to be different (in
attempting to be number-one, to earn the most money, to
conquer the world) everyone's desire is the same. Desire
therefore organizes individuals so that it can isolate
them. Sartre calls this formation serial, or unified,
alterity.16
By highlighting the consequences of Willy's
interpellation, Sartre's concept of serial alterity
offers us an alternate way of reading the play. That is,
Willy is the only man in the play isolated by the
pursuit of happiness. Most critics imagine that he is
because Willy's voice marginalizes the other characters,
and because Miller's commentary on Willy results in a
kind of damage control whereby the success of the play
16 See Sartre 256-310.

is dependent on Willy functioning as an aberration (a
"failed social adjustment," as Thomas Greenfield
suggests). Miller's argument that the social positions
of Willy (the salesman) and Charley (the business owner)
reflect a balance is also misleading since it suggests
that mobility itself is a balanced operation. Charley's
rise seems to be magical since, as Charley says, "my
salvation is that I never took an interest in anything"
(CP 191). Miller, to his credit, does problematize the
mobility myth in other parts of the play. Ben's success
is dependent on "a faulty view of geography": I
discovered after a few days that I was heading due
south, so instead of Alaska, I ended up in Africa"

(CP

156); and Happy, no matter how hard he works, won't
progress up the corporate ladder until the merchandise
manager dies (CP 139). The most potent symbol of Willy's
desire, Dave Singleman, whose name, as Ruby Cohn notes,
embodies the irony of male desire in American, also
problematizes the mobility myth (43). These instances of
problematization, however, suggest that the myth is
merely arbitrary in distributing it goods (somewhat like
a lottery)

instead of an ideological formation which

disguises a structural limitation at the very center of
capital. The secret of the myth (the national subject,
the masculine unconscious)

is that admission to the

higher echelons of capital is limited. The publicity
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apparatus therefore organizes the cultural field around
a false promise that sets men against other men.
Willy, again, is not the only one implicated. All
the men in the play compete with each other, either
directly or indirectly. The most obvious examples (other
than Willy) are Happy and Biff and Ben. Happy's desire
turns him into an inveterate liar and, in a scene that
recalls Peter's betrayal of Jesus, leads him to deny his
father:

"No, that's not my father. He's just a guy"

(CP

205). Biff's desire turns him into a criminal. Ben
scoffs at Willy for being a salesman:

"What are you

building? Lay your hands on it. Where is it? (CP 184).
Even Howard Wagner, Bernard, and Charley are implicated
in. the frenzy, although to a somewhat lesser extent.
Howard Wagner's fear of other businessman leads him to
fire Willy because he is inefficient.

"Successful"

Bernard, who embodies Franklin's dictum "Well done is
better than well said," does not have a loving
relationship with his father because he is too busy
competing with other lawyers (CP 191).
Charley's "compassionate treatment" of Willy,
however, seems to contradict the dominant male behavior
of the play; but, as Bigsby points out, "the system of
which he [Charley] is the most admirable representative
can clearly accomodate itself to individual acts of
charity provided that these don't threaten its
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structure. The fact is that Charley underwrites the
system that destroys Willy"

(2: 180). Charley's desire

is more manageable than Willy's only because he is in a
superior position to Willy; he's got the goods; he is
the other to Willy, which separates him from Willy.17
Willy, however, wanting what the other has, denies
Charley's charity because taking charity is a sign of
weakness or failure. Willy wants to be self-made— and
this desire not only isolates him from Charley but also
separates him from his sons and his wife.
Ultimately, all the men in the play labor in
alterity programed by the other (or others) as parts of
the machine of capital. Their desire and their
isolations are expressions of the larger machine. Their
"prefabricated being"

(being as other-than-itself) is

fixated on consumption by the publicity apparatus of
capital (Sartre 227). Even when they question the
program, as Biff does when he says "I don't know...what

17 Charley's desire to help Willy is also an effect
of the apparatus, which does nothing to disrupt the
demands of the system (i.e. Willy still gets fired
because the company considers him inefficient).
Likewise, Willy's refusal of Charley's job offer is
based on Willy's desire to emulate the protocols of the
apparatus: Willy wants to be successful; he wants to
continue to play the role of the provider, and Charley's
loans enable him to do this since loans can be repaid;
but his acceptance of a job from a friend is charity and
therefore signifies failure, according to the models he
emulates.
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I'm supposed to want," they know what the machine wants
them to desire:
...I spent six or seven years after high school
trying to work myself up. Shipping clerk, salesman,
business of one kind or another. And it's a measly
manner of existence. To get on that subway on the
hot mornings in the
summer.To devote your whole
life to keeping stock, or making phone calls, or
selling or buying. To suffer fifty-two for the sake
of a two-week vacation...And always to have to get
ahead of the next fella. And still— that's how you
build a future. (CP 138)
Biff's "moment of epiphany" is not disruptive or
transcendent because Miller can imagine no mechanism
whereby Biff's insight is translated into social action
(Bigsby 2: 185). In fact, as Bigsby suggests, Biff's
return to the West, like Crevecoeur's farmer's return to
the wilderness, or Huck Finn's "lighting out for the
territory," is an empty, ahistorical gesture, a flight
from reality:

"in The Misfits....Biff Loman has become

Gay [Langland], an aging cowboy as bewildered by the
collapse of the world as Willy Loman has been. And so
Biff, who at the end of Death of a Salesman has
supposedly learned the lesson which Willy could not,
seems to be committed to the same mistake of seeking in
movement and space what he could perhaps have sought in
relationship"

(2: 185).

The system of value that the play represents, as I
have argued, permits no true relationship between men;
it permits only isolation through competition. The
dissatisfaction of the desiring machine can therefore
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only express itself through nostalgia, an eternal return
to previous models and their (pre)determining goals. The
consequence of this interpellation is that solidarity is
nullified by the desire of the other, thereby ensuring
that men will continue to be exploited by their desire.
It is fitting then that in death Willy returns to
the earth that sustains his dream in life. The garden
scenes that frame Willy's life in the play represent
Jefferson's agrarian vision, or what Thomas Porter calls
"a pre-Alger agrarian way of life” (42), which no longer
exists— except in memory kept alive by popular
representations of masculinity. The autonomy, wealth,
and power that Willy longs for are as sterile as his
garden. Surrounded and closed off by the post-war
suburban expansion, nothing will grow. His attempts to
control and to understand this transformation— by
retreating into representations of the past— have failed
to free Willy, have failed to earn Willy the title of
"single man,"— so he kills himself. The desire of the
success machine cannot be deceived. As Deleuze and
Guattari point out,

"Desire can never be deceived.... It

happens that one desires against one's interests:
capitalism profits from this"
"attention must b e . ..paid"

(257). In the end, then,

(CP 162) to Willy Loman not

because he is exceptional (by being an aberration) but
because his repression in paradigmatic. Not because, as

Michael Spindler writes,

"Willy has seized upon the

notion of commercial success as a substitute for genuine
identity"

(206). Willy, again, seizes nothing; his gods

are given to him. Attention must be given to such a man
by readers of Salesman who would fetishize masculine
autonomy, since Miller powerfully suggests that
masculine desire is an instrument used by the American
culture industry to organize and regulate social
relations and the economy.
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